As the GOP candidates for President prepare to hold their second debate on foreign policy in Washington D.C. tonight, the American Values Network and the American Security Project are airing an ad on CNN aimed at raising awareness about the hundreds of billions of dollars that the U.S. plans to spend on nuclear weapons in the coming decades.

Some of this spending is necessary, but a significant portion is designed to confront Cold War-era threats that no longer exist at price tag that is unaffordable.  High-ranking military leaders have repeatedly expressed concerns about the cost of current plans, and are looking for ways to find budget savings.  As the ad notes, we ought to be particularly mindful of the damage that current nuclear spending plans could do to more vital defense priorities.  

Our national security will be better served by investing in capabilities that are more relevant to the current threat environment – while still allowing the US to maintain a survivable and credible deterrent.

For more information about the ad, see here.

A joint report on Pakistan by the Atlantic Magazine and the National Journal highlights some important issues in U.S.-Pakistani relations with regards to nuclear weapons. It also offers insight into the geopolitical situation that plagues the region as a whole, such as the conflict in Afghanistan, the rivalry between India and Pakistan, and Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions. The main aim of the U.S. should be to ensure the security of nuclear weapons and vulnerable nuclear weapons material in the region even though this entails looking at a broader range of issues than the threat posed by terrorism.

In the report, Graham Allison, an expert on nuclear weapons from the Belfer Center at Harvard, argues that there are three big threats with regards to Pakistan and nuclear weapons:

  1. A terrorist theft of nuclear weapons (a nuclear 9/11 or Mumbai).

2. The transfer of nuclear weapons to a state like Iran.
3. The takeover of a nuclear weapon by a military group during a period of state instability.

The American ambition in Pakistan clearly focuses on the elimination of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Yet it appears as though many in Pakistan fear the U.S. more than al-Qaeda. They seem willing to take inadequate security measures (thereby making their nukes more available to terrorists) in order to more easily hide them from the U.S. Pakistanis furthermore seem to resent what they view as a patronizing U.S. attitude toward Islamabad. This was evident when Secretary Clinton visited the country in October 2011 and was told that the U.S. is like a hard-to-please mother in law.

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is a complex one, riddled with paradoxes, mistrust and suspicion. On the one hand, Pakistan relies on the U.S. for aid. On the other hand, many Pakistanis in high places consider America to be their enemy, especially in light of strong U.S. support for India’s regional ambitions. Similarly, the U.S. needs Pakistan to help in Afghanistan as well as for sharing information on al-Qaeda, yet we know that Pakistan only selectively shares information and that they support certain terrorist organisations.

Where do we go from here?

Perhaps most importantly, a regional focus needs to be applied. The problem of securing vulnerable nuclear materials in Pakistan cannot and should not be viewed in isolation from other security issues in the region, particularly Pakistan’s strategic competition with India. We need to be mindful of the roots of Pakistani insecurity and the underlying problem of Pakistan’s inferiority complex with regards to New Delhi.

As Henry Kissinger phrased it at a Wilson Center event on November 1:

“The problem of Pakistan seems to me a much more long term issue, namely how they can find a national identity not based primarily on fear of India.”

This observation ties into the fear of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. One of the terrorist organisations supported by officials in Pakistan is Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

In a similar vein to what the report in the Atlantic Magazine argued, a functioning U.S. relationship with Pakistan remains vital, though we should not pretend that the two sides share similar goals.

As Georgetown Professor C. Christine Far recently told Congress, “Washington has no choice but to acknowledge that U.S. and Pakistan interests and allies are fundamentally incompatible while also understanding the essential need to stay engaged in spite of this fact.”

We should not be blinded by the elimination of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as our only goal. Instead, making sure that vulnerable nuclear material in Pakistan remains safe should also be an urgent priority.

Before the Senate retired for Thanksgiving, Senators submitted over 275 amendments to the defense bill, only a very few of which have been considered. When the Senate returns on November 28, it will resume consideration of the bill.  Below is a list of the key amendments related to nuclear weapons policy, as prepared by Center Executive Director John Isaacs:

Iran sanctions: Kirk (R-IL), Manchin (D-WV), Blunt (R-MO), Tester (D-MT) and others amendment No. 1084 to require the President to impose sanctions  on foreign institutions that conduct transactions with Iran’s central bank. Menendez (D-NJ) amendment No. 1292 is similar.

Nuclear weapons triad: Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1183 to require the maintenance of all three legs of the nuclear weapons triad, those on land, at sea and in the air. Hoeven (R-ND) , Tester (D-MT), Blunt (R-MO, Enzi (R-WY) and Vitter (R-LA) have a similar amendment No. 1279 supporting the triad and endorsing all three legs of the triad.

Missile defense on the East Coast: Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1185 to require a report on stationing missile defense on the East Coast.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Barrasso (R-WY), Enzi (R-WY), Conrad (D-ND), Baucus (D-MT) and Tester (D-MT) amendment No. 1307 requiring the U.S. to maintain all 450 ICBM’s in the force with the New START limit of 800 strategic launchers, including 420 on alert or operationally  deployed status, with any reductions to be taken equally from the three ICBM bases.

Sharing missile defense information with Russia:  Kirk (R-IL), Kyl (R-AZ), DeMint (R-SC) and Sessions (R-AL) amendment No. 1310 barring sharing classified missile defense technology with Russia.

After a lot of moving and shaking over the past 48 hours, today the Senate will begin consideration of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (now S. 1867).   The Senate was supposed to consider and hopefully complete action on the FY 2012…

I’m a little late to this, but it looks as though Maj. Gen. William Chambers, the Air Force’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, recently had some interesting things to say about the B61 life extension program.  Here’s a summary, courtesy of Air Force Magazine:

No Wavering: The Air Force—and the United States—”remain committed” to providing aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons to support NATO’s nuclear mission, said Maj. Gen. William Chambers, who oversees nuclear issues on the Air Staff. “There is nothing currently being considered to undo or change that commitment,” said Chambers during a Capitol Hill speech on Oct. 28. “We are a nuclear alliance. We believe in the deterrent force. We are going to help provide that.” However, some issues still are uncertain regarding that US force’s future shape, he said. Decisions regarding the integration of a modernized version of the B61 nuclear bomb on the F-35 strike fighter have slipped to the right due to the F-35’s overall schedule delays, said Chambers. “It is probably not” going to be resolved as part of the Pentagon’s Fiscal 2013 to Fiscal 2017 budget program, he said. Further, there has been “no decision made yet” on the specific course of action for extending the B61’s life, he said. Chambers later told reporters that the Air Force’s current nuclear-capable aircraft for NATO—Europe-based F-15Es and F-16s—”remain very viable into the next decade and beyond. In fact, the F-15E will be viable with a nuclear-weapon-carrying capability into the mid 2030s.” [emphasis mine].

Meanwhile, Inside Defense quoted Chambers as stating: “there are a lot of different ways to meet the requirements [for the B61 life extension program]. If there’s money available to do a little more than the basic requirements, then that’s been put on the table as well.”

Contra Air Force Magazine’s headline, there does appear to be some wavering going on…  

Perhaps I’m reading too much into this, but I was taken aback by Chambers’ statement that no decision has been made on the specific course of action for the B61 life extension program, as well as his suggestion that there are a lot of different ways to meet the requirements for the program. Heretofore the Pentagon and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have been clear, definitive, and bullish about their goals and preferred outcome for the B61.

My understanding is that the Phase 6.2/2A study to develop feasible design options for the life extension program was supposed to be completed in September 2011 (i.e. about two months ago), a year later than initially planned.  It’s also my understanding that the Air Force and NNSA, at the direction of the Nuclear Weapons Council, pursued a study that was ambitiously and broadly scoped.  The study was to include an analysis of options to replace non-nuclear components on the verge of obsolescence, consolidate four versions of the weapons into a single version, and incorporate previously untried technologies and design concepts to enhance the safety and security of the weapon. The total cost of the life extension was estimated at $4 billion.

In sum, the goal was to do much more than “the basic requirements”.

However, over the past year numerous doubts have arisen about the scope and schedule of the program.  In May, the Government Accountability Office released a report expressing concern that “the Nuclear Weapons Council’s June 2008 request was considerably broader than prior life extension programs and has complicated the agencies’ effort, given the tight time frames for completing the study.”  The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees echoed similar concerns in September, reducing the FY 2012 budget request of $180 million for the program by $43.6 million. And then of course there is the small matter of the current budget environment, which will require spending reductions at both DoD and NNSA.

At this point the feasibility study should be complete or nearly complete. Given how late in the game it is, it seems suspicious that no option has yet been chosen to extend the life of the B61.  It’s also curious that Chambers appears to be tempering expectations for the program.

Could it be that in the course of the study it became apparent that a full scope life extension program incorporating the most ambitious new approaches and technologies proved to be neither cost-effective nor technically feasible?

Stay tuned.