On August 21, the Libyan opposition forces stormed the capital, Tripoli, and took control of President Ghaddafi’s compound.  The war is not over, as Ghaddafi loyalists continue to battle the rebels, and the Transitional National Council (the organization formed to represent the opposition) will need to begin work to fill the power vacuum. The council has a huge task ahead of it to restore order, rebuild the country, create legitimate national institutions and cobble its different factions into some sort of working government.  More immediately, the opposition and NATO have to secure Ghaddafi’s chemical weapons and low-enriched uranium stockpiles.

In addition to Ghaddafi’s arsenals of conventional weapons, he is rumored to have stockpiled chemical weapons agents.  NATO has pledged to secure the chemical weapons so that Ghaddafi forces cannot use them against the opposition and civilians, but the opposition will also need to be involved.  James Corbett, a member of the Center for Research on Globalization, doesn’t believe the Ghaddafi regime would use these weapons in a last ditch effort to hold on to power, since it hasn’t used them yet.  However, the greater risk is that, amidst the chaos of Ghaddafi’s overthrow, these stockpiles could be susceptible to theft by smugglers or terrorists.  Terrorist organizations, such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, have successfully used chemical weapons against civilians in the past.  

Also potentially of concern are the hundreds of metric tons of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials at Libya’s Tajoura nuclear reactor facility.  Under an agreement between Ghaddafi and the U.S. to dismantle Libya’s nuclear program, all highly-enriched bomb-grade uranium has been removed from Libya, but low-enriched uranium, radioisotopes and spent fuel remain stockpiled at the reactor.  Olli Heinonen, former head of U.N. nuclear safeguards inspections worldwide, warns that the remaining nuclear and radiological materials could be used in a dirty bomb, which consists of conventional explosives used to disperse radiation.  If the Ghaddafi-employed guards securing the facility flee or NATO simply does not have the manpower to protect the plant, it could become a target for looting.

NATO, the U.S. and the IAEA are working to secure the materials and the U.S. has sent specialists to inform the transition council of how to best protect them, but the power vacuum remains a serious concern.  It will take time for a new government in Libya to stabilize the country and the transition process and any future opposition in-fighting could distract the council from providing the necessary security for the chemical agents and nuclear materials.  The U.S. and IAEA should stay vigilant and continue to offer their assistance to protect Libya’s dangerous nuclear materials and chemical weapons at this crucial time.

The first Pyongyang-Moscow summit in nine years – aimed largely at deepening bilateral economic ties – concluded with no news on the nuclear front. Based on the available information reported on the August 24th summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Pyongyang merely reiterated its basic position without clear signs of taking any steps forward toward denuclearization.

However, it is difficult to make a complete and definitive assessment since the summit results were carried by the media, absent official word from North Korea. Closed door deals, if they exist, remain veiled. The other parties to the Six Party Talks have yet to be debriefed on the summit while chief nuclear negotiators from Seoul and Beijing are slated to meet on Thursday, August 25th.

At this point, only an initial and limited assessment can be made based on preliminary information delivered by the media: (Click “Read More”)

1. “(Nuclear) Moratorium… in the course of the Six Party Talks”

The Kremlin reportedly said Kim Jong-il could be prepared to temporarily suspend (moratorium) nuclear production and testing “in the course” of the Six Party Talks process. This position does not go beyond the one it took in March when chief Russian nuclear negotiator visited Pyongyang. During the March meeting, the North indicated that once the Six Party Talks resume, it is willing to – based on the principle of “action-for-action” – discuss the other parties’ demands for a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and for IAEA inspectors to visit its uranium enrichment plant in Yongbyon. The key point here is “once the Six Party Talks resume” – in other words, the “Six Party Talks first” – whereas Seoul and Washington are demanding a moratorium first.

Some critical questions need to be answered:

First — in a diplomatic world where diction and subsequent interpretation are perhaps just as important as corresponding policies, global media reports have used varying terminology – is it a “moratorium” or a “suspension” or a “temporary halt” of fissile material production and nuclear testing? All three have different nuances, and must not be confused with a “test ban.”

Second — does Pyongyang mean it will (temporarily) refrain from nuclear activities including testing  before (in the lead up) or after the Six Party Talks resume? Or does it mean Pyongyang will impose a WMD moratorium while the Six Party Talks proceed, or consider a “moratorium” at some undefined time after multilateral negotiations begin? In the past, North Korea has shut down and disabled key nuclear facilities in Yongbyon beginning 2007 as a result of Six Party Talk agreements – hence, “during” the Six Party Talks. This was materialized with the other parties verifying the disablement measures.

Third, and most importantly — diction aside, it is only a matter of time before Pyongyang turns the nuclear switch back on. The key is being able to confirm that all nuclear activities – particularly uranium enrichment – and nuclear testing are halted.

2. “Unconditional Return to the Six Party Talks”

According to the Kremlin, Kim Jong-il told his Russian counterpart that Pyongyang is ready to return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions. Such reiteration of its basic position would not fare well on Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. Some observers suspect the regime’s unconditional demand is a sneaky way to propose meeting at the six-way negotiating table as an equal player.

The allies are demanding action and not mere words. Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have made it clear that prior to the resumption of the Six Party Talks, Pyongyang must:

–    Halt all nuclear activities including uranium enrichment;

–    Allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant;

–    Moratorium on nuclear and missile testing;

–    Pledge to implement the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement on denuclearization.

Missing Link: UEP

Initial reports on the summit out of Moscow were mum on North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP) unveiled in November 2010.

The facility was shown to one American scientist, but international nuclear experts must thoroughly confirm first-hand the extent of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment development. In order to verify its uranium capabilities, enrichment activities must end. The biggest question is whether the North will accept IAEA inspectors and under what conditions?

Should Pyongyang accept IAEA inspectors to visit its pilot UEP facility, it will likely request an entrance fee. For an administration that repeatedly vows it “will not buy the same horse twice” or “pay for talks,” Washington may not be so eager to purchase a ticket.

(Source: Andy Wong – Associated Press)

Joe Biden, greeting a Mongolian wrestler, August 22, 2011.    

The Vice President’s stopped in Mongolia Monday as part of his trip around Asia, and was met by a small group of protesters with posters that read: “Yankees keep your hands off Mongolia” and “Hi Joe, No Nuclear Waste, Go Home,” referring to alleged secret negotiations between the U.S., Mongolia, and Japan to build a spent nuclear fuel repository in Mongolia.

NoH is efforting to confirm reports that the Department of Energy encouraged Biden to challenge the Mongolian wrestler to a match for the rights to build the repository.

Through the years, I worked with other people, aircraft and weapons, ranging from a hand-picked team of perfectionists developing the B-2 bomber, to an unmotivated group of foreign military transcripts at an undisclosed NATO base, complete with an alco…

On August 17 the National Nuclear Security Administration announced the return of 6.3 kilograms of U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuel from a nuclear research facility in South Africa.

Carried out by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in conjunction with the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, the removal is yet another key step forward in the effort to eliminate dangerous nuclear materials so that they can never be used to make a nuclear weapon.  Such efforts are our first line of defense against the threat of nuclear terrorism.

MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow highlighted the successful removal on her show last night (see the video above).  She rightly referred to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s employees as “trained badasses.”  Her guest, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), referred to them as “a peaceful Seal Team Six.”  Right on! (The Arms Control Association also received a nice hit in the piece.)

A crude nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 25 kilograms of HEU.  Since April 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration has removed nearly 1000 kilograms of HEU.  In total, it has removed over 120 bombs worth of HEU.  

However, hundreds of kilograms of HEU still remain in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Vietnam – much of it not adequately secured.  And even after the August removal, South Africa still possesses hundreds of additional kilograms of HEU left over from its weapons program.

The removal of HEU from South Africa is but one in a long list of success stories authored by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and as Maddow noted last night, makes the House of Representatives’ recent reckless cuts to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative almost impossible to understand.  

The Senate must restore the cuts to the program when it returns in September, lest future such efforts to secure and eliminate HEU are delayed – or worse – not undertaken, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear terrorism.