Yesterday, I wrote about the four part joint UCS/FAS project analyzing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program for fiscal year 2012. Today’s post is about NNSA’s plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile through Life Extension Programs (LEPs). We find that “NNSA’s enthusiasm for extensively modifying all warheads may be going beyond what Congress and the Obama administration as a whole will support. The foundation for such objections is clearly laid out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which states explicitly that the United States ‘will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis.’ (p. xiv). This seems to contradict NNSA’s pursuit of every available surety feature for every warhead.”

You can read the entire post on the FAS blog or on the UCS blog.

The following letter to the editor by yours truly was published today in response to “The Undimmed Danger of Iran’s Nuclear Program”:

We can agree that a more coherent strategy is needed in the U.S. approach to Iran’s nuclear advances, as was pointed out in the editorial on the Iranian threat. It is important to recognize, however, that time still exists to pursue a negotiated solution.

Although Iran is currently enriching uranium with advanced machines, the work is far behind schedule. Contrary to Iran’s original forecast, it has not yet installed any advanced centrifuges at its intended facility, and a large part of the reason for this delay are the sanctions that The Post’s editorial implied have failed.

While sanctions may buy time, they cannot solve the problem. The United States should continue its efforts to slow Iran’s program and maintain international pressure on Iran, while keeping the possibility open for a negotiated solution that establishes the inspections and transparency necessary to best detect and deter any eventual move to build a weapon.

Laicie Olson, Washington

The writer is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Every year, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) releases its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), which is an outline of its near- and long-term plans for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. Right before I left the Union of Concerned Scientists, I co-wrote an analysis with Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists and Stephen Young, Senior Analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, of NNSA’s SSMP for fiscal year 2012. Over the next week, UCS and FAS will be publishing that analysis in a series of four joint blogs.

Today’s post, titled Nuclear Plan Conflicts with New Budget Realities, includes a detailed analysis of NNSA’s spending strategy over the next decade and beyond. Among the pieces of noteworthy information is that NNSA’s high-end budget estimate for nuclear weapons spending between FY12 and FY24, when it plans to complete construction of two major production facilities, is more than $120 billion.

Our key conclusion, echoed by Kingston in his analysis of the Senate version of the FY 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations bill, is that the recent deal to increase the debt limit means that the funding curve for NNSA’s weapons programs is likely to flatten out as opposed to drive upwards as projected.

You can read the entire post with all of its glorious details on the FAS blog or on the UCS blog.

Just FYI. It is the same piece in both links because this is a joint project between the Federation of American Scientists and the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Last Wednesday the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.  Head over to the mothership for my full analysis of the bill.  Here’s the summary:

Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and the rest of the members of the subcommittee deserve great credit for prioritizing essential nuclear and radiological material security and nonproliferation programs. While the House cut the budget for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the key program in the effort to secure and eliminate dangerous nuclear material worldwide at an accelerated rate, by $85 million below the administration’s FY 2012 request, the Senate fully funded it at the FY 2012 request, an increase of $72 million over the FY 2011 enacted level. The Committee should also be applauded for beginning to reign in excessive spending on nuclear weapons programs, while still providing more than enough funds to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal.

“The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons….Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counter proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.”

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004.