As anticipated by many, it was reported this weekend that Russia has decided to cancel its controversial sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system to Iran.  According to Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov, the cancelation was a result of the restrictive measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1929 –though its not clear if the Resolution would actually prohibit the sale. The news marks the apparent end of a years long saga in which Russia ostensibly delayed delivery on a number of occasions due to ‘technical reasons’ – but perhaps more realistically as a result of pressure from Israel and the U.S.   As a result, this news represents an Israeli and U.S diplomatic success and illustrates a possibly increasing distance between the once close Iran and Russia…

The S-300 PMU-1 is one of the most advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the world, capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously up to 90 km away. Given the capabilities of the system, it was always easy to see why countries like Israel and the U.S were opposed to the sale.  Indeed, by installing S-300 missile batteries close to its nuclear facilities, Iran could have made it a lot harder for an enemy to successfully destroy its nuclear program from the air.  Naturally, this would not be in the interests of either Israel or the U.S in the event that they felt they had to use military force…

Looking back, perhaps Russia did initially plan on delivering the missile system to Iran – but was waiting for a politically feasible moment to do so.  However, that moment never came, as Iran has faced growing international scrutiny and pressure over its nuclear program since the deal was signed in 2005.  In addition, relations between Russia and the U.S continue to improve following their ‘reset’, thanks in large part to the Obama administration’s tireless outreach and diplomatic work.  Thus, transferring the system to Tehran seemingly became so politically intolerable that Moscow had no choice but to abandon the sale.

The wording of Resolution 1929 backs up the idea that Russia made a political, not legal, decision to cancel the S-300 contract.  While the Resolution states that…

‘all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any […] missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms’

…it is important to acknowledge that it defines missiles according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which explicitly ‘Does not include ground-to-air missiles.’ Clearly then, Moscow made the decision to thus read 1929’s call for States to ‘exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel’ as a de facto legal obligation, rather than point to loopholes which would allow it to proceed with the sale.

So while Iran won’t get its hands on the illusive S-300, it appears that it has already started work an indigenous alternative – and there is always the possibility it might buy a system from China too.   This news also suggests a Russia working ever closer with the United States, and an Iran that is further isolated.  The Obama administration’s policy of engagement and multilateralism backed up by the threat of tougher measures has isolated Iran and strengthened the U.S. ability to secure international support to put additional pressure on Iran.

Above all, though it remains clear that diplomacy must prevail, for a unilateral strike on Iran’s program – with or without air defenses – will no doubt have extremely destabilizing effects for all in the region, and beyond.

On June 24, former George W. Bush administration officials Robert Joseph and Eric Edelman will testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START treaty.  Joseph and Edelman are considered to be strong skeptics of the agreement.

While they have yet to oppose the treaty, Joseph and Edelman published a piece in the National Review last month that recycles most of the well-worn objections to the treaty.  These criticisms have been forcefully addressed in previous hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee on New START.  Below is a point-by-point rebuttal (in italics) to their article.

May 10, 2010

New START: Weakening Our Security
The Senate needs to ask some tough questions.

“All previous nuclear-arms-control treaties have been subjected to close scrutiny and the nation has benefited as a result.”

There is an important distinction between “close scrutiny” and the delay strategy some Republicans seem to be advocating, which is that the Senate should take a really, really long time to evaluate New START.  For instance, Sen. Jon Kyl has argued that 430 days elapsed between the signature of START I and Senate advice and consent to ratification. However, this example overlooks the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed five months after the treaty was signed on July 31, 1991, which required the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to include Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine as parties to the treaty.  The more relevant measure of scrutiny is thus to the time that elapsed between the signature of the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, and Senate advice and consent to ratification on October 1, 1992, a period of just over 4 months.

“Despite claims by the administration that the treaty will reduce by 30 percent the number of nuclear warheads each side is permitted to deploy (from 2,200 to 1,550, a net reduction of 650), the numbers are really smaller, since both the U.S. and Russia were moving towards force levels significantly lower than those permitted under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty negotiated by President Bush, which reduced the levels by almost 4,000 warheads.”  

In the absence of limits on the size of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, Russia would have less confidence in its ability to maintain a stable strategic nuclear relationship with the United States. This could prompt Moscow to maintain a larger number of deployed warheads (and delivery vehicles) targeted at the U.S.  than it would with a new treaty.  As STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton stated, “One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because…when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty.”

“Moreover, some of the claimed reduction is an artifact of a revised counting rule. In fact, because a bomber will now be counted as one warhead no matter how many bombs or cruise missiles it carries, the agreement may be the first of its kind to permit an actual increase in fielded warhead levels.”

New START’s bomber counting rule is not a fundamental departure from how START I, which the authors supported, counted bomber weapons.  Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) noted that counting one weapon per bomber “appears to continue guidance first set down by President Reagan….President Reagan’s position was to minimize the counting of bombers reflecting their stabilizing nature.”  Bombers are inherently less destabilizing than missiles because they take much longer to deliver warheads to their target and can be recalled.  Neither side is likely to get a strategic leg up on the other via the bomber counting rule. Moreover, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the number of Russian deployed strategic warheads “is above the treaty limits.  So they [the Russians] will have to take down warheads.”

“Furthermore, as some analysts have suggested, the treaty may contain a startling loophole, large enough to drive a train through, which would not count ICBM launchers on rail-mobile platforms. Given past and present Russian interest in such forces, the Senate must certainly determine whether such a gap exists and, if it does, fix it.”

There is no loophole in the treaty regarding rail-mobile ICBM launchers.  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. James Miller testified that “The treaty central terms and definitions cover all ICBMs and all ICBM launchers, which would therefore include any rail-mobile systems.  In the event that Russia deploys rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the launchers and the ICBMs they carry would be – and the warheads as well would be accountable under the New START Treaty.”

“The agreement, by reducing deployed-launcher levels to 700 while keeping warhead levels high and discounting bomber loads, creates an even greater incentive for Russia to field land-based missiles with multiple warheads — which is exactly what Moscow intends to do.”

Russia’s deployment of a new, multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27 (known as the RS-24) is a concern.  Yet rejecting New START would only heighten uncertainty about the number and location of these missiles and provide Russia with an even greater incentive to maintain a larger number of warheads on its delivery vehicles.  

“As for “tactical” nuclear weapons — as though any nuclear weapon can be tactical or “non-strategic” — the agreement is silent; which is exactly what Moscow wanted, to preserve its estimated 10-to-1 advantage in this category of weapons.”

Like previous strategic arms control agreements supported by the authors, New START does not impose limits on non-strategic warheads. While experts agree that these weapons present difficult challenges, the best way to address tactical nuclear weapons is to ratify the New START agreement as soon as possible, and then to begin negotiations with Russia on this issue.  In response to questioning from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated that ratification of New START is a necessary “precursor” to deal with threat posed by Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal.  

“Other senators, including Kerry, Carl Levin, and Dianne Feinstein, also issued scathing criticisms of the Bush agreement, especially because it failed to place any limitations on overall stockpiles or to require any elimination of warheads.”

Despite the concerns they raised, former Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) and every other Democratic Senator voted in favor of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

“The September 2008 Defense-Energy White Paper suggested a future force of approximately 900 launchers necessary for deterrence purposes and, as the Wall Street Journal noted on March 31, “In Congressional testimony last summer, Deputy Joint Chiefs Chairman General James Cartwright put 860 launchers as the bare minimum.” What has changed since these assessments were made?”

Gen. Chilton recently observed that “time has passed since General Cartwright testified, and we have had the opportunity to do a lot more analysis during this period.  And as we looked at it, it not only made sense strategically, but it certainly is doable to continue to sustain the triad at these current [New START] numbers.”  Secretary Gates proclaimed: “[T]he first step of the year-long nuclear posture review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed.  This, in turn, provided the basis for our negotiation of New START.”

“But will New START allow for a resilient Triad, including a credible bomber leg?”

According to Secretary Gates, the U.S. will continue to maintain a robust triad of delivery vehicles and “retain…complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protects our national security interests.”  The Department of Defense has established a baseline force structure to guide U.S. planning under New START in which the U.S. will retain up to 240 deployed SLBMs distributed among 14 submarines, up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, and up to 60 deployed heavy bombers.  This planned force structure would reduce SLBMs from a current force of 288 to 240, deployed ICBMs from a current force of 450 to 420, and nuclear-capable bombers from 94 to 60.  The U.S. can meet the limits in the treaty without physically destroying a single launcher or altering current or planned basing arrangements. In addition, the administration has announced a plan to spend $100 billion over the next ten years to sustain and modernize all three legs of the triad.  

“All of these issues are complicated by the verification challenges raised by the treaty.”

New START contains an updated, streamlined, and more cost-effective system of verification procedures that are tailored to the limits in the treaty, reflect the realities of the current U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, most importantly, will allow the U.S. to effectively verify Russia’s compliance with the treaty.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified that, “in totality, I’m very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now.”  Gen. Chilton argued that without the treaty “we would have no verification regime because…START I has expired.  And so…we would lose any transparency or right to inspect the Russian force structure.  And I think that’s important that we have that…visibility into their force.”

“New START abandons on-the-ground monitoring of Russia’s missile-manufacturing facility and permits Russia to withhold telemetry of some of its missile tests, undermining our ability to know both what is being produced and what is being developed.”

In November 2008 the Bush administration presented the Russians with a proposal for a follow-on agreement to START I that did not include continuing monitoring at Votkinsk, where Russia produces its Topol-M (SS-27) and Bulava (SS-26) missiles. START I negotiator Ambassador Linton Brooks recently remarked last year that “the continuous monitoring at Votkinsk was done at a time when we were worried about large numbers of spare launchers and large numbers of spare missiles that could be brought together, and that has proven not to be a genuine worry.” While New START will not include on-site monitoring at Votkinsk, it will include provisions that will continue to allow the U.S. to monitor Russia’s mobile missiles. For example, the treaty requires Moscow to notify the U.S. 48 hours before new solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs leave Russian production facilities such as Votkinsk.

According to Secretary Gates, “we don’t need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty.” That the U.S. negotiating team was still able to secure an agreement to exchange telemetric information on up to five missile launches a year is a nice win for transparency and confidence-building.

“Beyond its specific terms, much of the rationale for the treaty is that it will help with resetting our relations with Russia and help win support for the administration’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program as well as other issues of mutual concern. Here, there has always been reason to be skeptical…”

The resumption of the formal arms control process between the U.S. and Russia has in fact enhanced relations between the two countries and facilitated cooperation in other areas vital to U.S. national security.  As Sen. Kerry put it in an op-ed this week, “[a] major achievement of our outreach has been Russia’s increased cooperation in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”  Russia had been skeptical of further sanctions against Iran but supported new sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council last month.  After the vote, Moscow also canceled the sale of the S-300 anti-missile system to Iran.  Russia has also aided the U.S. effort in Afghanistan by granting the U.S. access to Russian airspace and overland transit routes, thereby making it easier to get crucial supplies to our troops in the field.  

“With missile defense, the explicit limitation is found in Article 5, which precludes any further conversion of ICBM silos for use by defensive interceptors.”

The New START treaty does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.  Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly said: “I do not see any limitation on my ability to develop missile defenses.”  He added that “from a technical basis…I would say that either one of those approaches of replacing ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or adapting the submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor, would actually be a setback—a major setback—to the development of our missile defenses.”  In fact, New START actually helps U.S. missile defense programs.  According to Gen. O’Reilly, “[u]nder New START the Trident-1 missile is not accountable so we will have greater flexibility in using it as a missile defense test target with regards to launcher locations, telemetry collection and data processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures and operationally realistic intercept geometries.”

“[T]he Russians…have already threatened to leave the treaty if the U.S. increases its missile-defense capabilities.”

As was the case with START I, the U.S. and Russia have issued unilateral statements on how they interpret the relationship between the new treaty and missile defense.  In its statement accompanying START I, the Soviet Union threatened to withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty.  Yet when the U.S. did withdraw from the ABM treaty in 2001, Russia did not withdraw from START I.  As Secretary Gates pointed out, “the Russians can say what they want.  If it’s not in the treaty it’s not binding on the United States.”

“As for conventional global precision strike weapons, the NPR makes explicit that they will be counted under New START.”

New START will count ICBMs and SLBMs whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads, thus a prompt global strike capability would be subject to the treaty’s limits. However, Secretary Gates stated that <strong.“the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less.  The treaty’s limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, combined with the ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability.”</strong>  Moreover Undersecretary Miller testified that “DoD is also exploring the potential of conventionally-armed long-range systems that fly non-ballistic trajectory, for example, boost-glide systems.  We are confident that these non-nuclear systems…would not be accountable…for the purposes of the treaty.” It remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s full plans are for a prompt global strike capability.

“[T]he NPR…announces a new declaratory policy that undercuts our ability to deter biological attacks that may be as lethal and more likely than nuclear attack.”

Joseph and Edelman misconstrue the impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on U.S. national security.  The NPR strengthens U.S. security by making clear that any state using chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies would still face a devastating conventional military response, and that the leaders of the responsible countries would be held personally responsible.  This is a far more credible threat than the use of nuclear weapons, which no country has employed since the end of World War II.  The NPR also notes that: “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.”

“[T]he NPR imposes severe constraints on the modernization and maintenance of our nuclear stockpile.”

The Nuclear Posture Review and the Section 1251 report make clear that “the Laboratory Directors will ensure the full range of life extension program approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components are studied.”  This approach reflects the fact that there is no technical or strategic need to replace the nuclear components in warhead primaries and secondaries, and that doing so could undermine the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.  However, if replacement of such components becomes necessary, then the President has the option to do that.  The director’s of the three U.S. nuclear weapons labs have strongly endorsed the NPR’s approach.  In their April 9 joint statement, they said: “We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.”

“The Senate will have to decide whether the limitations on future U.S. capabilities that are in this treaty will enable us to have adequate means for meeting the threats we know we will face, as well as those that we cannot know but may well emerge.”

To date, every witness who has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Committees on New START has strongly endorsed the New START treaty as big win for U.S. national security that will allow the U.S. to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent and will not limit U.S. missile defense plans or advanced long-range conventional strike capabilities.  Most of theses witnesses have been former high-ranking officials in Republican administrations (e.g. Schlesinger, Hadley, and Scowcroft) or military leaders that assumed their commands during the administration of George W. Bush (e.g. Gates, Mullen, and Chilton).

Furthermore, nearly every witness has testified that failure to ratify the treaty would make the U.S. less secure.  In the words of Schlesinger, “to fail to ratify the treaty in the due course of the Senate’s deliberation would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to particularly the nonproliferation issue.”  Likewise, Gen. Chilton remarked that “if we don’t get the treaty, they [the Russians] are not constrained in their development of force structure and…we have no insight into what they’re doing.  So it’s the worst of both possible worlds.”

Will any of that cut come from defense?  

The plan has not been formally announced, but AP reports that House Democratic leaders will propose a $7 billion cut in President Barack Obama’s fiscal 2011 budget.  The plan is expected to be attached to the rule for floor consideration of the supplemental, which could move this week

The House won’t pass a budget resolution this year, but sees its upcoming one-year spending plan as the “functional equivalent of a budget resolution.”  The plan will set the cap for the 12 regular fiscal 2011 appropriations bills and include selected other provisions.

It looks like few of those bills are likely to be complete come Election Day, though, and will be passed in an omnibus bill during a lame duck session, post-election.

Stay tuned, the one-year “budget enforcement resolution” could be ready later today.

On June 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearing on the New START Treaty, with witnesses Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. They all testified in favor of ratification. As in earlier hearings on New START held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, criticism of the treaty focused primarily on the treaty’s provisions with regard to missile defense, verification, and nuclear weapons complex modernization. Ranking members Carl Levin and John McCain framed the debate for the hearing in their contradictory opening remarks:

LEVIN: There have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply incorrect…This treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses.

…

MCCAIN: Secretary Gates, you have been quite clear, and I quote, “that the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. While such assurances are welcome, they don’t change the fact that the treaty text, not just the preamble, but Article 5 of the treaty itself, includes a clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options.”

MISSILE DEFENSE, ARTICLE V, AND THE RUSSIAN UNILATERAL STATEMENT

In their prepared statements, both Clinton and Gates reaffirmed the treaty’s lack of legal restrictions on American missile defense. Clinton in particular devoted a significant period of time to discussing Article V of the treaty, which forbids both parties from converting existing ICBM or SLBM launchers into interceptor launchers for missile defense purposes. Explaining that the U.S. never had any plans to convert additional existing launchers for missile defense purposes, Clinton emphasized the irrelevance of Article V to American missile defense efforts:

CLINTON:  I mean, we could have had a long list — you know, we’re not going to launch from any moving vehicle, like a car or a truck or a cow. I mean we could have said a lot of things that we’re not going to do. But the fact is, we weren’t going to do them, and we weren’t going to do this either.

Sen. McCain seized on the issue of the Russian unilateral statement in the Q&A. He noted that in the statement, the Russian government mentioned that it would consider exercising its right to withdraw from the treaty should the U.S. develop its missile defense capabilities “in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.” Both Clinton and Gates, however, were quick to dismiss the importance of the statement, with Clinton arguing it was as legally binding as a press release and Gates noting, “the Russians can say what they want. If it’s not in the treaty it’s not binding on the United States.” Gates also reiterated that the United States had no plans to develop missile defense on a scale that would threaten the Russian deterrent.

Later in the Q&A, Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss emphasized the importance of missile defense, arguing that “the issue of missile defense may be more important than any agreement that the U.S. and Russia enter into regarding nuclear weapons. And that’s because we’re much less likely… to face a nuclear conflict with the Russians than we are to be attacked or threatened by a rogue nation or a terrorist group that possesses nuclear weapons.”

RUMORED SECRET AGREEMENTS

When asked by Senator Levin if there existed any secret, side or informal agreements between the United States and Russia that might limit American missile defense, Clinton replied: “No.” A later question on the same subject by Maine senator Susan Collins elicited a longer response from the witnesses. Collins asked Clinton about the veracity of a news report that asserted the Obama administration was working to ink an as-of-yet incomplete deal with the Russian federation that limited U.S. missile defenses. Clinton and Gates both rejected the report’s claims, but suggested that the United States was seeking to cooperate with the Russians on a joint missile defense system, which could also include Europe. Towards the end of the hearing, Clinton revisited the issue of secret agreements, in what appeared as an attempt to preempt any future speculation:

CLINTON: …Number one, there is no secret deal. Number two, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses either in this treaty or in any other way. And number three, on that score, the story is dead wrong. I want to be very clear about that because I don’t want anyone using what is yet again another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. And as Secretary Gates and I have both said, we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia, but the talks are not secret and there’s nothing on the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would involve any limits on our missile defense. Instead, we’re seeking to see whether they can be expanded with additional capabilities for our system.

NEW START IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Unlike this week’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on New START, which tended to discuss the treaty in a bilateral U.S.-Russian context, today’s hearing discussed the impact of New START on wider nonproliferation efforts. Both Secretaries Chu and Clinton emphasized that ratification would demonstrate the United States’ willingness to uphold its disarmament commitments under the NPT, thus illustrating American support for the global nonproliferation regime. Senator Hagan further reiterated the important nonproliferation benefits of New START in the Q&A:

HAGAN: …if the two nations that possess the most nuclear weapons — us and Russia — agree on verification and compliance of nuclear weapons and are committed to nonproliferation, it is possible to achieve consensus with other countries. It is important to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ratifying this treaty will demonstrate our commitment to nonproliferation, sending a message and isolating Iran.

Secretary Gates also clearly shot down proposals from Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC) and other Senators for building a national wide defense against Russia and all countries:

“Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation’s large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile defenses do not and will not affect Russia’s strategic deterrent. To build such a capability, a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980s, is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive and destabilizing. Therefore, we have no plans to do so.”

Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) gave his official blessing to the treaty:

“My own feeling is that if this New START treaty is ratified, it will be a small step forward for mankind, but a long way, I’m sure you’d agree, from the dream that people harbor of having a nuclear-free world.”

After setting the stage at the UN last week, the US and EU have followed through on their pledge to implement strong unilateral sanctions on Iran.  While decades of US sanctions have eliminated Iran’s reliance on the US market and rendered US sanctions essentially worthless, the implementation of stronger European sanctions is a significant step.

According to an official statement, the European measures include sanctions on “key sectors of the gas and oil industry with prohibition of new investment, technical assistance and transfers of technologies” and related equipment and services.  In addition, Iran’s shipping and air cargo companies will be blacklisted and banned from operating in EU territory, and new visa bans and asset freezes will be imposed on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.  Officials say the new sanctions could come into force within weeks.

Prior to this move, the EU has not placed significant trade restrictions on Iran beyond existing UN sanctions.  As a result, the EU is one of Iran’s largest trading partners, along with China, and provides for more than 20 percent of Iran’s trade.  H/T to Max Bergmann here, who makes some great points on the Obama Administration’s containment strategy over at the Wonk Room. Bergmann points out that…

While the effort at the UN has been the most visible aspect of the Administration’s Iran policy, it has taken other steps to contain and isolate Iran. Militarily, the administration has reoriented US missile defense plans in Europe so that they are more focused and effective in countering the Iranian missile threat. Through General Petraeus the Administration has sped up missile defenses in the Persian Gulf. They have also reassured Iran’s Arab neighbors of US commitment to their security in an effort to stave off potential cascade of nuclear proliferation throughout the region. Ideologically, through its broader outreach to the Muslim world and by developing a direct dialogue with the Iranian people the Administration has helped undercut Iran’s ideological appeal in the region.

Internationally, the administration has been able to increase Iran’s isolation and box it into a corner…

In a statement released today, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has stated that the US and EU moves demonstrate Western neglect of Russia’s opinion, and that unilateral sanctions will erode international efforts.

“We are extremely disappointed that neither the United States nor the European Union is heeding our calls to refrain from such steps,” Russian news agencies quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov as saying.

While many critics speculated that Russia and China would attempt to water down UN sanctions to the point of insignificance, it seems that the US has come away with both a strong UN Resolution and unilateral sanctions that fill in the gaps.

This is not to say that sanctions will end Iran’s nuclear program (in all likelihood they will not) but at this point, the US has managed to gain a slight upper hand that most, including Iran, probably didn’t see coming.