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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

August 4, 2010

China Shoots Down a Second Satellite

It was reported at the end of last month that China successfully shot down one of its redundant satellites in January.    Allegedly, the firing took place at nearly the same time as a successful Chinese missile interception test conducted on January 11.   Given the reaction to its 2007 launch, some observers have suggested that the recent launch may have been ordered as a means for Beijing to vent displeasure over recent Taiwanese efforts to buy the Patriot missile defense system from the U.S.  However, others claim that the time needed to prepare for such a launch makes this notion unlikely.  Either way, the news is further evidence of continuing Chinese efforts to boost their space based military capabilities, and given the outcry following the last test, has probably not been met with cheers from countries possessing satellite capabilities.

In context of this news, Beijing’s official position on space might come as a surprise to some:

“The Chinese government has all along regarded the space industry as an integral part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy, and upheld that the exploration and utilization of outer space should be for peaceful purposes and benefit the whole of mankind.”

China’s official position is probably guided by the concerns over the prospect of space based missile defense systems which might one day render its relatively few numbers of ICBMs useless.  However, just as in 2007, China risks losing legitimacy in this regard when it destroys its own satellites….

After its 2007 anti-satellite test, Beijing commented “China has never, and will never, participate in any form of space arms race”.  Nevertheless, countries such as Japan and Australia viewed China’s launch in exactly that context – especially given that it was the first such test since the Cold War.  With the military benefits that satellite constellations confer to a country, it is arguable that they had much justification in this accusation.

Indeed, the informational advantages that satellites and space-based services can bring to military and security operations are significant.  They can improve the capabilities and performance of conventional weapons, greatly expand intelligence services, and through the actual launching of satellites, improve upon a nation’s missile capabilities.  Given its public stance on the militarization of space, China’s decision to shoot down the satellite in 2007 was thus highly controversial.  Indeed, one can only imagine how difficult it might be in coordinating any defense against a possible Chinese invasion of the Taiwan Straits without the aid of the U.S satellites currently watching over the area.

Another problem associated with anti-satellite operations results from the actual strike of the kinetic missile and the sheer amount of debris it causes.  Such debris can cause significant damage to other space users and this dynamic was one of the motivations for the USSR and USA to stop such testing in the 1980s.  According to one report, the 2007 satellite destruction is “now being viewed as the most prolific and severe fragmentation in the course of five decades of space operations”.  NASA studies indicate that the debris cloud now extends from 125 miles to 2,292 miles, orbiting at mean altitudes of 528 miles or greater – which reportedly means it will be very long lived.   Naturally, should any of this debris crash into satellites or spacecraft in low orbit there would be calamitous results.  So significant is this problem that it is thus somewhat interesting that reaction to this year’s anti-satellite test has been so much more muted than in 2007.

Anti-satellite testing is clearly dangerous, but as a result of the advantages it can confer to an attacker, it may be inevitable in future warfare.  Consequently, it seems that tests such as these are only likely to provoke other countries to invest in alternative approaches and technologies to mitigate the effects of losing a major surveillance satellite.  One approach could see countries putting constellations of smaller satellites into orbit that provide increased coverage and survivability.  Another could result in greater investment in UAV technology, which can increasingly play some of the roles traditionally reserved for satellites – as well as offering a short-notice fix (given UAV’s can be put into the sky so quick).  But while these outcomes are not indicative of the start of a space arms race, if in the future they are accompanied by other countries conducting further anti-satellite tests, things may change.

It is also hard to see how China’s tests will help pave the way for future cooperation with the U.S  President Barack Obama’s June 2010 National Space Policy emphasized the important role of international cooperation in space and demonstrated the apparent willingness of the US to begin work on a space weapons treaty.  However, news of China’s January 2010 test may have ruffled feathers among members of Congress, whom Gregory Kulacki at the Union of Concerned Scientists noted, “will want to deny China status as a member in good standing of the international community of space-faring nations”.   Ultimately though, this might not be something China is seeking to pursue.  With its abundant financial resources and high level scientific know-how, the prestige of advancing its space based technologies by itself may prove too irresistible for Beijing.  But quite how future tests will fit with China’s commitment not to ‘to test, deploy or use any weapons, weapons systems or components in outer space’, remains to be seen.

Given the technology for shooting down satellites has been around since the Cold War, it is hard to see the technological imperative for countries such as China to conduct such tests.  While Beijing may have made a political statement (for good or bad) with its 2007 test, if it remains committed to the peaceful use of space then it is hard to understand the advantage of shooting down further satellites.  Indeed, with the U.S made Vanguard 1 still in orbit since launch in 1958, one has to wonder why China feels compelled to shoot down satellites that are several decades younger.   The debris caused by such tests is a major risk for other space users and given its potential to upset the prospects for a space weapons treaty, it seems evident that China should refrain from further anti-satellite launches.

Posted in: Asia, China, Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 4, 2010

New Working Group on Iran Sanctions

Yesterday, Howard Berman and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee released the following statement announcing the initiation of a bipartisan Working Group on Iran Sanction Implementation:

Today we are initiating a working group that will help ensure that U.S. and international sanctions on Iran are fully implemented, effectively enforced and, ultimately, have the intended effect of bringing about Iran’s termination of all activities contributing to its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, which was signed into law by President Obama on July 1, has already had a significant impact on Iran’s access to international markets and its ability to acquire refined petroleum.

We will continue to pressure and isolate Iran until it terminates its illicit nuclear weapons activities.  A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable.

“The group will meet on a regular basis with Administration officials, foreign ambassadors, and outside experts to oversee and verify enforcement of Iran sanctions implementation” —- which is pretty ambiguous, but there’s nothing like leaving for recess on a strong note, right?

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 2, 2010

The Cutting-Room Floor

A small article from The Hill caught my attention Friday evening, because it illustrates how complex the federal appropriations puzzle really is.  The Congressional Black Caucus is upset after White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel promised Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.) $1.5 billion in farm disaster relief in exchange for her support of the (soon-to-be filibustered) small-business bill.  The CBC is miffed because the administration is stonewalling them on the settlement of Pigford v. Glickman:

Six members of the Congressional Black Caucus wrote to President Obama on Thursday calling on him to find a way to compensate black farmers who suffered discrimination in government loan programs during the 1980s and 1990s.
[snip]
…the administration has told black farmers it lacks the funds to pay a $1.2 billion agreement they reached with the Department of Agriculture in 1999 to settle the Pigford class-action lawsuit.
[snip]
The lawmakers say that Obama should also take administrative action to pay $3.4 billion the federal government promised to settle claims that it mismanaged Native American trust funds. Elouise Cobell is the lead plaintiff in the case against the Interior Department.

Lincoln’s $1.5 billion was originally part of the small-business bill and was later removed in a vain effort to curry Republican support.

What does this have to do with defense spending?

Today, President Obama signed the FY 2010 War Supplemental, sending $37.1 billion of funding to the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The bill as passed contains over $21 billion in spending unrelated to the wars.  However, the House added two amendments with an additional $22.8 billion (fully offset) that were later eliminated by the Senate.  Included in this was $4.6 billion dollars to settle the aforementioned Pigford v. Glickman lawsuit, as well as another, Cobell v. Salazar.

The inclusion of a final Pigford v. Glickman settlement in the House amendments was a significant victory for the CBC, but illustrates the sometimes paradoxical nature of the appropriations process.  Discrete, unrelated items become uncomfortably mashed together or linked in the strangest ways: the war supplemental (which campaign-Obama promised never to sign) contains farm subsidies and veterans compensation.  At one point it also included education funding and Pell grants, summer jobs funding, border security money, and federal discrimination and mismanagement lawsuit settlements.  

These various causes are but a tiny fraction of the total yearly federal budget, and yet it seems jarring that we should be discussing funding for waging war in the same breath as educating our children and helping farmers.  These are incompatible ideas, linked only by their roles as slices of the federal pie in a system where the competition never ends.  

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

August 2, 2010

Sanctions Deja Vu?

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on July 21 a series of measures to increase Washington’s ability to “prevent North Korea’s proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions.”  She added, “We will implement new country-specific sanctions aimed at North Korea’s sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities.”  Although the U.S is already committed to implementing exactly these sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, Ms. Clinton explained that they will now be more strictly imposed in response to steps North Korean entities have taken to adapt to the existing sanctions.   In addition to bolstering current sanctions, Washington also looks set to freeze a number of bank accounts associated with suspect North Korean companies, although on limited scale. So, is this latest development merely a posturing, the seeds of a major change in North Korean behavior, or likely to start a second Korean war?

In answering this question it’s important to look first at the context in which the U.S announcement was made.  March 26 saw the sinking of the Cheonan, on May 26  South Korea released its alleged evidence of North Korean culpability and ever since, U.S rhetoric has continued to condemn Pyongyang’s behavior while also warning of inevitable consequences.  Unfortunately for Washington though, ‘consequences’ did not arise for North   Korea when the Cheonan incident was finally raised at the United Nations Security Council in early July.  While the UNSC statement condemned the sinking of the ROK navy corvette and expressed “deep concern” over South Korea’s investigative report, the carefully worded text excluded any actual reference to the DPRK.  Consequently it came as no surprise that North Korea considered the UNSC statement a “diplomatic victory,” enabling it to elude any formal punishment at the Security Council.  This was of course due to China’s reticence on the issue, which derives from the fact that Beijing was unwilling to call out its communist neighbor by name (just as the U.S is rarely willing to do so with Israel)….

In the immediate follow-up to the Cheonan incident, a number of North Korea watchers made it clear that the U.S and South Korea would need to act decisively to restore deterrence over Pyongyang.  While the ROK had a number of measures planned, it initially realized very few beyond an anti-submarine drill in its West Sea.  The U.S and South  Korea have since announced a number of joint drills (regarded as highly controversial by both the DPRK and China), currently being scheduled to take place in both the East and West  Seas.  The “new” sanctions now being called for by Hillary Clinton seem to fit into a strategy that seeks, at least, to make it look like North Korea is being punished for the Cheonan incident – whether the UN likes it or not.

As some analysts have already commented, this new round of U.S sanctions will likely be regarded as “meaningless” by the DPRK.  It is important to remember that the U.S has had virtually no economic contact with Pyongyang since prior to the Korean War, and having already placed numerous sanctions on the country, has very little leverage left – if any at all in unilateral terms.  And as I have previously explained, for the type of ‘targeted’ sanctions currently being pursued to really bite, China would have to start implementing them with a lot more vigor.  While Hillary Clinton visited Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to discuss exactly this issue last Thursday, the fact that the U.S chose not to consult with Beijing before announcing the new sanctions would not have bode well to secure Chinese cooperation on the issue , Foreign Policy.com suggests.

With the new sanctions unlikely to change things in Pyongyang, Ken Lieberthal is correct in suggesting that “The one approach that has caught North Korea’s attention in the past is financial sanctions that disrupt its access to the international banking system.” Indeed, George Bush’s freeze of DPRK assets held by the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) bank in 2005 caused significant consternation in North Korea.  However, even this was not without unintended consequences.  Indeed, the BDA freeze was very likely one of the motivating factors behind North Korea’s July 2006 missile tests and its October 2006 nuclear test – a series of tests that ultimately pushed the Bush administration to negotiate the frozen funds in return for a rejuvenation of the 6 Party Talks.   It may have been this record, in combination with North Korea’s post-Cheonan warning on further sanctions, that led Washington, keen to avoid further belligerency, to opt for a symbolic ‘tightening’ of the current set up and a limited approach to bank freezes, as opposed to anything more substantive.

Even though the new sanctions proposed by the U.S appear to make little difference, North   Korea has nevertheless reacted vehemently to them – labeling them a violation of the spirit of the recent UNSC statement.   They likely also contributed to the recent flurry of nuclear threats in response to the U.S & ROK naval exercises.  But although Pyongyang has warned that both the sanctions and naval drills ‘present a grave threat to the peace and security,’ history would suggest otherwise.   But at the same time, history would also suggest that symbolic ‘tightening’ of existing sanctions will have no affect on North   Korea’s future strategic thinking.  Instead, it seems increasingly clear that the U.S and South Korea will have to simultaneously embark on a credible engagement strategy with North   Korea if things are to ever change on the peninsula.  Of course, they could always opt for regime change a la Iraq, since we all know how well that worked out.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

July 28, 2010

War Supplemental Clears Congress

Two months after the Senate first passed their version of the war supplemental, the House passed the final version of the bill yesterday, 308-114.  Now all that stands between the military and a delicious $37.1 billion is the stroke of President Obama’s pen, coming in the next few days.

We’ve reported on this bill twice already, tracking its progress through Congress.  

A quick recap:

The Senate version of the bill, passed May 27, contained $58.8 billion in spending, including $37.1 billion for the war, over $13 billion for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange, $5.1 billion for FEMA, and $2.9 billion for Haiti disaster relief, as well as a host of smaller expenditures.

The House then passed its version of the bill on July 1, which accepted the Senate version while adding $22.8 billion in spending fully offset by $23.5 billion in cuts and law modifications.  This included a $10 billion education jobs fund, $1 billion for youth summer jobs, $5 billion in Pell grants, $4.6 billion to settle two class-action lawsuits, and $701 million for border security.

The bill then got sent back to the Senate, which was unable to invoke cloture on the new amendments on July 22 and ended up passing…the exact same bill they passed back on May 27.  

Ultimately, the House decided to play along, passing the original Senate version of the bill yesterday.  Thus, despite the title, the bill contains no funding for summer jobs and quite a bit for the war.

The bill created quite a bit of controversy, becoming a flash point for pro- and anti-war members of Congress.  Indeed, House Appropriations Chairman David Obey (D-WI), despite steering the bill through committee, voted “no.”  The bill’s passage was not helped by the release of secret war documents on Wikileaks just a few days before, but ended up clearing the House in a bipartisan vote.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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