Through the years, I worked with other people, aircraft and weapons, ranging from a hand-picked team of perfectionists developing the B-2 bomber, to an unmotivated group of foreign military transcripts at an undisclosed NATO base, complete with an alco…
Another Success Story in the Fight to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism
On August 17 the National Nuclear Security Administration announced the return of 6.3 kilograms of U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuel from a nuclear research facility in South Africa.
Carried out by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in conjunction with the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, the removal is yet another key step forward in the effort to eliminate dangerous nuclear materials so that they can never be used to make a nuclear weapon. Such efforts are our first line of defense against the threat of nuclear terrorism.
MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow highlighted the successful removal on her show last night (see the video above). She rightly referred to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s employees as “trained badasses.” Her guest, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), referred to them as “a peaceful Seal Team Six.” Right on! (The Arms Control Association also received a nice hit in the piece.)
A crude nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 25 kilograms of HEU. Since April 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration has removed nearly 1000 kilograms of HEU. In total, it has removed over 120 bombs worth of HEU.
However, hundreds of kilograms of HEU still remain in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Vietnam – much of it not adequately secured. And even after the August removal, South Africa still possesses hundreds of additional kilograms of HEU left over from its weapons program.
The removal of HEU from South Africa is but one in a long list of success stories authored by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and as Maddow noted last night, makes the House of Representatives’ recent reckless cuts to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative almost impossible to understand.
The Senate must restore the cuts to the program when it returns in September, lest future such efforts to secure and eliminate HEU are delayed – or worse – not undertaken, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Withdraw from the INF Treaty?
By Lt. Gen. Robert Gard
True to past form, John Bolton and Paula De Sutter authored an op-ed in the 15 August 2011 Wall Street Journal advocating withdrawal by the United States from the landmark INF Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which entered into force on 1 June 1988. A treaty signed by the sainted President Ronald Reagan, no less. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Treaty was extended to include the Soviet successor states.
This Treaty, with a highly intrusive and reliable verification regime, eliminated in slightly less than three years a total of 2,692 ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. These nuclear-armed missiles, deployed in the European theater by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were ready for launch on short notice. This obviously was an inherently unstable situation with the danger of an unauthorized or accidental launch that could escalate into an unintended nuclear war.
Even though they have condemned treaties in general for limiting U.S. flexibility and options, why would Bolton and De Sutter recommend that the U.S. should withdraw from such a mutually advantageous agreement? While it’s difficult to believe, their rationale is that other countries, including China, Iran, and North Korea, are deploying short and intermediate range missiles that could threaten U.S. forces.
In their view, this requires us to deploy ground-based missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty to provide a second strike deterrent capability. It is by no means clear why they believe that a deterrent to the employment of cruise and ballistic missiles against our troops must consist of mirror-image weapons systems when we have more than ample military capability that can serve the same purpose. Unless, of course, because this is simply a convenient if illogical excuse to free the U.S. from constraints on adding to our weapons arsenal by deploying short and medium range missiles.
Bolton and De Sutter implicitly dismiss any significant impact on relations with Russia of U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty by asserting that since Moscow has announced that it is no longer bound by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, it is likely to take the same action with regard to the INF Treaty. So we should pre-empt?
What would Ronald Reagan say?
Enhancing U.S. Security Through Treaties
Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller spoke to the U.S. Strategic Command 2011 Deterrence Symposium on August 4, and her comments regarding progress on the New START treaty were encouraging.
Gottemoeller stated that the Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, has been “very successful,” and she likened its implementation to a “fast moving train.”
To date more then 1,000 notifications have been passed between Washington and Moscow, tracking movements and changes in the status of each country’s strategic offensive arms and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller noted that U.S officials and their Russian counterparts have been “constantly in communication,” strengthening mutual understanding and confidence.
On site inspections began as of the first week of April, and Gottemoeller said they have proceeded at an “intense pace.”
When START I expired in December 2009, Russia was no longer required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States was unable to conduct on-site inspections. As George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, James Baker III, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell wrote in the Washington Post last December: “America’s understanding of Russia’s arsenal (was) degraded, and resources (were) diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps.”
Since April, eight on site inspections have taken place, and the two sides are keeping up with one another. Inspectors are even receiving data about warhead loadings on their counterpart’s missiles, and can confirm these numbers on any randomly selected ballistic missiles – an inspection right achieved only in the new treaty.
Both parties have also displayed their strategic systems to each other, strengthening and validating the verification regime. The U.S. presented its B-1B and B-2A heavy bombers to the Russians and the Russian Federation showed its RS-24 Inter Continental Ballistic Missile and associated road mobile launcher to the U.S. This exchange marked the first time U.S. officials have ever had the opportunity to view this new Russian strategic system.
These successes rebut criticisms that New START was just a long list of U.S. concessions made to the Russians. As Gottemoeller noted, “concerns that were raised during the ratification debate are being assuaged now essentially by the process of implementation.” In the last few months, U.S. officials and military planners have regained crucial insight into Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
New START, Gottemoeller said, has been a “bright spot” in U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ of relations. It is a testament to the growing strength of the partnership that since the passage of New START, two additional arms control agreements have been implemented: the 123 Agreement for nuclear cooperation with Russia entered into force in January 2011 shortly after the ratification of New START, and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, meant to eliminate excess weapons-grade plutonium, was brought into force recently on July 13.
Gottemoeller expressed confidence in chances for further arms control agreements with Russia, as well as multilateral dialogue within the P-5 (United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and further bilateral conversations to lay the groundwork for negotiations with other nuclear powers.
Certainly, positive results from the Treaty’s implementation should encourage Washington and Moscow to pursue formal negotiations on a new treaty to further reduce their nuclear arms, which should contain verifiable limits on all types of nuclear warheads, including tactical warheads.
Emma Lecavalier is a Summer 2011 intern with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Where Opinion Leaders Stand on the Afghanistan Drawdown
Image created by the Afghanistan Study Group.
