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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

December 8, 2011

Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don’t have to, #10

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman
(For more information on this feature, see here.)
And this week’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

Exploring the Maze: Counter-proliferation Intelligence
Crawford, M., 2011. Exploring the Maze: Counter-proliferation Intelligence, Survival. 53:2, 2011, Spring 2011. pp.131-158.  

“Since 9/11 there has been minimal political and public tolerance in the United States and some other Western countries for failures of pre-emptive intelligence affecting homeland security. This has created a strong political intelligence-community bias in favour of worst-case scenarios.”(p 138)

Michael Crawford examines the problems that surround gathering intelligence for tracking foreign weapon of mass destruction programs.  A major difficulty stems from the wide range of backgrounds that are required to fully analyze WMD programs.  WMD programs are often times the most closely guarded of state secrets.  It becomes very difficult to for intelligence agencies to gain access to these programs.  Crawford highlights the role that the intelligence failures of the past such as the failure to prevent 9/11 have had on intelligence agencies.  As a result of these failures, many intelligence analysts have created a culture of immediately moving towards the worst case scenario estimates.  These scenarios, when coupled with WMD programs can often yield overhyped results.  Crawford concludes that intelligence agencies should learn from past successes and failures to improve the capability of developing proliferation intelligence.

Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb – Nuclear Alarmism Justified?
Brands, H. & Palkki, D., 2011. Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb – Nuclear Alarmism Justified? International Security. 36:1, Summer 2011. pp. 133-166.

“In short, Saddam expected that an unconventional arsenal would permit Iraq to achieve a conventional victory, thereby weakening Israel geopolitically and making him a hero to the Arab world.”(p 135)

By using previously classified information made accessible by the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Brands and Palkki explore Baathist Iraq’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Through these documents they show that Hussein’s threats against Israel were not merely rhetorical. Instead they assert that he was convinced that Israel had to be dealt with militarily. The authors furthermore argue that Hussein not only wanted nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Israel. Instead, Hussein believed that the threat of a nuclear war between Iraq and Israel could force Israel into a conventional war. He was convinced that Iraq’s conventional military was superior and he thus hoped that his country could win back territory lost to Israel. Brands and Hagan’s argument goes against mainstream beliefs that states acquire nuclear weapons as a defensive deterrent. They conclude by stating that in the case off Iraq it was a good thing that the international community was concerned about the country’s interest in nuclear weapons.

Managing the Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism
Pandza, J. 2011. Managing the Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism. Survival. 53:5, Autumn 2011. pp. 129-142.

“The consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack would be horrific, and even a limited radiological incident could cause substantial disruption. Measures to prevent such an event should continue to receive the highest priority; but if prevention fails, decreasing a state’s vulnerability to the impact of an attack would make the public more secure.”(p 138)

Pandza argues that the international effort to counter nuclear terrorism has only focused on prevention. He urges policy makers to also turn their focus to being prepared to deal with the consequences of a potential nuclear terrorist attack. He acknowledges that prevention is very important and that it should remain important. Yet he highlights that we can never guarantee that an attack will not happen, and thus we should prepare to limit the consequences if it does. The author argues that the threat of a radiological incident is especially great. However, the damage could be substantially minimised by investing in precautionary measures such as swift responses, public communication and efficient decontamination. Moreover, if the damage can be limited then the incentive for an attack might be reduced. Pandza concludes by arguing that this issue should be given formal attention as an item on the agenda for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 7, 2011

Quote of the Day: AEI edition

Let’s turn to “New Start” and global zero. Without regard to China’s modernizing strategic arsenal, Obama signed an agreement with Russia to reduce the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675. American Enterprise …

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 2, 2011

Defense Authorization Bill Passes Senate, Conference Looms

Yesterday, the Senate voted 93-7 to approve the defense bill. Senate and House conferees will meet this month in conference to reconcile differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill.  

The bill contains $527 billion for the basic Pentagon budget, $117 billion to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and $18 billion for Department of Energy, for a total of about $662 billion. The total authorization is $27 billion less than the President’s request and $43 billion less than enacted in Fiscal Year 2011.

Prior to passage yesterday, the Senate adopted by unanimous consent a package of 11 “non-controversial” amendments.  It also adopted other amendments by voice vote.  The Senate rejected two amendments offered by Sen. Feinstein (D-CA) to alter the controversial provisions on detainees in the bill, but later approved a compromise amendment offered by Sen. Feinstein by vote of 99-1 that would leave it to the Supreme Court to make the final decision on the constitutionality of holding American citizens in military custody. It is unclear if this compromise language will be enough to prevent the White House from vetoing the final version of the bill, as it threatened to do if the bill’s original provision on detainees was not removed.  

The Senate also unanimously approved an amendment offered by Sens. Kirk (R-IL) and Menendez (D-NJ) that would call for sanctions on the Iran Central Bank.  Dozens of other amendments were either not voted on or withdrawn.  Prior to passage of the bill, Sen. Levin (D-MI) indicated that he plans to offer as separate legislation a package of 71 pending amendments to the bill that were objected to by Sen. Cornyn (R-TX).

In all, there were 382 amendments filed to the bill, but many were minor, many were non-germane and many faded away.

On the nuclear side, most of the amendments on the triad and the nuclear weapons complex we’ve been highlighting were not adopted and melted away.  The Senate adopted three Republican amendments on nuclear weapons and missile defense calling for reports. The amendments don’t do anything other than require reports.

As the two sides prepare for conference, they will have to reconcile many differences on nuclear weapons and missile defense.  Recall that the House version of the bill contains many egregious amendments on nuclear policy.  The Senate version is devoid of such provisions.

What’s next up on the Senate floor? Congressional Quarterly reported last night that as the House and Senate work to address the impending expiration of the current CR in mid-December, the Senate could turn back to the Energy and Water bill next week.  I’ve also been told that the House and Senate have already begun to conference this bill.  Stay tuned.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 1, 2011

Dec. 1 Update: Key Amendments in the Senate to the Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Authorization Bill

Yesterday, the Senate voted 88-12 to invoke cloture on the defense bill. That means that many of the 380 amendments submitted will disappear.  By unanimous consent, the Senate adopted a package of about 40 “non-controversial” amendments.

One of these amendments was a Sessions (R-AL) modified amendment No. 1183 to require a report from the Administration if it proposes a change to nuclear force structure. By contrast, the earlier version of the amendment would have called on the U.S. to maintain the triad no matter what.  

The Senate also adopted other amendments by voice vote, including a Merkley (D-OR) amendment calling for an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

Today the Senate is expected to continue debate and vote on two amendments offered by Sen. Feinstein dealing with controversial detainee provisions.  It is also scheduled to take up an amendment offered by Sens. Kirk (R-IL) and Menendez (D-NJ) that would call for sanctions on the Iran Central Bank. The Senate could vote on final passage of the bill as early as tonight.  Below is an updated list of key nuclear weapons related amendments that have either been submitted or are still pending.

Iran sanctions: Kirk (R-IL), Manchin (D-WV), Blunt (R-MO), Tester (D-MT) and others amendment No. 1084 to require the President to impose sanctions  on foreign institutions that conduct transactions with Iran’s central bank. Menendez (D-NJ) amendment No. 1292 is similar. Both these amendments have been withdrawn and there is a new amendment No. 1414 from both Senators.

Nuclear weapons triad: Hoeven (R-ND) , Tester (D-MT), Blunt (R-MO, Enzi (R-WY) and Vitter (R-LA) amendment No. 1279 supporting the triad and endorsing all three legs of the triad.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Barrasso (R-WY), Enzi (R-WY), Conrad (D-ND), Baucus (D-MT) and Tester (D-MT) amendment No. 1307 requiring the U.S. to maintain all 450 ICBM’s in the force with the New START limit of 800 strategic launchers, including 420 on alert or operationally  deployed status, with any reductions to be taken equally from the three ICBM bases.

Sharing missile defense information with Russia:  Kirk (R-IL), Kyl (R-AZ), DeMint (R-SC) and Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1310 barring sharing classified missile defense technology with Russia.

Nuclear weapons complex funding: Corker (R-TN) amendment No. 1380 permitting the Defense Department to transfer funds to the Department of Energy for nuclear weapons activities up to the level authorized if the appropriations level is less than the authorized level. Sen. Kyl (R-AZ) has a similar amendment No. 1386 permitting the Secretary of State to transfer funding to the Department of Energy. Corker and Kyl combined to introduce amendment No. 1401 to permit the Secretary of Defense to transfer the funds. Kyl amendment No. 1453 also permits the Defense Department to transfer funds to the Department of Energy for nuclear weapons activities.

Support of nuclear weapons triad: Kyl (R-AZ)-Lugar (R-IN) sense of Congress amendment No. 1444 endorsing maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons triad of delivery systems,  maintaining robust nuclear weapons laboratories and providing full funding for these programs.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 1, 2011

CNN Interview on China’s Nukes

I was asked to comment yesterday on the recent Washington Post story detailing a study by a group of Georgetown University students that uses some questionable sources (including Wikipedia and the Chinese version of “24”) to conclude that China’s nucle…

Posted in: Asia, China, Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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