During the recent UK election campaign Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg made his opposition to like-for-like Trident replacement plans clear, mainly on the basis of the high costs and record breaking budget deficit.   Forming a key element of the newly elected Coalition Government with Conservative David Cameron, Clegg is now in an excellent position to highlight other problems associated with Trident modernization plans before they are irreversibly acted on.

One problem not highlighted in the leadership campaign is the ‘dependence’ of the Trident system on the support of the US.   Indeed, having presented Trident modernization in the 2006 White Paper as meeting the requirement of a ‘UK nuclear force [that] remains fully operationally independent’, suggestions that it is anything short of this call into question the very rationale for renewing it on this basis.

The UK remains the only country in the world to procure its entire nuclear delivery system (Trident D5 missile) and a large proportion of its nuclear infrastructure from another country, the USA.  This cooperation remains unique and originates from collaborative Anglo-American nuclear weapon design, development and operational planning that continues to this day.  This shared approach is best highlighted by the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) and its subsequent renewals (most recently in 2004), that allow for the exchange of information on nuclear weapon designs and technologies if they assist the common security.

In the 2006 White Paper the Government suggested that the Trident missile would not last much beyond 2020 and that under the 1958 MDA, it received assurances from the US that it can participate in the US life extension programme that will extend the D5’s service life until the 2040s

In the same way that the future replacement of the D5 missiles relies on steady relations with the US, the current stock of missiles, build of the submarine and several component lines associated with the warhead design are also highly dependent on US assistance.  Rather than owning the current stock of missiles employed on the Vanguard submarines, the UK instead leases missiles from a US based common pool, which also serves as a refurbishing and maintenance base for UK stocks.  Amongst other items, the neutron generator, warhead design, re-entry body shell and missile guidance systems are all designed and manufactured in the USA. In the unlikely event that relations deteriorate, the servicing of these components could over time become problematic – impacting on the UK’s capacity to launch its missiles independently, if at all.

In terms of being able to launch a missile reliably, the exact position of the submarine (essential for targeting) can only be determined using two US systems, GPS & ESGN, of which the former the US can deny access to at any point.  In addition to this is the fact that the Royal navy is a recipient of ‘US gravitational information and forecasts of weather over targets, both of which are vital to high missile accuracy’.

From these points alone it is clear that the UK nuclear deterrent has and will continue be thoroughly dependent on US technical assistance.  So although some like Commodore Hare might state that the US has no ‘technical golden key’ to prevent the UK from using the system, it seems that at the very least, Washington could, using technical means,  make a launch substantially less straightforward or reliable for a British Prime Minister.  Dan Plesch makes a strong case in arguing that US sourced nuclear capabilities fails the ‘1940 requirement’ – when ‘the US [was] either actively neutral [to the UK] as in 1940 or actively opposed, as in 1956 at Suez, let alone where the US [could be] an adversary’

Although situations where the US would actively withdraw support for the UK’s deterrent are difficult to imagine, the fact that this could happen highlights some the problems associated with employing a US sourced system.  It is thus likely that if the UK were to at some time go ahead and launch a Trident missile against US wishes, Washington could ‘see such an act as cutting across its self declared prerogative as the world’s policeman…’ and would certainly make the UK pay a high price, likely through withdrawal of political and technical support for Trident.

Failing this test of independence, Clegg should therefore highlight the problem to his peers and push for a prompt and thorough review on the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent takes place.  Given the especially high costs of investing in an indigenously produced, truly independent alternative, and the huge British budget deficit at the moment, one would hope that the Coalition government would see sense, lead by example and eliminate its nuclear weapons

Predicting when Iran will get the bomb has been a popular activity for politicians, strategists, analysts, and the public for some time now.  Unfortunately, these predictions are frequently politicized and exploited to justify increased investments in long-range missile defenses, unilateral sanctions, and even military strikes.

Last month, a report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities concluded that a deployable Iranian ICBM is more than a decade away. The study, authored by former UN weapons inspector Mike Elleman, states that “Iran is not likely to field a liquid-fueled missile capable of targeting Western Europe before 2014 or 2015… Iran is many years away from developing a ‘second-generation’ 4,000-5,000 km intermediate-range solid-propellant missile, if it should decide to do so.” It goes on to say that “many years” has historically been around ten, and thus concludes that since Iran would develop and field an intermediate range missile before developing an ICBM, “a notional Iranian ICBM, based on No-Dong and Scud technologies, is more than a decade away from development.”  The report also separates the development of ballistic missile technologies from the development of nuclear capabilities, saying it can only “appear” that these two programs are linked, but that this cannot be confirmed by the IAEA, and is in fact denied by Iran.

This analysis helps to clarify statements put forward by public officials, which are often stripped of crucial context and twisted by the media in an effort to make an Iranian nuclear weapon seem right around the corner.

For example, in a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on April 14, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright claimed that Iran is currently between two and five years from producing something that could actually produce a nuclear explosion, and would also need three years to develop a reliable means of delivery (such as a missile). Cartwright followed these statements with a note that should Iran simultaneously pursue the construction and the means of delivery of a weapon, the two estimates could be lumped together to produce a final minimum of three to five years.

Complicated and nuanced language on the pace of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs has created never-ending opportunities for the media to overstate the imminence of the threat and over exaggerate certain milestones in Iran’s programs. For instance, while Iran might be able to obtain enough bomb-grade material within a year for a potential weapon, Fox News has falsely interpreted this as synonymous with the completion of an actual deliverable nuclear weapon.  This misinformation is in turn used to bludgeon skeptics of long-range missile defenses and supporters of smart, targeted sanctions against the Iranian regime.

The IISS report has elucidated in writing the stages of the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb (should Iran decide to make one)—something much needed in a field where estimates are easily misconstrued, and extreme precision is needed when answering the question: “when will Iran have a nuclear weapon?”  

Nevertheless, just last week, the press surged with media interpretations of the IAEA’s report on Iran, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” released on May 31, 2010. Characteristically, the imminence of the threat was exaggerated beyond the findings of the report, with headlines such as “U.N. Says Iran Has Fuel for 2 Nuclear Weapons.” Stay tuned for further analysis.

After a recent delay, the White House has expressed confidence that the UN Security Council will back Iran sanctions in the next week, despite controversy over Israel’s Gaza flotilla raid.

While some have all but condemned UN sanctions to a slow and painful death, Robert Gibbs stated yesterday that, “I think the president and the team here remain confident that … within the next week, we’ll have a number that will pass that resolution.”

If a vote does not take place by June 21, as the White House expects, you can bet that Congress will be waiting in the wings to pass its own set of sanctions.

Just prior to the Memorial Day recess, Sen. Chris Dodd and Rep. Howard Berman announced their intention to hold off on Congressional Iran sanctions until the end of June:

With the progress in negotiations at the Security Council, we believe that our overriding goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is best served by providing a limited amount of time for those efforts – and expected follow-on action by the EU at its mid-June summit – to reach a successful conclusion before we send our bill to the President.

Slowed progress will, no doubt, light a fire under those who disagreed with a delay in the first place.

Thanks to our friends over at the Stimson Center, the office has cheerily been playing disarmament video games this afternoon.  Stimson launched “Cheater’s Risk” today, described in their own words below: As part of Stimson’s “Unblocking the Road …

As of the Memorial Day recess, there has been substantial progress toward ratification of the New START agreement. While no one knows when the Senate will vote on the treaty, the Obama Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have done an excellent job building support for the treaty and responding to GOP criticisms…

While many of us complained about the lack of vocal support for the treaty by the Exectuve Branch and by Senators while the negotiations were underway in 2009, those complaints have been calmed by a well-coordinated effort to secure 67 votes once the treaty was completed.

Past Administrations have been riven by national security internicene rivalries and disputes. Indeed, the President-elect appeared to like the theme from Lincoln book of a “Team of Rivals.”

However, the New START team instead is a “Team of Teammates.” It includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other key military leaders who have all sung from the same hymnal on New START. Long-time Biden aide Brian McKeon is coordinating Administration efforts and doing an excellent job.

The Administration’s campaign has included joint appearances by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to announce the treaty signing and to testify at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

It included major opinion pieces by Vice President Biden and Secretary Gates in the Wall Street Journal.

It has been comprised of many briefings for key Senators and staff by chief New START negotiator Rose Gottemoeller and her team.

It has also consisted of wide outreach to key former government and military leaders. When former Secetaries of States James Baker and Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, both said they had been briefed in advance by the Administration.

It incorporated key supporting roles for the Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, James Cartwright, the head of the Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton, Missile Defense Agency Director Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency Thomas D’Agastino.

The key moment in the debate thus far has been the strongly supportive testimoney by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Schlesinger, working with Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), was a key figure in taking down the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999. He also opposed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. A leader among conservative national security specialists, Republicans chose him to head the conservative wing of the congressionally-appointed nuclear posture commission.

Schlesinger’s prepared statement before the Foreign Relations Committee was tepid at best, but in response to committee member questions, he suggested that it was obligatory for the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification and that failure to do so would be detrimental to U.S. security. He then proceeded to knock down some of the major criticisms of the treaty.

Support for the treaty by other major Republican figures has been very helpful.  Baker, Kissinger, former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor Stephen Hadley, former national Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Ambassador Linton Brooks and others have all come out in favor of the treaty.

So too has been unanimous active duty military support for the treaty and the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: the two have often been discussed jointly in the hearings.

It is very helpful that the two leaders of Foreign Relations, Sens. John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) are working to win treaty approval. Past ratification efforts have been handicapped by unfriendly committee chairs, particularly the late Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), who never was enthusiastic for arms control.

Additionally, numerous Democratic Senators are speaking out for the treaty on the Senate floor and in the Foreign Relations committee, including Senators Casey (D-PA), Kaufman (D-DE), Franken (D-MN), Feingold (D-WI), Feinstein (D-CA) and Shaheen (D-NH). In hearings, the committee members have elicted positive responses from committee witnesses.

Sen. Kyl, on the Senate floor, and Sens. Jim DeMint (R-NC), Bob Corker (R-TN), James Risch (R-ID), Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Johnny Isakson (R-GA) in the Foreign Relations committee, have raised a series of criticisms about alleged restrictions on missile defense, the adequacy of nuclear weapons complex modernization, whether the treaty is moving too quickly, the quality of the verification procedures and other topics.

The good news is that both Administration and GOP witnesses have provided credible answers to these questions. The bad news is that Republican Senators keep raising the same issues over and over. However, none but Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK) has declared his opposition, Lugar has argued vigously for the treaty while Kyl has asked his fellow Republican Senators to avoid prematurely declaring a position on the treaty.

Finally, there has been substantial grassroots support for the treaty in states represented by key Republicans, with organizations muting their differences on other issues to work in harness for New START.

It remains impossible to predict timing for Senate action or state definitely that 67 votes will be in hand when the Senate votes. The Administration hopes for a vote in July but that is a wishful scenario.  A vote before the end of 2010 is a more realistic goal. While the administration and its supporters should not view ratification as a given, the major battle will likely be on conditions, understandings and reservations offered to the resolution of ratification reflecting the criticisms already leveled against the treaty.

The Foreign Relations Committee will hold additional hearings (including with treaty skeptics), the Senate Armed Services Committee will conduct a hearing with cabinet secretaries and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of June 17 and the Intelligence Committee will hold a hearing on verification after the intelligence community completes a new National Intelligence Estimate.

All in all – an excellent start to New START.