Over at the mothership we’ve put together some handy resource centers on U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear material security spending. At our nuclear weapons funding resource center you’ll find estimates of how much the U.S. spends on nuclear wea…
Missile Defence – A Game Changer in US-Russian Relations?
On October 12, Michael McFaul, the nominee for US Ambassador to Russia, stated at his confirmation hearing that the negotiations between the U.S. and Russia on missile defence cooperation have stalled. Less than a week later, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, although using a more optimistic tone, conveyed a similar message.
McFaul mentioned in his opening statement at the hearing that tensions between the US and Russia remain on issues such as Georgia, Syria and human rights. When asked about the prospect of an agreement on missile defence cooperation before the NATO Summit in Chicago May 2012, McFaul stated:
“We’ll continue to talk to them about — it’s — after all, a lot of this is about physics. This is not about perceptions. And, you know, we’ll see what we have as we prepare for the summit next May. I’m not optimistic right now, but we’re going to continue to work this issue.”
He went on to say this work could take years instead of months.
This view was echoed by Secretary Tauscher during a conference on missile defence hosted by the Atlantic Council on October 18. Her tone appeared more optimistic, yet she began her address by jokingly saying:
“I did just come back from Moscow. It was partly cloudy and getting colder every day. That’s what you were looking for, right? The weather report? (Laughter.)”
When asked if this was a metaphor she replied affirmatively. She repeatedly referred to missile defence cooperation with Russia as a potential game changer in US-Russian relations that could pave the way for progress on many other issues. She would not speculate in when an agreement could be reached, but affirmed that the window of opportunity will not remain open forever:
“It’s not an infinite opportunity. And I think everybody knows what’s at risk if we don’t do it. We don’t want to return to the 1980s. We want to remove mistrust so that we can remove miscalculation, and we want to move from a world of mutually assured destruction to a world of mutually assured stability, and this could be the way to do it.”
However, McFaul and Tauscher seemed to disagree on the sources of Russia’s concerns about missile defence. Whereas McFaul claimed that it has a lot to do with physics and not perceptions, Tauscher seemed more sensitive to the underlying political issues. When asked about Russia’s objections to U.S. missile defences, she said that some of it is technology and culture, but that we have to remember that missile defence has been a political irritant between the two countries for years.
In general, talking about Russia without talking about perceptions and politics is problematic; it is very rarely just “about physics”.
The Atlantic Council’s conference also highlighted the largely indifferent view of the European countries toward the importance of missile defence. Of course Europe does not speak with a single voice, but the consensus of the Conference’s European panel, which included scholars from Turkey, France, the Czech Republic and the UK, seemed to be that missile defence is not a big issue in Europe in political and economic terms. Although some countries are happy to host US ships and bases, the incentive for larger European financial and military contributions to the system appear to be low. Dr. Michael Rance, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute, explained the UK view:
“In the U.K. missile defence is – to coin an almost appropriate phrase – below the radar both politically and in the public perception. It rarely appears in the media.”
To sum up, the negotiations on a common missile defence with Russia appears to be going badly at the moment, though they’re far from hopeless. As Tauscher noted, the ongoing talks are vitally important, as failure to reach an agreement could stymie U.S.-Russia cooperation on other important security issues, such as further reductions in the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.
White House Support for the Senate-Passed Levels for Nuke Modernization and Nonpro?
*UPDATE (10/26): This post has been revised.
On October 19 the White House sent a memo to Congress outlining its priorities for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 appropriations within the constraints imposed by the deal reached over the summer to raise the federal debt limit (a.k.a. the Budget Control Act). A big hat tip to Josh Rogin and the Stimson Center for posting the letter.
The administration threw its support behind the Senate Appropriations Committee-passed allocation for defense, which freezes the Pentagon base budget (not including funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) at the FY 2011 enacted level. As Stimson’s Matt Leatherman notes, “the BCA’s security cap made it difficult to increase military resources above inflation in FY12, and this newly-announced administration position makes that even less likely.”
The White House also supported the Senate’s allocation for the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations account, which is just over $6 billion below the FY 2012 request but $5 billion above the FY 2012 House enacted level.
Indeed, among the different spending bills that comprise security spending under the Budget Control Act, the House and Senate are farthest apart on the allocations for the Pentagon and the State Department (conversely, they are within $500 million of each other on the other security accounts: Veterans Affairs, Homeland Security, and NNSA). It remains to be seen when the Senate and House will come together to conference the security spending bills, but when they do, to quote Matt again, “for the most part, appropriators have created a direct trade-off in which every new dollar for defense will come from State and Foreign Operations.”
Could State and Foreign Operations also be a bill payer for NNSA weapons activities, which could be bad news given how much has already been cut from the State Department? Supporters of more money for nuclear weapons may be looking at how to use State and Foreign Operations as a potential offset, especially now that we’re hearing that the bill could be considered along with the energy and water bill (which funds NNSA) as part of a “minibus” appropriations bill on the Senate floor next week.
As I noted last week, there is also a risk that more money for weapons could be filched from from the defense nuclear nonproliferation account, an outcome which (like further cuts to the State Department) could severely undermine U.S. national security depending on which programs are cut.
Speaking of weapons and nonproliferation, the White House letter to Congress stated:
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Administration urges the Congress to support robust funding for NNSA to continue the commitment to modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and to upgrading the stockpile set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review and reaffirmed as part of the New START Treaty ratification process. In addition, at a time when a grave danger is posed by the proliferation of nuclear materials which can fall into the hands of terrorist organizations, the Administration urges support for highly enriched uranium reactor conversions.
While this statement is admittedly vague, I think its noteworthy for several reasons.
First, on nonproliferation, the letter appears to support the Senate Appropriations Committee-passed level for vital nuclear terrorism prevention programs (which is more or less identical to the President’s request). That said, the White House could have more vigorously defended these programs (recall that highly enriched uranium reactor conversion was not the only critical program cut by the House).
Second, on weapons activities, I didn’t detect in the letter a strong desire to increase funding for nuclear modernization above the Senate-passed level (which is $440 million below the President’s request).
The administration appears to understand that given the constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act, weapons and nonproliferation are competing for scarce resources within NNSA, meaning an appropriate balance will need to be struck. The Senate Appropriations Committee struck such a balance by making difficult choices on a bipartisan basis that protect the key non-proliferation programs and impose sensible reductions on weapons spending while still providing nearly $300 million above the FY 2011 enacted level – more than enough to maintain safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warheads.
New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms
Note: For our analysis of the first New START data exchange, see here. Category of Data Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers 822 United States of Ameri…
Where we mine academic/industry writing on nukes so you don’t have to, #5
By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman
(For more information on this feature, see here.)
And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…
Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?
Kreps, S. & Fuhrman, M., 2011. Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation? Journal of Strategic Studies. April 2011.
“The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the sceptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed.” (2011, p. 61)
Sarah Kreps and Matthew Fuhrman explore the effectiveness of military action against nuclear facilities. They find that the military option is not always ineffective, but also has significant limitations. Whether an attack is undertaken during peacetime or wartime had a significant effect on the success of the action. Military actions taken during wartime showed less success than those taken during peacetime. A difficult situation occurs because the most effective time to conduct a military strike is when the program is in its earliest stages, the time that such strikes are most incompatible with international law. The authors conclude that a more careful examination of previous military strikes is required, but that in the future the military option should not be completely discounted, nor thought of as a sure fire solution.
The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Sagan, S., 2011. The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. Annual Review of Political Science. March 2011.
“We need more interdisciplinary research on the technical bottlenecks and legal restrictions on the spread of nuclear facilities.” (2011, p. 141).
Scott Sagan conducts a thorough research of recent scholarly work in the field of non-proliferation. His goal is to determine the validity of the work being conducted, and areas that need more study. Sagan highlights both the supply side of proliferation and demand side. The supply side looks at the transition from nuclear power program to a nuclear weapons program. The demand side looks at why states would want to pursue a nuclear weapon. Sagan finds that one of the new areas that is being looked at is the leadership of countries trying to pursue nuclear weapons. Sagan finds that more works needs to be done in examining the connection between regime types and proliferation, the connection between nuclear programs and nuclear weapons proliferation, and how the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty influences nuclear proliferation.
Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains
Ogilvie-White, O. & Santoro, D., 2011. Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains. Survival. 53:3, June-July 2011. pp.101-118.
“The obvious problem is that even when the will to implement disarmament and non-proliferation efforts exists, regional security challenges and priorities sap momentum and prevent progress. Progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world will only be possible if active work to overcome these hurdles is conducted in parallel with the negotiation of fair and equitable bargains between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states, in a mutually reinforcing process.” (pp.113-114)
Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro set out to show how small successfully implemented bargains, rather than big unrealistic goals, can make the path to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation easier. The authors show that the early ambitious rhetoric on nuclear disarmament by the Obama Administration has not been realised, and as such, it has created problems for further progress. They argue that the Administration should instead find and implement smaller achievements which can be used in negotiations on non-proliferation with non-nuclear countries. The problem, as the authors portray it, is that many non-nuclear countries think that the nuclear weapons states are not doing enough. The authors conclude by quoting Kissinger et al. (i.e. the Four Horsemen), and saying that nuclear disarmament does not alone lead to a nuclear weapon free world. Many additional factors, such as regional security challenges, need to be addressed before that goal can be achieved.
