The search for federal budget savings was apparent as the Senate Appropriations Committee released its version of the fiscal year 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill on September 7. While the Committee recommended $7.19 billion for nuclear weapons programs, approximately $250 million more than the fiscal year 2011 enacted level and over $800 million more than the fiscal year 2010 enacted level, it made major strides in addressing some excessive and wasteful nuclear weapons programs.

The Committee took on the Life Extension Program (LEP) for the B-61 bomb, the plan to build the Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at the same time, and Scaled Experiments. The Committee’s strong language on LEPs and construction projects is a welcome surprise. These programs were a central part of the nuclear weapons funding debate that took place in the context of the consideration of the New START treaty for much of the past two years.  

The Committee made it clear that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) cannot complete all of its major life extension and construction projects as planned and sustain its other activities given the current fiscal environment.  Rather than move forward with multiple programs that are unlikely to be completed on time or on budget, the Senate bill provides NNSA with a good opportunity to prioritize the programs that are most essential to its primary mission, which is to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.

B61 Life Extension Program

The Committee recommended $180,000,000 for the B61 life extension program, a reduction of $43,562,000 below the Obama administration’s request. The B61 Life Extension Program is slated to be the most extensive and expensive program to modernize an existing nuclear warhead NNSA has ever undertaken. In its report, the Committee notes that the B61 LEP would replace three times as many major components as the LEP for the W76 warhead and incorporate “untried” technologies. Given the unprecedented scope of the LEP, the Committee also raised concerns about NNSA’s ability to execute such a comprehensive program. These concerns—which included meeting production schedules, manufacturing critical materials and components, and the quality of final products—echoed those raised in a report by the Government Accountability Office earlier this year.

The bill also attempts to address a major flaw in NNSA’s planning for LEPs. As Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out last year, NNSA’s goal for LEPs appears to be to enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons “independent of any threat scenario.” While it is important to ensure that nuclear weapons are safe and secure, there need to be clear baselines to determine how much safety and security is enough, lest there be no limits on what NNSA attempts to pursue. To address this issue, the Committee laid out a number of practical reporting requirements that will hopefully help to ensure that LEPs only add the most essential safety and security features and do not compromise the reliability of the weapon.  These requirements include:

1. A JASON defense advisory group report to determine “whether proposed intrinsic nuclear warhead safety and security features for the B61 bomb will affect the long-term safety, security, reliability, and operation of the weapon, whether these surety features are justified when measured against the plausible range of deployment scenarios and threats likely to confront the future B61 stockpile, and the benefits outweigh the costs of installing such features.”

2. Certification from the NNSA Administrator and nuclear weapons lab directors “that the benefits of installing intrinsic safety and security features outweigh the costs and there are no less costly and effective alternatives to surety that can be accomplished without introducing intrinsic surety features.”

3. A report from NNSA that includes “a description of the safety and security features NNSA would add to a refurbished B61” and “a cost and benefit analysis of installing the proposed features in the warhead.” The cost benefit analysis will include: the costs of science, technology, and engineering to install new safety and security features; the costs of assessing the impact the new features may have on the performance of the nuclear explosive package at the national laboratories; the extent to which the proposed safety and security features address specific safety and security concerns; and why current safety and security features would not be sufficient.”

These new reporting requirements could be the first step toward the development of a less ambitious plan for the B61 LEP. Instead of being able to endlessly “improve” safety and security without any publicly stated rhyme or reason, NNSA will have to explain how the modifications it seeks are actually connected to the current security environment. With current plans for the B61 LEP far exceeding $4 billion, NNSA should be able to develop a less expensive strategy for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the weapon.

W78 Life Extension Program

Notably, the committee recommended a $25 million decrease for the W78 Life Extension Program on the grounds that there have been delays in the Defense Department and NNSA’s effort to determine basic features and concepts for the LEP.

Large Construction Projects

NNSA is currently designing the two largest and most expensive construction projects in its history, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which would manufacture in Tennessee uranium components for nuclear weapons, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR), which would manufacture in New Mexico plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. With little more than 50% of the UPF designed, it is already estimated to cost as much as $7.5 billion. Also still in the design phase, the CMRR is estimated to cost approximately $5.8 billion. As design is completed and construction begins, both of these estimates are likely to increase. The Committee’s report expresses concern about these exploding costs and noted that, because NNSA’s “highest priority” should be LEPs, “fiscal constructs will limit construction funding.”

In an attempt to manage fiscal realities, the Committee report asks NNSA to submit a plan “that would identify the consequences to cost, scope, and schedule of delaying project implementation and the impact of sequencing (emphasis added) construction of these two major facilities on stockpile requirements.” The idea of sequencing construction of the UPF and CMRR has been around for a few years, most notably in the 2009 final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. The commission said that, if funding were not available to build both facilities concurrently, NNSA should build the CMRR first. As the CMRR is built, NNSA could look at ways to minimize the UPF’s size and cost, as well as learn more about reusing uranium components.

These two construction projects should be watched closely because NNSA has not provided a consistent and compelling case for how it intends to use these facilities. When pressed by Chairwoman Senator Dianne Feinstein at a Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committee hearing earlier this year, NNSA Administrator Tom D’agostino was unable to say how many plutonium pits the CMRR would produce, what kinds of pits would be produced, and for what purpose. This was not a lapse of memory by Administrator D’agostino. NNSA plans to build this facility before it decides how it will be used. Despite its argument that the facilities are needed to maintain the stockpile, neither the UPF nor the CMRR will be operational in time to support any  of the currently planned LEPs. By the time they are scheduled to be completed in 2024, all nuclear weapons in the arsenal except for the W80 cruise missile and W87 warhead will have already been refurbished or in the middle of a refurbishment.

Scaled Experiments

For some time, certain factions within NNSA have been interested in conducting scaled experiments at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site. Scaled experiments are subcritical tests using plutonium pits specifically designed not to produce a nuclear yield when detonated. Although only a small amount was requested for fiscal year 2012 to study these experiments, the committee made an important decision. NNSA cannot spend any money to design, prepare, or execute scaled experiments. The committee report also raises questions about the need or wisdom of pursuing scaled experiments further, stating that they “may not be needed for annual assessments of the current stockpile” and “may interfere with achieving the Nuclear Posture Review’s goals and schedule.” This is significant because, according to the committee report, NNSA currently lacks the diagnostic capabilities needed to collect the necessary data from these experiments. NNSA would need hundreds of millions of additional dollars beyond what is currently budgeted in order to install the necessary radiographic equipment and facilities.

I co-authored an op-ed with Igor Khripunov for The Bulletin today.

You can read the full piece on The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists website.

Key points are:

As the IAEA has suggested, the lessons of Fukushima that need particular study are “those pertaining to multiple severe hazards” that might afflict a nuclear power plant. Such complex hazards can emerge from natural disaster, sabotage by terrorists or other malcontents, or be a combination of natural events and intentional acts. Nuclear safety and security staffs — whose cultures are quite different — should be trained to interact with one another as they respond to all three types of severe hazards.

You can also view it on the Center’s website here.

We cut a section due to word count, but we raised a point that pushed the envelop a bit. Click “Read more” if you’re curious:

Grey Zone. Asking whether governments, groups of people, or individuals may replicate natechs for hostile purposes may seem like a question for science fiction. During the Cold War, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union experimented with high-altitude tests that generated electromagnetic pulses (EMP) far more severe than solar activity. Countries and groups possessing nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices could deploy EMP blasts against electric grids, communication satellites, and other vital infrastructure. U.S. secretary of defense William Cohen warned at an April 1997 conference sponsored by the University of Georgia, “Others are engaging even in an eco-type of terrorism whereby they can alter climates and set off earthquakes and volcanoes through the use of electromagnetic waves.”

North Korea, for instance, may entertain EMP ambitions. Some U.S. experts reportedly believe that Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in 2009 included a “super-EMP” weapon capable of disabling the power grid across most American states. In a recent Asia Times article, a scholar believed to be associated with the Kim Jong-Il regime speculated that the North’s retaliation against U.S. aggression would involve high-altitude nuclear explosions that cause major explosions at U.S. nuclear power plants.

The U.S. NRC takes such threats seriously. It admits that portions of nuclear power plants’ electrical instrumentation and control systems could be disabled through enormous induced voltages and currents, depriving nuclear cores of coolant and leading to meltdowns. NRC officials believe, however, that such a failure would likely have only momentary impact. The failed equipment would be swiftly restored to service. The NRC’s position is consistent with early 1980s Sandia Laboratory analysis of worst-case scenarios. Having conducted simulations, Sandia scientists concluded that EMP poses no substantial threat to nuclear power plants. Such optimism is not universal, however.

Such ambiguities make fertile ground for conspiracy theories and fantasies. There are persistent claims that a device or system could be developed or has already been developed which would enable a nation to create earthquakes, volcano eruptions, or other cataclysms by interfering with the earth’s geological processes. Science can work miracles, but experimentation in this field is banned by the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifications Techniques. Under Article 1, state parties agree not to engage in such techniques which have “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other state party.”

Center Chairman Lt. Gen. Robert Gard has an op-ed in the Baltimore Sun today on the recent House cuts to vital nuclear material security programs.  Here’s an excerpt:

Fortunately, the Senate appears to have listened, as it is poised to reverse the cuts.

This afternoon the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee approved the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.  The Subcommittee received an allocation of $31.625 billion, approximately $57 million below the FY 2011 enacted level, but $986 million above the FY 2012 House enacted level.  The full Appropriations Committee is scheduled to take up the bill tomorrow.  No amendments were offered in Subcommittee but amendments are expected to be offered in Committee tomorrow, although probably not on the NNSA portion of the bill.  You can read the official Subcommittee summary of the bill here.

According to Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) opening statement (the full text of the bill will not be released until tomorrow), the Subcommittee appropriated $11.05 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration, an increase of $528 million (or 5%) above the FY 2011 appropriation and an increase of $451 million above the FY 2012 House enacted level.

Within NNSA, the Subcommittee appropriated $2.383 billion for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Account, an increase of $109 million (or 4.7%) above the FY 2011 enacted level and an increase of nearly $300 million over the FY 2012 House enacted level.  The appropriation is $167 million below the President’s FY 2012 request of $2.549 billion.

Sen. Feinstein stated that the Subcommittee’s highest priority within NNSA was to fund nonproliferation and nuclear material security programs in support of the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.  While we will have to wait for the release of the bill text tomorrow for confirmation, the additional funding looks like good news for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (the key program in the effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials), which the House cut by $85 million below the FY 2012 request.

On the weapons side, the Subcommittee appropriated $7.190 billion, an increase of $294 million over the FY 2011 enacted level and an increase of $99 million over the FY 2012 House enacted level.  The appropriation is $440 million less than the President’s FY 2012 request of $7.63 billion.

The future schedule for the bill is unclear.  Most people I talked to at the hearing did not believe the bill would go to the Senate floor, and that final funding levels will be decided in conference between the House and Senate.  It’s also not clear whether an agreement can be reached before the end of the fiscal year on September 30.

Stay tuned for more tomorrow when the final bill text is available.  

Okay, IAEA, we need to talk about your timing.  Don’t get me wrong, I’m happy to have a new Safeguards Report on Iran, but… well, I guess if you’re tuned into Nukes of Hazard right now you’re probably not on your way to the beach anyway (or maybe you are?) so here’s what you need to know:

On one hand, the IAEA is “increasingly concerned” about “the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”  

On the other hand, while the report is anything but “evidence of Iran’s transparent and peaceful nuclear activities,” it does show a moderately increased level of cooperation by the country, a level that could be significant if maintained.

The report details a visit by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards to Iran from August 14-19, 2011.  During his visit, the Deputy Director General was allowed access to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (which was down at the time), the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the IR-40 Reactor and Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak, and the conversion and fuel fabrication facilities at Esfahan.  In addition, Iran provided access to “an installation where research and development (R&D) on advanced centrifuges was taking place,” along with “extensive information” on its current work on advanced centrifuges, which has fallen behind its originally conceived timeframe.

According to the report, Iran estimates that between September 14 and August 20, 2011, approximately 45.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced.  This would result in a total of approximately 70.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 having been produced since the process began in February 2010.  

Ultimately, Iran’s decision to continue producing 20%-enriched uranium beyond the needs of the Tehran Research Reactor is increasingly concerning, but before folks tack on to those two new words used by the IAEA, they would be wise to calculate the real time remaining and consider the steps that can still be taken with regard to diplomacy, as well as the considerable messiness of the other option.

The report is due to be discussed by the IAEA’s 35-member board of governors at a meeting September 12-16.