It was reported today that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has submitted the New START Treaty to the lower house of the Russian parliament for ratification – the Duma.  While it is well known that Senate ratification could take some time, some suggest that in contrast, Duma ratification is a foregone conclusion.  But are suggestions like this an accurate portrayal of Russian politics or overly simplistic ?

For the START follow-on Treaty to be ratified in Russia, it needs to pass through the two houses of the Russian Federal Assembly.  The lower house, or State Duma, is the more powerful of the two and will be the first port of call for Treaty ratification.  For the Treaty to be approved by the Duma, and thus passed onto the Federation Council for consideration, it must be supported by a majority vote.  The Duma has 450 members, who since November 2007 (after intervention of Vladimir Putin), have been elected by proportional representation.  As a consequence , United Russia (‘essentially a creation of Putin’) now has 64.3% of the seats in the Duma.  This suggests that theoretically, the New START Treaty – especially given United Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev approval of it – will have no problem getting approved at the Duma.

The Federation Council has 168 members, of which more than half need to vote in favor of the Treaty (post-Duma approval) to complete the ratification process.   In 2000 President Putin controversially reformed the Federation Council, which prior had been used by Yeltsin as a means to mitigate the Duma’s power and was thus generally obstructive.  As a consequence of these reforms, Putin ensured the selection of a wave of Kremlin-friendly senators – implying that approval of START follow on in the upper house should also be relatively straightforward. 

Nonetheless, there are two issue areas that could potentially delay ratification, or at worse, lead to no ratification at all.

1. Missile Defense

In the U.S., Republican Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain are well known for their concerns regarding the START follow on Treaty, specifically with regard to it potentially limiting future U.S missile defense deployments.  In response, Treaty negotiators have been at pains to highlight the fact that the Treaty does not formally limit missile defense.   In contrast to Kyl and McCain, some Russians are concerned that a further expansion of U.S missile defense might threaten the nuclear balance of power, limiting both their tactical and strategic missile deployments.  Reflecting this concern, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov started in March that ratification would not take place if the Treaty ‘does not take into account the link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense’.   To get around this divergence of opinion, Treaty negotiators included two non-binding ‘unilateral’ statements, designed to appease the likes of Kyl and Gryzlov.  However, because these statements are inherently contradictory, there is potential that despite their non-binding nature, stubborn members in either the Duma or Senate could delay ratification.  As Riki Ellison of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance points out, ”the reality of a successfully ratified outcome will most likely not happen unless we agree to disagree on the linkage of missile defense with Russia.”

2. Presidential Election 2012

Vladimir Putin was forced out of his Presidency in 2008 because of a two-term consecutive limit.  However, because there are no restrictions preventing him running for a third term after someone else serves, rumors now suggest that Medvedev will be facing competition from Putin at the 2012 Presidential Election.  According to Alexander A. Pikayev, the very possibility of this has now triggered a wave of speculation on what appears ”to be a widening crack between those aides closest to the two leaders, if not the leaders themselves.”

The implication it seems is that even though President Medvedev might be eager to get the treaty ratified as soon as possible (to evidence strong leadership in the run up to the 2012 Presidential elections), Putin could delay ratification to undermine his colleague using this power, should he so desire.

Cause for Hope?

In conclusion, while there are two potential risk areas that could delay ratification, it seems that overall it will be in the interests and capability of United Russia, through both Medvedev and Putin, to ensure that ratification is favored in both houses – thus facilitating (if not forcing) a straightforward ratification.

The international team investigating the sinking of the Cheonan released its report last week, alleging North Korean responsibility for the attack.  With the outcome of the investigation widely accepted by the international community, condemnation of Pyongyang has been nearly universal.  As I explained in last week’s analysis, both South Korea and its allies have few avenues to reprimand the DPRK.  Nonetheless, talk of U.N sanctions and the resumption of South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign has infuriated Pyongyang, which has  threatened to retaliate with ‘a sacred war involving the whole nation’, using an ‘indiscriminate punishment of our style’.  While this isn’t the first time North Korea has threatened to respond with war or even use nuclear weapons, its release in the context of the Cheonan incident must not be dismissed lightly – especially given signs that Kim Jong Il has instructed the DPRK military to get ready for combat.

Given the current uncertainties surrounding succession, Kim Jong-Il will not want to look weak to the DPRK military – the group holding the most significant power broker in North Korea.  By not following through on at least some of the type of actions detailed in North Korea’s warnings, Kim could risk being seen as ineffectual – potentially causing problems for the planned succession to his son Kim Jong-Eun.  Kim’s leadership over the coming days and weeks will thus be informed by this context.  Similarly, Lee Myung Bak has stressed that South Korea ‘will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence’.  He too will be under pressure to show strong leadership, especially in advance of the June 2, 2010 local elections in South Korea.  In this context, it seems there are several potential flashpoints that could lead to escalation.

Firstly there is the complex issue of how to address the incident at the UN.  On May 24, Ban Ki Moon condemned North Korea, and expressed hope that when South Korea brings this incident before the UN Security Council, swift action will be taken.  Should a new round of sanctions be approved, and in light of its May 20 warning, North Korea may find itself obliged to at the very least intensify its military presence around the disputed northern limit line and engage in provocative acts – which in turn could escalate into conflict through the stern responses promised by South Korea.  It will be up to the UN Security Council to approve a new round of sanctions.  While most of the international community has accepted the Cheonan report, China has so far remained neutral, calling for all parties to ‘calmly and properly handle the issue and avoid escalation of tension’ – even after two days of intensive lobbying by Hillary Clinton in Beijing.  Given the recent visit to China by Kim Jong Il last month and Beijing’s vested interests in maintaining the regime in Pyongyang (as explained here), this should come as no surprise.

China is going to have to make a choice to either supporting North Korea– a regime it has a long bloodline history with and country in which it has significant economic interests, or South Korea, a strategic partner which has become one of China’s major trading partners.  Complicating matters is that if it vetoes sanctions based on credible and scientific international findings, Beijing’s ever improving international aspirations could be damaged, due to making it appear willing to support unprovoked aggression and killing by a state considered by many as a pariah.   Alternatively China could abstain from the vote, but this would mean any sanctions would pass, perhaps leading to an escalatory response from North Korea.

The second potential flashpoint relates to South Korea’s psychological warfare campaign.  Initially stopped in 2004 as part of a North-South agreement to suspend propaganda across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), South Korea have decided to erect facilities along the 150 miles of the MDL and resume both anti-regime radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, to make North Korea recognize that its illegal activities will definitely have consequences’.   In addition, reports today suggest Seoul will drop propaganda leaflets in North Korea detailing the Cheonan findings and a statement criticizing North   Korea’s behavior.   In response, North Korea Monday warned that it would fire on and destroy such facilities, with South Korea in turn stating that it would view such a move as ‘an act of military provocation and would merit the exercise of self-defense under international laws.’ Without cool headedness on both sides, this potential flashpoint could raise tensions significantly.

Thirdly, South Korea has said it is preparing to fully participate in the U.S.-led ship interdicting Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in an attempt to stem the proliferation of North Korean weapons of mass destruction.  While South Korea is already obliged to interdict suspect North Korean cargoes as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, a more proactive approach will be deemed provocative by the DPRK, which could raise the level of its military responses to any attempted interdiction.

Fourthly, South Korea has banned North Korean vessels from entering its territorial waters, including the straits between the southern island of Jeju and the mainland.  Adding three to four days onto journeys for DPRK vessels headed from East coast to West coast ports, this blockade of sorts could be one that North Korea may attempt to flout early on.  This has the potential of exacting potentially aggressive South Korean responses, given Lee Myung Bak’s statement that ‘if our territorial waters…are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense’.

Fifthly and finally, North Korea has announced that it will cut all ties with South   Korea.  A South Korean official today stated that Pyongyang has already acted on part of this threat, cutting all marine communications between the two Koreas.  This greatly increases the potential for misunderstandings and accidents, and given the charged atmosphere, also the chances of military escalation.

Where escalation will lead in any of these areas is hard to predict.  All-out war is neither in the interest of North or South Korea.  But it has been avoided in the aftermath of other similarly provocative incidents; the DPRK’s bombing of flight 858, two assassination attempts on South Korean presidents in 1968 and 1983, and after the bloody 1976 ‘axe incident’.

So far things, have played out in a relatively calm fashion.  Despite a North Korean threat to expel all South Koreans from the Kaesong Industrial complex, it appears that Pyongyang is not actually acting on this.  Even though South Korea’s psychological campaign has begun, there has been no military response thus far from North Korea.  And despite reports that Kim Jong Il has personally instructed the military to prepare for war, troops do not appear to be on alert at the moment.  So it seems North Korea is being careful not to escalate the situation in any areas where it could really cost them.

Nevertheless, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons might today make it more confident in responding with force to any further South Korean responses  This is especially so given Kim Jong Il’s need to show strong leadership in advance of his succession.   In the highly charged atmosphere, further conflict cannot be ruled out.

Building on the very useful analysis of CAP and IISS, here are some of the key differences between the October 2009 and May 2010 fuel swap proposals:

1)    Iran’s uranium supply is larger now: 1,500kg in 2009 vs. 2,300kg in 2010.  As initially laid out, the swap would have removed nearly 80 percent of Iran’s stockpile of LEU.  As it stands now, the proposal would remove only about 50 percent, leaving behind enough to, theoretically, build one bomb.

2)    In the original proposal, Iran’s fuel would be shipped to Russia, enriched to 19.75 percent, and then sent to France to be converted into fuel rods.  In the new proposal, Iran would send its fuel to Turkey for storage.  

3)    The 2010 plan does not outline what will happen to the 1,200 kg of LEU being stored in Turkey once the deal concludes.  Should another country offer up its own stockpile of LEU for enrichment, which is far from guaranteed, then send that enriched fuel to France for conversion, no provisions exist to state where Iran’s original LEU will go at the end of the process.  One would assume back to the country that offered its LEU for conversion.  For this scenario to work, however, the US or Russia must first agree to provide 1,200kg of LEU.

4)    Paragraph 8 of the 2010 proposal states that: “In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran’s LEU to Iran.”  The terms “not respected” are broad and give Iran the right to request the return of its LEU with no specification as to what constitutes a violation.

5)    The 2009 proposal would have granted the IAEA full-access to Iran’s nuclear program – 2010 does not include any statements regarding inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

6)    The 2010 plan requires that the fuel be delivered to Iran within in one year.  France’s fuel fabricator AREVA EURODIF S.A. has indicated, however, that it will require at least two years to produce the required amount of fuel.

7)    The 2010 proposal states the “right of all State Parties [to the NPT], including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful purposes without discrimination.”  This statement could be taken to assert Iran’s right to continued enrichment in contradiction of current UN Security Council Resolutions, but its intent is not clear.