Guest Post by Volha Charnysh

Yesterday, U.S. ambassador to Russia John Beyrle urged Moscow to join Washington in building a worldwide missile defense system. Last week, prior to his meeting with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama was quoted as saying that “cooperative missile defense with Russia has enormous potential” and that the United States “want[s] to work with Russia to be a key player and beneficiary in this global [missile defense] architecture.”

The idea of U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation is not new, and the initiatives considered today have been pondered for decades. The two countries agreed to “explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe” in a joint declaration at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia Summit, but their dialogue reached an impasse when George W. Bush unveiled the plan to build 10 interceptor missile systems in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic.

A window of opportunity for Russia’s participation reopened with Obama’s September 2009 decision to deploy a phased adaptive missile defense in Europe. As per the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. proposals for missile defense cooperation with Russia include integration of U.S. and Russian sensors; joint research and development; joint missile defense testing; joint modeling and simulations; missile defense exercises; and joint analyses of alternative U.S.-Russian missile defense architectures for defending against common, regional threats. After the U.S. change of plans, NATO has also expressed readiness to explore the potential for linking U.S., NATO and Russian missile defense systems and declared missile defense cooperation with Russia its target for the next NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010…

Despite its longevity and revived popularity, missile defense collaboration remains a contentious issue, and not only because the technical plausibility and cost-effectiveness of missile defense systems are still being debated. However modest the scope of cooperation in question – primarily technology and information sharing – some in Washington fail to see its potential benefits. For example, Bill Gertz writes in Washington Times that the Obama administration is “secretly working with Russia” on an agreement that may limit U.S. missile defenses.

I argue that missile defense collaboration with Moscow, which has already become an important U.S. partner in confronting nuclear proliferation challenges, would not only help to reduce Russia’s concerns regarding U.S. missile defense plans, but also provide Washington with additional technology and expertise, send a stronger message to regimes developing ballistic missile capabilities, improve the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship, and open possibilities for further arms reductions.

First, by cooperating with Moscow, which has a wealth of missile defense technology and expertise, Washington could reap important technological benefits. In fact, U.S. firms like Boeing and Lockheed Martin are already exploring the possibilities of joint design and development projects with Russian companies: a Russian liquid fuel rocket engine is used in new U.S. space launch vehicles, while a Russian rear moveable exhaust nozzle is employed in some models of the Joint Strike Fighter.

Washington could both augment its capabilities and save resources by taking advantage of the Kremlin’s 2007 proposal to grant the United States access to the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan and the Armavir radar station in Russia’s Krasnodar Territory. The Russian radars are much closer to Iranian targets than any potential U.S. installations, and with some adjustments, they could detect missile launches not only from Iran, but also from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The radars could also be linked to the missile launch data exchange center in Moscow, created by the U.S.-Russian Memorandum Of Agreement in 2000 “to minimize the consequences of a false missile attack warning and to prevent the possibility of a missile launch caused by such false warning,” but never built due to liability and tax issues. The efforts to make the JDEC a reality have intensified with the Obama Administration’s change of plans, and the center could become an important element of the U.S. phased adaptive missile defense in Europe.

Second, U.S.-Russian missile defense collaboration would send a strong message to regimes seeking to develop missile capabilities. For example, Tehran might think twice about developing longer range ballistic missiles if Russia, its long-time economic partner and ally, were integrated into European missile defenses against an Iranian strike. With a stake in the European missile defense system, Moscow might also be more eager to support international sanctions against Tehran and less careless about the technology it exports.

Third, engaging Moscow in a joint missile defense project could only improve U.S.–Russian bilateral relations. Information exchange and joint R&D efforts could increase transparency and trust between Moscow and Washington, thereby deepening their understanding of each other’s capabilities and intentions and reducing the incentives for mutual suspicion. By working with the West to defend Europe, Russia would feel more integrated into the European security architecture. In an indirect way, this would help address the concerns expressed by Moscow in its draft of the European Security Treaty, which failed to elicit a thoughtful response from the West.

Most importantly, missile defense collaboration could pave the way for the next round of bilateral strategic arms reductions. Moscow and Washington have reached their first shaky compromise on missile defense in New START. The treaty’s preamble notes the interrelationship between offense and defense and bars the United States from placing missile defense interceptors in ICBM silos or SLBM launchers – something the United States no longer plans to do. In addition, Moscow issued a unilateral statement that it would consider withdrawing from the treaty if the U.S. develops strategic defenses capable of threatening the Russian deterrent –something the United States also has no intention of doing. However, the most difficult and bitter disagreements over missile defenses lie ahead, and the amount of contention generated by the modest wording in the New START in Washington suggests that the road to further reductions will be closed, unless the United States and Russia are able to collaborate on missile defenses in the future.

Of course, whether the benefits mentioned above actually come to fruition depends on overcoming some important political and technical challenges. However, the two sides concluded far more complicated agreements in far less auspicious circumstances during the Cold War. Today, with the “reset in their relationship and with the possibility of the NATO framework bringing the two countries together on this sensitive issue, the success of the U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation looks even more likely.

In her January 29 speech at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris, Secretary of State Clinton called missile defense “an extraordinary opportunity for us [the United States, NATO and Russia] to work together to build our mutual security.” It’s time for the two countries to muster enough political will to make this happen.

Volha Charnysh is currently the New Voices Nonproliferation Fellow at the Arms Control Association and will begin a Ph.D. in government program at Harvard University in the fall. The views expressed are her own.

At least Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) is honest.  At last Thursday’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START, he explained his absence at the previous nine hearings on the treaty thusly:

I agree that this is the tenth hearing you’ve had.  I would suggest that you haven’t had any hearings where the witnesses are opposed to the treaty….We’ve had…seventeen witnesses so far; no witnesses in opposition to it.  I don’t know who thinks that can be reasonable.

Inhofe continued that he could finally show up because the tenth hearing included two witnesses (Bob Joseph and Eric Edelman) whose questions about the treaty largely comported with his own.  

As you may recall, a day before the hearing our own John Isaacs published a nice little blog over at the Chain Reaction taking the good Senator to task for criticizing New START without bothering to show up for or ask a single question at any of the previous public hearings.  

While Inhofe eventually got around to correctly noting that it was John who criticized him for his prior absences (who knew the Council had the power to get a Republican to show up at a hearing??), he at first confused John’s missive with an ad paid for last week by the Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) in which 30 Republican and Democratic leaders backed the treaty.  The endorsement included such left wing luminaries as Colin Powell and former Senators Nancy Kassebaum-Baker (R-KS), Howard Baker (R-TN), and Alan Simpson (R-WY).  Inhofe actually held up the PSA ad and claimed that it was attacking him!  

Ohhh the irony.  I doubt Senator Inhofe intended to inadvertently make the case for New START, but he ended up doing just that.  As he noted, the seventeen previous witnesses who support the treaty include the likes of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (assumed his position under W. Bush), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen (assumed his command under W. Bush), STRATCOM Commander Gen. Kevin Chilton (assumed his command under W. Bush), Stephen Hadley (National Security Advisor under W. Bush), Brent Scowcroft (National Security Advisor under H.W. Bush), Jim Baker (Secretary of State under H.W. Bush), and James Schlesinger (Secretary of Defense under Nixon and Ford).  Add these to the PSA ad (which Inhofe triumphantly displayed at the hearing) and what you get is an ironclad bipartisan consensus in support of New START.  

This is just a thought, but maybe the Obama administration should hire Inhofe to do some of its PR on the treaty?

Last week the Council on Foreign Relations released a Task Force report suggesting that the current U.S policy of ‘strategic patience’ offers a ‘time time frame for achieving denuclearization…so vague that there is a significant risk that [it] will result in acquiescence to North   Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli.’ Echoing a frustration shared by many Korea watchers, the report describes the current administration’s efforts toward the objective of denuclearization in North Korea as ‘halfhearted’.  It warns that Washington must up its game and deal with the policy challenges presented by North Korea, ranked according to their fundamental importance: 1) preventing DPRK nuclear proliferation to others; 2) rolling back the nuclear program; and 3) integrating the isolated nation into the international community.

In order to deal with these issues the Task Force first identifies and reviews four policy options for the current administration: (1) explicitly recognizing and acquiescing to a nuclear North Korea; (2) containing and managing the problem; (3) attempting to roll back the program and; (4) pursuing regime change.  The report suggests that while the current policy of ‘strategic patience’ is most similar to option 2, it is now time to pursue this in combination with option 3, including ‘a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs’.

While many will welcome the timeliness of the report and its rightful critique of current policy, it is not clear how the proposed combination of policy options 2 and 3 can offer Washington any new leverage over Pyongyang…

This is especially so in light of the recommendation that ‘the United States should continue to make it clear to North Korea that there is no prospect of diplomatic normalization without denuclearization’.  Indeed, setting one’s desired outcome as a precondition to providing the other side with any real benefits has so far proved an ineffective route to realizing positive results.  By advocating the status quo of delaying normalization until after denuclearization, it is hard to see what of the reports’ suggested interim ‘inducements’ would actually motivate North Korea to get rid of its weapons – after all it is technically still at war with the U.S, and continuously argues that it needs its nuclear deterrent to prevent U.S attack.

Thus the reports’ recommendations all sound very familiar – bandage the gunshot wound with a small plaster (non-proliferation and denuclearization with cargo inspections and export controls), get out the sticks and carrots (sanctions / aid and cultural exchanges), then hope that the Koreans will change their tune.  This will not, and has never worked.

While aid is often welcomed, the nature of the regime in the DPRK means cultural exchanges will only ever be inbound (sending its nationals abroad is not in the regimes interest). The best carrot is thus diplomacy, pursued genuinely and not simply as a reward for good behaviour.  After all – diplomacy does not just mean engaging with friends; it also requires engagement with countries with which one has disagreements, to seek outcomes of mutual benefit to both parties.   And while engagement between the U.S and North Korea has borne little fruit, this should not be viewed as a justification to delay new and credible negotiations that could ultimately break the current impasse.

The report is correct in noting that the Obama administration has so far made little effort to negotiate or liaise with the North Koreans in any meaningful way. While the President may well have had plans to do so, it’s evident that North Korea’s long-range rocket launch on 5 April 2009 and its second nuclear test on May 25 2009 made it nigh politically impossible to do so.  But to characterize this belligerent period as a North Korean effort to place ‘every possible obstacle in the way of renewed dialogue’, as the report does, is to misrepresent the reality of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy in the run up the 2008 presidential election.

In describing these months the report suggests that the situation Obama inherited followed ‘last-ditch efforts on the part of the George W. Bush administration to convince the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to accept international verification of its nuclear facilities as part of a February 2007 implementing agreement under the six- party framework’. But this description of events fails to point out that North Korea had no obligation to verify any of its facilities under Phase Two of the Six Party Talks.

At Phase Two, when Pyongyang submitted an 18,000 page declaration of its plutonium activities in June 2008, the U.S was in return supposed to delist North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terror.  Instead of doing this, Washington demanded that before it could remove North Korea from the list, Pyongyang should accept intrusive inspections of its declared facilities – a significant and retrospective modification of the February 2007 agreement.  These ‘last-ditch efforts’ thus amounted to last-minute goalpost shifting.   Condoleezza Rice even admitted as much in June 2008, saying that “what we’ve done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, into phase two”.  And when Washington did finally remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terror list in October 2008, it did so in the context of simultaneously suspending energy aid until North Korea accepted the proposed verification protocol.

Unfortunately, the CFR report makes no mention of these significant u-turns in policy.  In this author’s view, they are a major reason why relations deteriorated post-2008.  While North Korea’s nuclear programme is once again continuing unchecked and the country has reverted to engaging in reckless behaviour, it nevertheless continues to maintain that it is still committed to denuclearization and wants ‘a specific and reserved form of dialogue’ (read bilateral, with the United States).  Consequently, it seems clear that any effort to denuclearize North Korea must be pursued with this in mind – and as such engagement and diplomatic normalization should be implemented in tandem with initial steps in other areas, such as disablement and dismantlement. Reserving them as the final reward in contrast, will achieve little – if anything.

As Stephen Haggard and Susan L. Shirk aptly point out in the ‘Additional and Dissenting Views’ section, ‘[this] report wrongly suggests that these policy measures need to be rank ordered, when they should be under- taken in combination. Engagement is a crucial long-run element of any strategy toward North Korea if we are to gradually transform its economy and society and thereby improve the welfare of its people and change its stance toward the world.’

On Tuesday, Undersecretaries William Burns and Stuart Levey testified at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled “Iran Policy in the Aftermath of UN Sanctions.” The hearing focused on the recently passed Resolution 1929, which is intended to address “the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program” and “send an unambiguous signal to Iran that the international community holds it accountable for its actions.”

Overall, Iran sanctions appear to be a nonpartisan issue, where both sides have taken on the view that the harsher the sanctions are, the better, given the nature and seriousness of the Iranian threat.

Chairman Kerry opened the hearing by noting that “a nuclear armed Iran would pose an intolerable threat to our ally Israel, risk igniting an arms race in what is already the world’s most dangerous region, and undermine our global effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.”

The two witnesses strongly supported the utility of the sanctions. However, while Burns asserted that they will leave Iran increasingly isolated, weak, and defenseless, he cautioned that “sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves. They are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still committed.”

Levey spoke specifically about the “pressure track” strategy, which is intended to “hold Iran accountable for its continued refusal to address the international community’s concerns regarding its nuclear program, as well as its support for terrorism, suppression of domestic dissent, and abuse of the financial system.” This strategy consists of two parts: government action, which encompasses activity by the United Nations and concerned states of the international community, and private sector action, including steps taken by international private sector firms to protect themselves from Iran’s illicit and deceptive activity. Together, the administration hopes these two tracks will create a dynamic that is mutually reinforcing and powerful. Levey said that this strategy presents Iran with a clear choice between two paths: continued isolation or reintegration into the international community as an upstanding member.

The other Senators on SFRC by and large called for harsher action. Senator Menendez (D-NK) claimed the U.S. has a tendency to “roar like a lion and bite like a puppy,” while Senator Risch (R-ID) asserted that U.S. policy thus far has yielded no clear results, and that a “real wreck” is en route if the U.S. doesn’t take harsher action. Senator Boxer expressed support for the sanctions but said more precise action is needed, including prohibiting U.S. firms for using foreign subsidiaries or setting up shell companies abroad, which can indirectly support Iran.

Senator Kerry stood out as one of the few Senators who believes that “our ability to secure a new resolution at the United Nations and persuade allies to go still further in pressuring Iran is evidence that engagement has paid off.” Kerry asserted that a two-pronged approach of combining pressure and diplomacy will allow this round of sanctions to succeed.

Overall, SFRC emphasized the U.S. failure to contain the Iranian nuclear program thus far and the need to push for harsher action this time around.  It is troubling that officials continue to assert that sanctions have to date yielded no real benefit, and then conclude that further sanctions are the solution, some going so far as to add that efforts at engagement should no longer be pursued.

Pursuing the path of further sanctions, today the Senate passed new Iran sanctions legislation 99-0.

The Senate has unanimously passed H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, by a vote of 99-0.  The House is expected to follow later today.

The final bill expands existing U.S. sanctions to include entities that trade with Iran’s energy sector, since U.S. sanctions passed in 1996 targeted investment only.  It also imposes sanctions on financial institutions doing business with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or with certain Iranian banks blacklisted by the Department of the Treasury.  

While the bill does allow the president to waive penalties on countries cooperating with UN sanctions, it denies the exemptions the administration had requested and places extensive restrictions on the president’s waiver authority.  This exemption has been the most serious disagreement in a process that has had bipartisan support from both the House and Senate since its inception.

Under this bill the president may waive sanctions on companies for 12 months on a case-by-case basis as long as he certifies to Congress that the country where the company is based is cooperating with U.S.-led multilateral efforts to isolate Iran.

Getting down to a few of the specifics, the legislation will:

•    Expand the scope of sanctions authorized under ISA by imposing sanctions on foreign companies  — including insurance, financing and shipping companies — that sell Iran goods, services, or know-how that assist it in developing its energy sector;
•    Ban U.S. banks from engaging in financial transactions with foreign banks doing business with the IRGC or facilitating Iran’s illicit nuclear program or its support for terrorism  
•    Impose significant financial penalties and travel restrictions on Iran’s human rights abusers.  
•    Establish three new sanctions, in addition to the menu of six sanctions that already exists under ISA, including: (1) a prohibition on access to foreign exchange in the U.S.; (2) a prohibition on access to the U.S. banking system; and (3) a prohibition on property transactions in the U.S. The Act would require the President to impose at least three of the possible now-nine sanctions on an entity in violation of ISA.  
•    Ban U.S. government procurement contracts for any foreign company that exports to Iran technology used to restrict the free flow of information or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict freedom of speech.
•    Require a certification from a company bidding on a U.S. government procurement contract that it  is not engaged in sanctionable conduct.
•    Provide a legal framework by which U.S. states, local governments, and certain other investors can divest their portfolios   of foreign companies involved in Iran’s energy sector.  Strengthen efforts to stop black-market diversion of sensitive technologies to Iran.  
•    Strengthen the U.S. trade embargo against Iran by codifying longstanding executive orders and limiting the goods exempted from the embargo.
•    Increase substantially the criminal penalties for sanctions violations by U.S. entities.

The problems with this bill have been well aired here on NoH, but a few welcome changes did appear during conference, including:

•    Non-binding language supporting the work of US NGOs engaged in humanitarian and people-to-people programs in Iran.
•    A binding provision explicitly permitting the export to Iran of a wide range of goods, including those goods related to humanitarian needs, internet and online communications, safe operation of commercial aircraft, and other goods whose export is in the national interest of the United States.
•    A provision imposing sanctions on human rights violators.
•    A provision imposing sanctions on people who help Iran censor communications and the internet.