VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON

On June 16, three high-ranking DoD officials – James N. Miller, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Commander, US Strategic Command, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency – testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START treaty.  The hearing marked the eighth hearing on the treaty.

The witnesses’ introductory remarks were informative and reassuring from a military standpoint. Most notably, they took sufficient time to address Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty (which prohibits conversion of silos for ICBMs and for SLBMs for the placement of missile defense interceptors), testifying that it does not constitute a current or future limit on missile current U.S. missile defense plans. They specifically stated that the conversion of silos is an antiquated practice, costly and inefficient, and were it to be performed it would degrade U.S. national security, as it would require trading a Trident D5 SLBM for a single missile defense interceptor. Finally, General O’Reilly noted that New START is comparatively less constraining on missile defense than the original START I treaty.

Citing the dueling unilateral statements issued by the U.S. and Russia on missile defense, Senator Risch (R-ID) challenged the witnesses as to whether the U.S. and Russia have deep differences on how to interpret the treaty when it comes to missile defense.  Gen. O’Reilly responded by noting that the treaty does not in any way limit current and planned U.S. missile defense activities and that he has briefed the Russians in detail about our plans.  Undersecretary Miller stated that while some on the Russian side would like to use the treaty ratification process to constrain U.S. missile defense programs, the two sides don’t have a different interpretation of the treaty text and the U.S. has made it absolutely clear that it will continue to expand and improve its existing missile defense programs.

Senator Shaheen finished things up with a clarifying question regarding Sen. Risch’s concerns: “Do you believe that the Russian unilateral statement is a concern from a military perspective?” General Chilton responded: “No ma’am.”

THE NEGOTIATIONS

On June 15, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation and Chief U.S. Negotiator of the New START Treaty and Edward L. Warner, III, Secretary of Defense Representative to the New START Negotiations testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START Treaty. This was the seventh hearing on New START before the Committee.

Both witnesses provided strong, informative, and technically detailed testimonies in favor of the treaty. Much of the hearing focused on questions raised largely by Senator DeMint (R- SC) about missile defense, the only Senator apart from acting Chairman Sen. Kaufman and Sen. Lugar to appear at the hearing. Despite initial remarks by Gottemoeller and Warner, as well as Senator Kauffman, that missile defense capabilities are not limited by the treaty, that a comprehensive missile defense system able to render Russian ICBMs obsolete is “costly and impractical,” and that rather, the U.S. will deploy “the most effective system” as determined by defense needs, Senator DeMint nevertheless dove into a series of questions about U.S. intentions regarding missile defense and the United States’ reliance on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Warner provided the strongest response to DeMint’s claims.  He pointed out that not developing a comprehensive missile defense system that shoots down Russian missiles (the apparent goal of Senator DeMint) is not embodied in START, for in fact START does not touch on missile defense at all. DeMint then expressed his concerns about MAD, noting that he believes the American people are not happy with its implications (i.e., nuclear destruction). To this, Warner differentiated between the choice and the necessity of MAD- noting that all administrations since George H.W. Bush have acknowledged that a comprehensive missile defense system able to shoot down multiple warheads from long range ballistic missiles is simply not an achievable goal- and that consequently we revert to MAD out of necessity. Following Senator DeMint’s exit from the hearing, Senator Lugar commented: “I don’t know any serious thinker who has envisioned a comprehensive missile defense program,” which both Gottemoeller and Warner confirmed as correct.

Other important take-aways from the hearing include:
•Gottemoeller’s insistence that the treaty is the product of an interagency effort, and consequently the negotiators have full confidence that it accounts for all of the views of the U.S. government (confirmed in today’s hearing by the witnesses);
•Warner’s emphasis that the new treaty has the full support of the U.S. defense leadership, who believe that it strengthens our security while protecting our flexibility (again, confirmed today);
•Gottemoeller’s belief that the Russian unilateral statement should actually be interpreted as a good sign, for while it indicates that Moscow does not like our current position on missile defense, more importantly it shows that they did not succeed in including their objections in the text of the treaty;
•Gottemoeller’s response to a question from Senator Lugar as to why the use of telemetric data has changed from the previous START treaty, in which she noted that the new verification regime no longer requires the exchange of telemetric data, but that it will still be exchanged on a limited basis (for up to five missile tests per year).

Last Thursday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held it’s sixth hearing on the New START treaty with former National Security Advisers Lt. General Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley. One of the most interesting and important moments of the hearin…

I’m proud to be a part of a new report that identifies options for nearly $1 trillion in savings over the next 10 years within the Department of Defense.  Debt, Deficits, & Defense: A Way Forward was produced by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, a group of defense policy wonks put together by Representative Barney Frank to propose possible cuts to the military budget.

“I do not believe after this [proposed plan] is circulated that people will be able to dismiss the argument that you can responsibly, and at no cost to America’s genuine security, make reductions of over a trillion dollars for what has been proposed for the military budget,” Frank said at the release on Friday.

Cuts include further reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal and limits on the planned modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, which could save approximately $140 billion over 10 years.  When missile defense and space spending are also selectively curtailed, that number is increased to $194.5 billion.

Over 100 congressional staffers, NGOs, and members of the press were at the briefing on Friday.  When asked what his top three priorities might be for realistic savings within the defense budget, Frank included both nuclear weapons and missile defense.

See the briefing on C-SPAN here.

A report put out last week by former IAEA inspector Robert Kelly, on behalf of the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), claims that Burma is in the process of developing a nuclear weapons program. The evidence used to compile the report includes photographs and documents smuggled out by a renegade Burmese soldier, Sai Thein Win, Deputy Commander of a highly classified military factory that was the headquarters of the army’s nuclear endeavors. Accusations of a nascent nuclear program in Burma are longstanding; however this new evidence exceeds previous unclear satellite images and uncertain reports, and should heighten concern about the program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has launched an investigation into the claims and may be in a position to confirm some of the information.  

Without doubt, Burma is far from completing the project—and as an ostracized nation with a weak economy and few domestic resources, it will have trouble carrying through with it. However, the report claims the photos indicate a distinct interest in a nuclear weapons program—not a peaceful nuclear energy reactor. The evidence includes photos taken in critical facilities in Burma, including images of a vacuum glove box, used to produce uranium metal; technical drawings of a device known as a bomb-reduction vessel, which makes uranium metal for fuel rods and nuclear-weapons components; and detailed descriptions of tunnels used as command posts and storage areas for secret weapons and equipment.

The new evidence is said to complement previous knowledge about the Burmese nuclear program. The program is believed to be run by Dr. Ko Ko Oo and managed by the Directorate of Defense Services Science and Technology Research Center (DDSSTRC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the former of which has been charged with building a nuclear reactor, enriching uranium, and building a nuclear weapon. The DVB report concludes that Burma, a state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and an IAEA member, is developing nuclear technology and has full intent in building a bomb, but that it will have difficulty in doing so, and that the program is in a primitive stage.

While all of this should be taken with caution, due to the one-party source of evidence, attention should be drawn now to the possibility of a future increase of Burmese nuclear cooperation with North Korea.

In terms of their interconnectedness, a leaked report last year showed just how close the militaries of the two states have become. A photo record of Burma’s Joint Chief of Staff Thura Shwe Mann’s official trip to North Korea depicted his delegation visiting several secret locations in the DPRK, including what looks like a SCUD (Hwasong) production plant.  

Long accused of using front companies and intermediaries to provide illegal weaponry to Burma, Iran and Syria, North Korea has recently been accused by the United Nations of defying a UN ban through the continued export of nuclear and missile technology, supported by false labeling of exports and shipping containers, falsification of information about the destination of goods, and use of intermediaries and financial institutions in individual trades.  But while many worry about North Korea proliferating in this manner and transferring physical goods and technologies to countries such as Burma, a more immediate consequence of the DPRK nuclear program is the transfer of scientific ‘know-how.”  

North Korea has thousands of nuclear scientists available for dispatch who could prove a lucrative resource for the cash-strapped regime and importantly, are infinitely harder to detect than the actual transfer of physical nuclear technology.  As such, should the Burmese program carry on in its current form, Rangoon may soon look to North Korea for technical assistance personnel.  Even though Burma’s current program looks to be based on an enriched uranium approach – while North Korea’s is traditionally based on reprocessed plutonium– it is important to remember that Pyongyang has experimented with uranium enrichment and dealt substantially with the A.Q. Khan network (famous for its uranium enrichment technology proliferation) during the 1990s.  Consequently, North Korea is in a position to offer assistance and know-how in this area, and due to the plentiful stocks of uranium ore in its mountains, could one day be in a position to sell uranium for enrichment to Rangoon.

While a Burmese nuclear bomb is not yet in existence, recent developments indicate that we have all the more reason to keep close watch on North Korea’s clandestine behavior and Burmese actions.

I tried to work a good baseball reference into the title (but failed miserably) since at the water cooler this morning, most of DC was focused on new Washington National Stephen Strasburg’s impressive major league debut, rather than the impending UN Security Council sanctions vote.

In fact, maybe that’s the real reason why the vote was delayed?

After over an hour delay, said to be due to indecision on the part of Lebanon, twelve nations of the 15-member body voted for the resolution.  Turkey and Brazil voted against, as was expected, while Lebanon chose to abstain.

Ambassador Susan Rice spoke out strongly against Iran’s actions and addressed ongoing negotiations on the TRR Deal in her remarks following the vote:

Turkey and Brazil have worked hard to make progress on the Tehran Research Reactor proposal—efforts that reflect their leaders’ good intentions to address the Iranian people’s humanitarian needs while building more international confidence about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. My government will continue to discuss the Iranian-revised proposal and our concerns about it, as appropriate. But the Tehran Research Reactor proposal—then and now—does not respond to the fundamental, well-founded, and unanswered concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. This resolution does.

Later in the day, President Obama said that the new Iran sanctions resolution “demonstrates the growing costs that will come with Iranian intransigence,” but also repeatedly emphasized that the UN sanctions vote does “not close the door on diplomacy.”

Unfortunately, necessary posturing on the part of Iran is likely to make diplomacy difficult in the near future, and Congress is already gearing up to ensure that another round of sanctions is passed by the end of the June.

Rep. Howard Berman praised the passage of this morning’s resolution and confirmed that Congress would be moving forward on gasoline sanctions legislation:

We now look to the European Union and other key nations that share our deep concern about Iran’s nuclear intentions to build on the Security Council resolution by imposing tougher national measures that will deepen Iran’s isolation and, hopefully, bring the Iranian leadership to its senses. The US Congress will do its part by passing sanctions legislation later this month.