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US and South Korea Announce Naval Demonstrations

The United States and South Korea announced a series of joint naval exercises in the Pacific theater on Tuesday, designed to show force and resolve against a stubborn North Korea.  The first of the exercises will begin Sunday and will include ships, aircraft, sailors, and airmen (for a total of about 8,000 personnel) from both the US and Republic of Korea navy and air force.

The display is a direct response to and a continuation of the crisis begun when the South Korean frigate Cheonan was sunk off the coast of the Korean Peninsula on March 26.  An international investigation team concluded that the Cheonan was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine, a charge North Korea and its ally, China, have denied.

The statement said that the exercises “are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop.”  They will occur in both the East and West Seas, known to Americans as Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.

The military presence is quite large, with over a hundred aircraft and 20 ships and submarines, including the American aircraft carrier the USS George Washington.

Admiral Robert F. Willard characterized the first exercise, code-named Invincible Spirit, as “a show of force intended to send a signal to North Korea with regard to what has occurred post-Cheonan and is intended also to signal the region the resolve of this alliance and our commitment to one another and the scope and scale of our ability to operate together.”

Willard said this was only the first (and not necessarily largest) in a series of demonstrations taking place over the coming months.  Should North Korean behavior change, the exercises can be increased or decreased in intensity.

China has made its displeasure over these events known (EDIT: very well known), having just completed its own exercises in the area.  This New York Times article has a good description of their reaction.

Click here for the transcript of Willard’s remarks to the press.

"Consensus for American Security" Supports New START

The already strong bipartisan support for New START just got a little stronger.  On Monday, the American Security Project launched the “Consensus for American Security,” a group of more than 30 senior former military and national security leaders who support the New START treaty and other common sense measures to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

The bipartisan initiative includes former Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE), former STRATCOM Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff Gen. Arlen “Dirk” Jameson (USAF, ret.), former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral WIlliam Owens (USN, ret.), and the Center’s very own Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.).

Below are some excellent quotes from Consensus members who participated in Monday’s conference call launching the project (see here and here for good summaries of the call)…

Senator Chuck Hagel:

I think our greatest responsibility, our being certainly the United States and all of our allies and all governments and peoples of the world, is to work together to build a new global security framework, and the START Treaty in my opinion is part of that.

We all know that arms control treaties and any treaties are not perfect, they are imperfect documents, they are imperfect institutions and structures. But what motivates the treaty itself and why it is important that we have these kinds of structures and institutions to work within is because they do allow us to work within a framework of responsible, in this case, arms reduction.

…if this would fail, if this START Treaty would fail in the Senate, in my opinion it would be a devastating blow to future efforts in the world to try to harness some discipline and build, what I talked about earlier, a new 21st century framework to deal with these issues that are becoming more and more complicated.

General Dirk Jameson:

There are many reasons why ratifying New START Treaty without delay is important. As both senators said, it continues a critical process begun almost 50 years ago to bring stability, transparency, enhanced security and significant reductions to the two nuclear arsenals that hold more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

The new treaty picks up where the expired start left off by mandating reductions in the strategic nuclear warheads each country may deploy.

The new treaty requires extensive verification monitoring and information exchanges between the U.S. and Russia. This means reduced risk of accident, miscalculation or theft.

Without the New START agreement we would be poorly equipped to monitor what Russia is doing with the nuclear arsenal that in the past has been poorly guarded and poorly maintained. Risk of weapons or a nuclear material falling into the wrong hands is greater without the new treaty.

There are many other reasons to ratify the new treaty but one of perhaps greatest importance is that it will allow the U.S. to lead in pursuing greater cooperation and progress from our allies and other nations around the world.

Admiral Bill Owens:

So I am totally convinced that the provisions of the New START Treaty are in the best interests of our country. I think that many thoughtful military leaders who have, like the General and I, spent a lot of our time in nuclear positions along the way, are of a similar mind, and I just strongly encourage our Senate to take a bipartisan approach, pass this important legislation, and show the world that we truly are the leaders that they expect us to be.

National Labs: New START Will Not Reduce Ability to Maintain Safe, Secure, and Reliable Stockpile

The directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories appeared yesterday in front of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, testifying that the New START Treaty would not prevent the labs from ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The directors head the three labs that carry out the NNSA’s (National Nuclear Security Administration) stockpile stewardship program. The three directors were joined by Dr. Roy Schwitters, the Chairman of the JASON Defense Advisory Group, at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING

At the morning hearing – the Armed Services Committee’s second on the treaty – all four witnesses stated that the labs retained sufficient authority and flexibility to carry out their stewardship missions under the terms of the New START treaty and Obama administration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Moreover, in the Q&A, the four witnesses emphasized the consequences of a failure to ratify the treaty on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, arguing that discord in Washington inhibits the labs’ ability to attract and retain top talent. Dr. Miller, the director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, put it most clearly, stating: “having an agreed upon long-term vision for the future of the nuclear weapons stockpile is very important to the stability and engagement of the workforce.”

The few moments of contention centered on two issues: the Obama administration’s NPR and FY2011 budget. The Obama NPR gives a “strong preference to refurbishment or reuse,” rather than replacement, in warhead life extension programs. In criticizing the NPR, Senator McCain referenced a May 2010 letter, signed by 10 former national lab directors, which expressed concern about this policy in the NPR. All four witnesses, however, maintained that the NPR would not impede stockpile stewardship or life extension programs:

ANASTASIO (Los Alamos): “It is certainly true that there are restrictions in the NPR but I still believe that it is very clear that we have both the authority and responsibility to explore on a case by case basis what’s the best technical approach on each system to extend its life into the future.”

MILLER (Lawrence Livermore): “I believe that the concern expressed by the former lab directors is obviously legitimate…[however] I believe that the situation we have is a workable one.”

The four witnesses also stressed the need for a renewed and sustained financial commitment to the U.S. nuclear complex. The directors pointed out that prior to this year, funding for the NNSA has fallen each year since 2006.  Senator Inhofe (R-OK) seized on this comment as an opportunity to criticize the Obama administration’s FY2011 budget, arguing that the funds in the 2011 budget fell short of what was requested by the NNSA. Senator Reed (D-RI) quickly pointed out that the FY2011 budget’s allocation to NNSA is a 13% increase over the previous year’s budget, and the lab directors spoke highly of the budget, with Dr. Miller praising it as a “step in the right direction” and Dr. Anastasio arguing it showed a “strong commitment” to the nuclear stockpile.

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING

Directors Anastasio, Miller, and Hommert reiterated their views on the treaty in an afternoon hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the Q&A, discussion focused on the Obama administration’s 10-year Funding Plan. The directors praised the plan for its renewed financial commitment to the nuclear complex but also asserted that this focus would need to be maintained by future administrations and congresses.

MILLER: “Given the recent trends, I can’t stress how positive a step [the budget is.]”

ANASTASIO: “The 2011 budget submission shows a strong commitment on the part of the administration…[but] in the out years, we need to find ways to sustain our focus and commitment.”

Because the 10-year Plan pushes much of the funding increases into the out years (2016 and after), senators on both sides of the aisle emphasized the need for Washington to stick to the plan in the long run.

Finally, props to Senator Inhofe for managing to attend one of yesterday’s hearings (he sits on both committees, but 50% attendance is still a major improvement). In case you missed ourearlier post, Sen. Inhofe has a lousy attendance record at the New START hearings, noting that he doesn’t like to show up to hearings that include witnesses who support the treaty.  Apparently Sen. Inhofe’s knows better than Secretary of Defense Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mullen, STRATCOM Commander Gen. Chilton, and countless others.

Pentagon Makes Case for No More C-17s

All too often, defense programs consume resources like a fountain consumes water in a public park—always flowing regardless of cost or necessity.  Programs with no clear use running billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule remain fiendishly difficult to kill.  It is this unfortunate reality that made the July 13 hearing of the Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management so refreshing.

Department of Defense officials emphatically pressed lawmakers to cease production of any more C-17 cargo planes, saying they were neither requested nor required.  Indeed, they said, the current capabilities of our strategic airlift fleet exceed the military’s present-day needs as well as worst-case scenario projections.  Purchasing additional C-17 aircraft would run contrary to Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ goal of saving $100 billion over the next five years and would necessitate cutbacks in other DoD programs.

(More after the jump)

The U.S. strategic airlift fleet consists of C-5, C-17, and C-130 aircraft, including 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s, providing a capacity of 35.9 million ton-miles per day.  Air Force Maj. General Susan Y. Desjardins, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Mike McCord, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alan F. Estevez all testified that according to the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16) conducted by DoD, the greatest airlift demand under extreme cases would be no more than 32.7 mtm/d.

The witnesses repeatedly stressed this point, as well as echoing Chairman Tom Carper’s (D-DE) statement that the military has not requested any more C-17s since 2007.  Despite this, Congress has purchased 43 additional planes since that time.  Senator John McCain pointed out that this amounted to $9 billion in direct spending, as well as billions more in support, training, maintenance, and other recurring costs associated with increased aircraft supply.

In addition, 22 of the lowest-performing C-5s are to be retired, saving money on their associated upkeep costs.  Simultaneously, the remaining C-5s are scheduled to be upgraded with new engines and other systems, prolonging their service life and improving their reliability.  When asked if it would make sense to continue retiring C-5s in favor of new C-17s, McCord said this would be a waste of money.  Carper noted that for the cost of one new C-17, two C-5s can be upgraded, each of which can carry twice as much cargo and fly twice as far as a new C-17 while remaining in service for another 30-40 years.

So far Congress’ appropriations for FY 2011 contain no funding for additional C-17 aircraft, and Secretary Gates has recommended that President Obama veto any bill containing spending on them.  “If you’re in a hole,” said Carper, “stop digging.”

Long-Term North Korea Strategy is Missing

The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday.  Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved.

Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States.  Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame.  Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats.   He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”…..

He remarked that, “North Korea is neither going to be guiled into doing something that it thinks is against its national interest, nor is it going to be threatened.  The sooner we get away from that kind of simplistic approach the better.  And I think one of the ways we can start to build a more realistic framework for understanding North Korea is to at least go back and look at modern Korean history.”

In this regard Linton suggested that while for decades the DPRK had been obsessed with exporting its Juche ideology to the world, as the country became poorer in the 1980s it instead became “focused primarily on building real political and diplomatic relationships to allow it to survive”.  Responding to this situation he asked, “What have we offered North Korea?  Are we offering them national survival or are we offering them another extreme makeover according to an ideology that will essentially negate most of what they consider their primary gains in the last fifty years?”

With the context set, Linton suggested that current policy “does not compute as national survival” for North Korea.  

In moving forward from the current impasse he pointed out that it was imperative that countries such as the U.S and the ROK also stop responding to North Korea in a North Korean manner.  He pointed out that South Korea, despite having a pluralistic society, huge civilian sector resources, and an enormous private sector pool of wealth, nevertheless tries to funnel all possible engagement through the Government – in just the same way that North Korea conducts all of its relations with Seoul.   He conjectured that while private sector is the strongest part of a free society, U.S sanctions currently prevent American enterprise from making a difference, pointing out that “When a free society tries to funnel everything through government initiatives and ministries, you have a weakening rather than a strengthening of the process.”

A proactive approach would instead advocate a more hands-off approach allowing private organizations and enterprises engage North Korea on an individual basis, without the conditions and constructions currently being imposed by the current administrations in Seoul and Washington D.C.   Presenting a video of some of the Eugene Bell Foundations’ success in North Korea, he finished his analysis by illustrating some of the positive impact such activities could have.

Karen Lee, Executive Director of the National Committee on North Korea, suggested that lessons learned regarding the sanctions applied to Iraq had seemingly gone over the head of South Korea.  Remembering the widespread hurt to Iraq’s civilian population caused by the blunt approach applied after the Gulf War, she noted that the international community by consensus currently advocates sanctions that cause the minimal damage to civilian life.  Consequently, South Korea’s decision to now prevent the bulk of NGOs from either delivering aid or conducting monitoring visits illustrates just how far the country is out of touch with today’s international sentiment.  She added that Iraq “was a lesson that was learned the hard way, and I would expect that the South Korean government would come back inside within international consensus and lift that ban on NGO activities as quickly as possible.”

Labeling the various sanctions applied to North Korea as ‘tactics’, Lee rhetorically asked the administrations of South Korea and the U.S, “Where is the strategy? We know what your first and second step is, but what is the third step?”  Citing the measures taken in response to the sinking of the Cheonan case as evidence of this over-reliance on tactics, she pointed to the lack of an exit strategy as smyptomic of the overall lack of an over-arching North Korea strategy in both Seoul and Washington.  

Dwelling on the issue, Lee proposed that for sanctions to work effectively States must be united in their application and all must be in a position to have something to sacrifice.   For its part and as a result of Washington’s decades long policy of economic isolation, she suggested that it correspondingly had very little to lose when pushing for sanctions.  Correspondingly, Beijing, having significant economic trade with the DPRK, would have a lot more to lose if it were to vigorously impose robust sanctions – an important point to remember when accusing China of not currently doing enough, she added.   But from Seoul’s perspective,
“A very interesting new development is that South Korea is now making an economic sacrifice in response to the Cheonan.  It will be interesting to see if South Korea is able to sustain this economic sacrifice…A recent Chosun Ilbo report says that business people engaged in North Korean projects say they will be ruined if trade does not resume.  So lets say that South Korea listens to its people and that trade is restarted again.  How can the US continue to criticize China if it chooses not to engage in sanctions against the DPRK…if it doesn’t also choose to criticize South Korea, if in fact it makes this decision.”

Lee went on to show how little influence the US currently has with North Korea by citing the fact that the Obama administration recently linked visas for Track Two dialogue to success on the nuclear issue, a decision that actually took place before the Cheonan incident.  She remarked, “I don’t think visa denial is an expression of strength, I actually think its an expression of weakness.  I would like to see our government develop a transparent visa policy that encourages dialogue, not discourages it.”

Having illustrated the context behind each countries approach to sanctions, Lee rounded off her talk by pondering the situations they could ever be rolled back, especially with regards to partial compliance – a point that underscored her argument that they should only ever be part of a much larger North Korea strategy.

Doug Bandow, a Senior Fellow at Cato Institute rounded off the talk by recommending a new policy of engagement for Washington to pursue.  

Noting that Pyongyang is currently proceeding on both its nuclear and missile programs with a sanctions regime already in place, he suggested it was clear that current policy was not delivering any real results.  He argued that the concept of ignoring North Korea in the hope that the problem would go away was also imprudent, as illustrated by the fact that Pyongyang often acts belligerently when left alone for too long.   As a result, Bandow suggested that the lack of over-arching policy that the other speakers had alluded to in their presentations illustrated the need for a “refashioned form of engagement” with the U.S involving China involved in a “more positive way”.

While admitting that “I think there is no option that we know will work”, Bandow added, “Nevertheless, we have to look at some options and make some changes compared to where we’re at.  One of which strikes me is that we have to have diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Whatever the rest of the issues, I see little to gain from refusing to recognize North Korea”.   He remarked that such recognition would provide some sense to Pyongyang of respect from the U.S, while giving Washington some strongly needed inside information on a very closed society.  

He added that to get into North Korean society, the more people that could go there from the West and have relationships, the better.  However, he did admit that it was difficult to gauge the overall impact of such liaison.   Consequently he also advocated a separation of Private and Governmental aid as a means of facilitating the work of organizations such as the Eugene Bell Foundation in future times of tension.  

As part of this approach Bandow stated that it would be essential to simultaneously convince China that it is in their interest to be more proactive with North Korea.  He consequently recommended a new approach that would illustrate both how and why China should think differently.   Firstly, by making Beijing realize that the current situation was not necessarily as stable as it might think- through pointing to the sometimes strong pressure within the U.S to take military action against the DPRK following acts of belligerency.  Secondly, that China should not assume that future WMD proliferation by North Korea will be met with the same restraint that has been characteristic of responses so far.  Thirdly, that the U.S will not be interested in remaining in the middle of the situation forever and might one day allow the ROK or Japan to move ahead on their own nuclear programs.

He also suggested that China should be made clear that the U.S would not try and take unilateral advantage in the event things worked out badly, and that countries such as Japan and the ROK should be willing to share the costs of any future refugee problems.   Longer-term he stated that “If China was helpful in resolving the situation…the U.S would be quite prepared to say America’s military role is over on the Korean peninsula”, noting it is approaching the time when Washington should step back.  

In this regard he noted that without the 29,000 U.S troops stationed in South Korea, the U.S would actually not have much interest in the issue, nor would it be within easy reach of North Korean retaliation.   Without this presence he thus asserted that other countries in the region would face an increased onus to step up and deal with the issue, allowing the U.S to take a more supportive role in future.

The event took place at the CATO Institute in Washington D.C on Wednesday July 14 2010.  It was moderated by d Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.

What to do about North Korea – CATO