Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter has spent most of the summer arguing that the New START treaty drops the ball on verification.  This is a pretty daft claim, since DeSutter was one of the ring leaders for an administration that believed verification was neither necessary nor useful.  Recall that the Moscow Treaty was entirely devoid of any detailed data exchanges and monitoring and verification provisions.  In the eyes of DeSutter, President Reagan’s signature phrase “trust but verify” read “trust but don’t verify”.    

Both Kelsey Hartigan and Greg Thielmann have penned great take-downs of DeSutter’s latest contribution, which is particularly stunning and riddled with obfuscation. Writing in the National Review earlier this week, DeSutter alleges:

Had the administration deemed the data provided under START to be critical, they could have extended the START treaty until negotiations on New START were completed and it was ratified by the U.S. and Russia. Instead, they let START expire and negotiated against a deadline after making clear their desperate desire for getting an agreement.[emphasis mine.]

Alas, the 2007 version of Paula DeSutter made an extension of START I next to impossible:

While the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START “has been important and for the most part has done its job,” Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter told Reuters the pact is cumbersome and its complicated reporting standards have outlived their usefulness.

In the post-Cold war era, many provisions of the 1991 START accord, which mandated deep nuclear weapons cuts, “are no longer necessary. We don’t believe we’re in a place where we need have to have the detailed lists (of weapons) and verification measures,” added DeSutter.[emphasis mine.]

Kelsey also points out that DeSutter ran roughshod over the verification provisions in other key arms control treaties.

In last week’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus noted that the standard by which many Republican Senators are judging New START is markedly different from the one they used to judge the George W. Bush administration’s Moscow Treaty. As we’ve noted on the blog before, nowhere is this more evident than on the issue of verification.  See below the jump for some choice comments from select Republican Senators on verification during the Moscow treaty debate.  Could it be, as former Bush I national security adviser Brent Scowcroft has suggested, that “some just don’t want to give Obama a victory” before the midterm elections?

Remember, “trust, but don’t verify”…

Sen. Wayne Allard
What is most notable about the Moscow Treaty as submitted to this body is the absence of certain provisions that normally marked Cold War era arms control treaties. Those provisions were based on distrust and antagonism. Instead, this treaty utilizes confidence building measures based on trust and friendship.
March 5, 2003

Sen. Bill Frist
Many have observed the extraordinary ease by which this treaty was negotiated and compare its three short pages—indeed, it is just three short pages—to the many thousands of pages of documents negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.

This last point is, for me, the most significant of all, for as important as the substance of this treaty is, it is the form—the trust between the United States and Russia—that most shines through.
March 5, 2003

Sen. John Warner
The Moscow Treaty is unlike any treaty we have had before. It is the first arms control treaty to embrace the new Russian-U.S. strategic relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both sides consciously rejected the cold war mentality of distrust and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations and extensive legal structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that both sides would abide by their treaty obligations.
March 5, 2003

Sen. Jon Kyl
This treaty is a masterstroke. It represents, and, I am sure, will be sent as ushering in a wholly new approach to arms control for a wholly new era. The simplicity of this treaty is a marvel. It is extremely brief, indeed just three pages long. It is shorn of the tortured benchmarks, sublimits, arcane definitions and monitoring provisions that weighed down past arms control treaties.

This is for a very good reason. The simplicity and brevity of this treaty reflect the simple fact that the US and Russia have moved beyond the enmity of the cold war era. The treaty recognizes this fact. It assumes a degree of trust between nations that are no longer on the precipice of war.
March 6, 2003

Sen. Jim Bunning
I believe the level of verification in this treaty is what is needed.
March 6, 2003

Following news that Russia is to start powering up Iran’s Bushehr nuclear facility on August 21, John Bolton suggested that Israel subsequently has just days left to attack it.  This is because once Bushehr goes online, any attack would “almost certainly release radiation into the atmosphere,” implying that Israel will “most unlikely … act militarily after fuel rods are loaded.”   Both Bolton and the people at Heritage are worried that Russia’s assistance in bringing the plant online will “represent a major step forward for Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations”, giving the country a “second route to nuclear weapons.”

Bolton concedes that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains unlikely, but pointed out that if Israel was “going to do anything, they certainly wouldn’t be talking about it” – just like before the bombing of Iraqi and Syrian reactors in 1981 and 2007 respectively.  However, given the resurgence in speculation on the probability of an Israeli attack, the hawkish nature of Netanyahu’s coalition government, and now even Saudi Arabian media outlets advocating military action, might there be a chance that officials in Jerusalem believe attacking Bushehr is essential?

This depends on whether Israel considers Bushehr to constitute a key element of (what it see’s as) Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Powered by Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU), it is true that when operational, Bushehr will produce plutonium-239, which can ultimately be used to make nuclear weapons.  However, the creation of pU-239 is an inevitable by-product of the operation of a nuclear reactor and to assuage any fears that Iran might one day try and use this to create a plutonium based weapon, Russia has stated that it will be reclaiming all of the plant’s spent fuel rods.  Although the U.S was initially opposed to Moscow’s involvement in Bushehr, it is for this reason that Washington now finds the powering up of Bushehr as acceptable – and also no doubt because the Russian provided HEU helps challenge Iran’s argument that it needs to produce its own fuel to power its civilian power plants.

Furthermore, Bushehr will also be operating under IAEA safeguards, adding an extra layer of safety (although not to the intrusive levels outlined by the IAEA’s non-obligatory Additional Protocol).   As a result, if Iran really did want to one day divert any pu-239 to create a nuclear weapon, both the IAEA and Russian Government would be in a position to call them on it.   And in any case, it is unknown if Iran is even close to possessing the technology or capability to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods.

Israel’s attitude towards Bushehr will no doubt be shaped by the Obama administration’s public approval of the plan’s activation.  While Israel attacked Syria’s reactor despite private U.S disapproval, Michael Anton is correct to suggest that “this time such an attack would have to take place not merely in spite of an ally’s private objections to the operation but of its public approval of the targeted project.”  An attack in this context could thus prove calamitous for Israel-USA relations, something Jerusalem will probably be keen to avoid given the vast military aid it receives from the U.S.  Nevertheless, Israel might be more worried about Iran’s intentions and choose to attack anyway.

Indeed, Israel may believe that as Bushehr starts producing pu-239 (enough some say for 30 bombs per year) Iran will become increasingly tempted to master the art of reprocessing in order to facilitate a non-HEU based approach to nuclear weapons production.  This might be especially tempting for Tehran given the advanced state of their missile program and the fact that pu-239 allows for smaller, far more powerful warheads than HEU.  Israel may also be concerned that although Russia will indeed be collecting spent fuel rods, it can only do so after a several year long cooling process – a time period potentially open to abuse.  And as I have pointed out before, the IAEA’s safeguards are hardly watertight, so there is still the possibility that fissile material could be diverted undetected – something that although unlikely, may constitute an unacceptable risk for Israel.

Could Iran one day develop plutonium reprocessing facilities and divert spent fuel rods for nuclear weapon production?  Maybe, but this is nothing more than a hypothetical question at the moment.  Iran does not does not currently posses this capability; therefore it does not represent a current threat to Israel (who, let us not forget, could deter a nuclear armed Iran with its massive conventional superiority or its second strike nuclear submarine capability).  Moreover, the risks associated with any Israeli attack would probably outweigh whatever ‘benefits’ Jerusalem may calculate would result from taking Bushehr out of the picture. Iranian media has already quoted Iran’s defense minister in response to a potential Israeli attack as saying “we may lose a power plant, but the whole existence of the Zionist regime will be jeopardized.”  And as an article in The Atlantic outlined last week, any military strike on Iran could lead to a full-scale regional war.

Given the dire consequences of a military strike, it is therefore clear that if Israel really does believe that Bushehr is being developed for weapons use, then, with U.S. support, it should continue to use diplomacy to push Iran to sign up to the Additional Protocol and address the IAEA’s outstanding queries.   In addition, more transparency re: its own nuclear program and faithfully attending the 2012 conference on a Middle East free of WMD will also boost Israel’s diplomatic credentials vis-à-vis Tehran.

In a statement on the New START treaty with the press this morning, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the full Senate must provide its advice and consent to ratification of the agreement when it returns in September.

“Our national security is at risk,” Clinton said. “It’s been more than eight months since we’ve had inspectors on the ground in Russia” who give “a vital window into Russia’s arsenal.”

Clinton added: The treaty “will advance our national security and provide stability and predictability between the world’s two leading nuclear powers.”

NoH will post a full copy of the statement when it’s available.

UPDATE 8/11: Secretary Clinton’s full statement is pasted below the jump.

UPDATE #2 8/11: Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE) gave a great speech on New START this morning to open the 2010 Strategic Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Nebraska. His remarks can be found here.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Rose, why don’t you come up here and Rich, come on up here. They are two of the numerous people here in the State Department, the Defense Department, the Energy Department, the White House, you name it, across our government who have worked on this treaty and are now working on its ratification.

Next month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will bring the new START treaty one step closer to ratification. Last week, I was pleased to meet with Chairman John Kerry to discuss the committee’s schedule for consideration of the treaty on September 15th or 16th and in the full Senate soon after. The Chairman and Ranking Member Senator Lugar have constructed a good plan, and I am confident about the prospects for ratification.

In the weeks and months since the treaty was submitted to the Senate, it has earned bipartisan support from senators on both sides of the aisle as well as statesmen in and out of government from both parties. They understand that once the new START treaty is ratified and enters into force, it will advance our national security and provide stability and predictability between the world’s two leading nuclear powers.

We have worked closely with the Senate throughout this process. We welcomed senators to Geneva to observe the negotiations. The Senate has held 18 hearings, along with three classified briefings on the treaty. And in the wake of the hearings, we are providing answers to nearly 800 questions submitted for the record. There’s a lot of material for senators to review during this break, and we are working to resolve any outstanding questions they might have. We’ve already addressed several key issues, reassuring those who had had questions on such issues as missile defense or investment in our nuclear complex or verification.

This treaty will verifiably limit the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States and will establish equal limits on both countries’ strategic warheads, delivery vehicles, and launchers.

This treaty will provide for inspections that the United States would not otherwise be able to hold. For 15 years, START provided us access to monitor and inspect Russia’s nuclear arsenal. START, as you know, expired last December. It, therefore, has been more than eight months since we have had inspectors on the ground in Russia. This is a critical point. Opposing ratification means opposing the inspections that provide us a vital window into Russia’s arsenal. This treaty in no way does or will constrain our ability to modernize our nuclear enterprise or develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses for the sake of our security and for our allies, friends, and partners.

With respect to our nation’s nuclear complex, Secretary of Energy Chu, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Tom D’Agostino, and the directors of our nation’s three national laboratories have all testified that nothing in the treaty will affect our ability to modernize our nuclear complex and maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

In fact, President Obama’s budget request for the next fiscal year represents a 13 percent increase for weapons activities and infrastructure. Over the next decade we are asking for an $80 billion investment in our nuclear security complex. Linton Brooks, the head of President Bush’s national security complex, has applauded our budget and our commitment to nuclear modernization. Seven former commanders of the U.S. nuclear strategic planning effort have endorsed the new START treaty and recommended early approval by the U.S. Senate.

President Bush actually began this process more than two years ago with broad, bipartisan agreement that a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was imperative for the peace and security of our world. The Obama Administration has followed through with painstaking negotiations to finalize an agreement that lives up to this high standard and makes concrete steps to reduce the threat of strategic arms.

This treaty is another step in the process of bilateral nuclear reductions initiated by President Reagan and supported overwhelmingly by both Republican and Democratic presidents and congresses alike. In every instance, the Senate has ratified such treaties with overwhelming bipartisan support.

The Chairman’s decision to give members of both sides of the aisle additional time to review the underlying materials, but set a committee vote for the middle of September, is a gesture of good faith and underscores the tradition of bipartisan support.

But when the Senate returns, they must act, because our national security is at risk. There is an urgency to ratify this treaty because we currently lack verification measures with Russia which only hurts our national security interests. Our ability to know and understand changes in Russia’s nuclear arsenal will erode without the treaty. As time passes, uncertainty will increase. With uncertainty comes unpredictability, which, when you’re dealing with nuclear weapons, is absolutely a problem that must be addressed. Ratifying the new START treaty will prevent that outcome.

So this month and next, I look forward to working with members of the Senate, especially Senators Kerry and Lugar, to move the treaty out of committee and on to consideration by the full Senate. We’d be happy to take your questions and I’ll have Rose and Rich respond to most of them.

An advisory panel to Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan is poised to recommend that Japan reevaluate its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, report the Asahi Shimbun, Global Security Newswire, and Bloomberg. The three principles, which comprise some of the most stringent anti-nuclear legislation in the world, have guided Japanese nuclear policy since the 1960s. The principles forbid the possession and production of nuclear weapons by Japan as well as the introduction of foreign nuclear arms into Japanese territory.  

Arguing that “it may not necessarily be wise to have as a principle anything that unilaterally limits what the United States can do,” the panel’s report calls for a review of the third principle’s ban on introducing American arms into Japan. This recommendation comes on the heels of government admissions that the third principle had been violated secretly throughout the Cold War. Even given recent revelations about Cold War secret agreements, however, official governmental approval for the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan would carry significant domestic and international political repercussions.

First announced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were enthusiastically endorsed by both the Japanese public and the international community. The Diet adopted the principles as kokuze or “irrevocable policy” in 1971, and the principles earned then-Prime Minister Sato the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. They have remained Japan’s official nuclear policy through twenty-two Japanese administrations.

Nevertheless, rumors about Japan’s nuclear intentions have swirled for decades. To a large extent, this suspicion stems from Japan’s technical bomb-making capability. While Japan’s redundant legal and rhetorical rejections of nuclear armament are impressive, Japan’s nuclear infrastructure is remarkably extensive for a country so outwardly committed to disarmament. Much of this infrastructure stems from Japan’s civilian nuclear energy program, the third largest in the world. Japan possesses both enrichment and reprocessing facilities, dual-use technologies that can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, through its determined adherence to reprocessing, Japan has developed what is estimated to be the largest stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium in a non-weapons state.

A signatory of the NPT, Japan is unlikely to pursue the nuclear option in the near future.  Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law and Three Non-Nuclear Principles forbid nuclear armament; its populace firmly opposes nuclear armament, and its trade-based economy is particularly vulnerable to sanctions.  Nevertheless, given Japan’s technical bomb-making capability, amending the principles would raise questions about Japan’s adherence to its anti-nuclear ideals and possibly strain ties with some its neighbors.

The advisory panel’s recommendation likely reflects Japan’s deteriorating security environment. In advocating for a more assertive defensive posture, the panel cites the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s increasing naval strength. In the past half decade, North Korea has twice tested nuclear weapons, first in 2006 and again in 2009, and repeatedly fired missiles directly over or in the immediate vicinity of the Japanese home islands. When paired with its hostile rhetoric – the DPRK has publicly threatened to “plunge Japan into a nuclear sea of fire” – North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities present perhaps the most salient and immediate threat to Japanese security. Meanwhile, China’s growing economic and military might pose a long-term challenge to Japanese influence in Asia.

Despite the regional challenges facing Japan, amending the principles is likely to be a hard sell to the Japanese public. Anti-nuclear sentiment has remained constant since the 1950s, a phenomenon that suggest that the public’s opposition to nuclear armament has become detached from security concerns. For example, in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll taken immediately after the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test, 80% of respondents held that Japan should continue to abide by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles despite North Korea’s military threat.

It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Kan will act on the report’s recommendation.  Public opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan cannot be overstated, and in a country where recent PMs can’t seem to hold on to power for more than a year, messing with Japan’s long-standing and extremely popular policy of anti-nuclearism would be a pretty brazen move. Also, Japan already enjoys the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, so stationing nuclear weapons on Japanese territory would not further improve Japanese security.

***Update: According to Global Security Newswire, at a ceremony commemorating the 65th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasak on August 9th, Prime Minister Kan announced he “would like to consider enshrining the [three] principles into law.” At the moment, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles function as Japan’s official policy towards nuclear weapons but are not legally binding. The article notes that Kan’s proposal is likely to face significant opposition, even from members of his own cabinet like Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, but Kan’s announcement evidences continued support for Japan’s policy of anti-nuclearism among the Japanese political elite.