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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

May 25, 2010

Preliminary Thoughts on the Draft NPT RevCon Final Document

A draft final document penned by the President of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Indonesian Libran Nuevas Cabactulan) has been circulating at the United Nations — and the internet — in the past 24 hours.

After a quick read through of the draft final document, it is clear that the core sticking points amongst States parties remain the same: disagreement over the voluntary vs. binding nature of the Additional Protocol, which would strengthen IAEA ability to oversee and inspect nuclear programs; the Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, for which a distinct conference in 2012 has been proposed and which Israel is being lobbied to attend; and the ever-present debate over a timeline for disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.

However, the draft document also makes clear how forcefully the Non-Aligned Movement states are seeking to delink non-proliferation from nuclear energy; the document text quite stridently defends their right to peacefully develop nuclear energy.  Some interesting points are highlighted below:

33: “The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”

And 34, which reaffirms the right of States parties to the Treaty to develop “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”

35 is also emphatic: “The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.”

Also notable:

On non-NPT states parties (103): “The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without conditions and promptly.”
Notably absent is any mention of Israel (although they are called out by name later).

On diplomacy: “The Conference emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State Party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.”

Unsurprisingly, the text of the final document does not mention Iran by name, but does express concern “with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.”

On the Additional Protocol: point 25 “notes that the entry into force and implementation of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapons States is of vital importance for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of non-nuclear-weapon States’ nuclear programmes.”

—

On an unrelated note, it seems likely that the United Nations Security Council will wait until the Lebanese presidency of the UNSC is over, i.e. until June, to begin discussing the fourth round of sanctions against Iran.  This saves face for Lebanon, and will also allow the NPT RevCon to get the attention it warrants during this last, closing week.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

May 25, 2010

Henry Kissinger: “Arms control is not a bi-partisan issue, it is a non-partisan issue”

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing: The Role of Strategic Arms Control in a Post-Cold War World (The New START Treaty)
May 25, 2010

On Tuesday May 25, Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START Treaty, unequivocally recommending the treaty’s ratification.

Secretary Kissinger is experienced in the field of arms control and nuclear security—he is author of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, he negotiated the first agreement to limit U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons through the SALT I accord, and in 2007 he became one of the most well known figures to endorse the goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons…

He referred to the New START Treaty as a continuation of decades of work by previous administrations and “a modest step forward” in “somewhat” reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world and stabilizing American and Russian relations, both of which improve transparency and stability and support the current administration’s objectives. He emphasized the importance in continuing dialogue with the Russians, without which the world would be subject to the greatest dangers, devoid of regulation. He said this cooperative relationship is important for success in arms control as well as in solving other global concerns.

Secretary Kissinger emphasized repeatedly that the consequences of non-ratification, saying that this would signal to both allies and enemies abroad a change in American polity and a new inclination to use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger brought up concerns that he said relate not to the text of the treaty, but to the international system in which the treaty will exist. He commented that when arms control started, the Soviet Union was a global enemy, but that today, war with Russia is a negligible danger. Similarly, when arms control began, the world was of a bipolar structure; today’s nuclear threat is multifaceted.

From these considerations, he gave two recommendations which he said should guide future nuclear discussions: today’s bilateral discussions should eventually be transformed into multilateral discussions, and tactical nuclear weapons must play a part of any future nuclear arms discussions.

Lastly he added that our goals should include: the elimination of the use of nuclear weapons by choice, the removal of any incentive to initiate nuclear war, and the elimination of the risk of war by miscalculation.

In response to Senate Committee member’s questions, substantive comments from Secretary Kissinger included:

•The treaty does not limit missile defense or modernization; “a robust program of modernization” should be part of these discussions.
•Modernization is a unilateral decision and taken by the Executive branch; as such, Republicans should not fear that this bilateral treaty limits our capacity to modernize.
•No one should ever envision a world with unlimited use of tactical nuclear weapons.
•We have enough nuclear weapons today to maintain deterrence.
•U.S. and Russian negotiations on nuclear weapons should become a pattern for the rest of the world.
•Agrees with Secretary Baker that we should not limit the flexibility of future Presidents in regard to missile defense, but in regards to the treaty this is “not important.”
•Agrees with Secretary Gates that the goal of our missile defense program is NOT to create an invulnerable defense, but to defend ourselves against rogue states and terrorist groups.
•In today’s international system, the U.S. would not gain by building more missiles than the Russians.
•In regards to Iran, the control of Iran’s behavior will be more important to Russian security than to American security, and Russia knows this.
•The argument for this treaty is not to placate Russia, but to improve American national security. It is in the American interest.
•The language in the NPR concerning the use of chemical and biological weapons by non-nuclear states is dangerous, and “incentivizes” states to pursue biological or chemical weapons programs.
•Arms control is not a bi-partisan issue, it is a non-partisan issue.

Secretary Kissinger concluded: “I recommend the ratification of this treaty.”

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

May 21, 2010

Iran Sanctions Update

Surprise, surprise!  According to Reuters, Iran “could cancel its agreement with Turkey and Brazil to transfer some of its uranium abroad if the UN Security Council approves a new round of sanctions against it.”

Turkey, Brazil and Iran have urged a halt to talk of further sanctions because of the deal, but the UN Security Council looks poised to move forward regardless.

In Congress, lawmakers seem as ready as ever to ignore the administration’s request to hold off on sanctions legislation until after a UN deal is concluded.

House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer said Tuesday he wants Congress to complete action on the new sanctions legislation before leaving for the Memorial Day recess:

“We hope it will move out of conference this week and be on the floor next week.”

Hoyer also called the proposed fuel swap “unacceptable,” since it would allow Iran to keep some of its enriched uranium “to pursue its nuclear arms intentions.”

Sen. Chris Dodd commended Sec. Hillary Clinton for the recent breakthrough on UN sanctions. Dodd noted that “international sanctions make a lot more sense than unilateral sanctions,” but also said that Congress would not “reduce or retreat” from passing a unilateral measure.

Inside the conference process, Josh Rogin reports that conferees and non-conferees alike have been holding meetings both at the staff and member level, and both Dodd and Rep. Howard Berman, sponsors of the Senate and House bills, respectively, have been engaged with the administration.

The drive to complete the bill quickly is bipartisan, since Republicans don’t believe the UN language will be tough enough and Democrats don’t want to look weak on national security.

At the UN, the schedule for sanctions remains a little more lax.  State Department Spokesman P.J. Crowley said Tuesday that, “There’s no particular timetable here. The president has indicated he’d like to see this done by the end of spring, and that remains the timeline that we are following.”

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

May 20, 2010

HASC mark a Banner Day for Rep. Turner

By Kingston Reif and Nick Roth

The Nuclear Posture Review took a beating at yesterday’s full House Armed Services Committee mark of the FY 2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136).

By the slim margin of 30-28, Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), the Jon Kyl of the House, secured support for a sense of congress amendment proclaiming that the Nuclear Posture Review weakens U.S. national security by taking options off the table to respond to a catastrophic nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional attack.  Needless to say, the optics of having the House Armed Services Committee on record as saying that the President’s Nuclear Posture Review damages U.S. national security is not helpful.

When it was all said and done, there was a lot of action on the Strategic Force part of the bill.  Two en bloc amendments passed and four additional Republican amendments, including the Turner amendment on nuclear use, were offered.  The administration’s request for nonproliferation programs was considered as part of the general provisions part of the mark, and was fully funded by the Committee.

See below for some more detail and additional thoughts on yesterday’s proceedings.  HASC’s summary of the full mark can be found here.

1. Lamborn (R-CO) amendment (#13): Restrictions on further strategic force reductions; Result: PASSED BY VOICE VOTE

According to Lamborn’s description of the sense of Congress amendment, the amendment limits reductions below those contained in the New START Treaty until such time that the Secretary of Defense and NNSA Administrator produce a report certifying that the strategic environment and threat have changed for the better or our modernization efforts have matured and been implemented in such a way as to make the stockpile more effective.  The amendment also preserves the viability and flexibility of the triad.  It also demands that any further reductions must not require the U.S. to change its targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue (city-busting) targeting.  The amendment wouldn’t categorically prevent future reductions but would ensure that those reductions are driven by in depth strategic analysis to ensure that we maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.  Based on the debate afterwards, the amendment appears to require that no further reductions can occur until 180 days after the report is submitted.

There was a vigorous debate on the amendment, which lasted for more than an hour.  For the most part, Democrats opposed the amendment on the grounds that it would tie the President’s hands and impinge upon the jurisdiction of the Senate over treaties.  They also defended New START and the Nuclear Posture Review, arguing that they address 21st century threats and do not constrain the triad. Representatives Larson (D-WA), Andrews (D-NJ), and Langevin (D-RI), all made very strong statements in support of the President’s policy.

Republicans supported the amendment on the grounds that they are very concerned about President Obama’s disarmament agenda, reductions below New START levels could invite peer competition, etc. Their view was that the amendment calls for common sense conditions that must be met before going below New START levels.

Toward the end of the debate Congressman Murphy (D-NY) submitted a clarifying amendment to strike some of the more objectionable features in the Lamborn amendment, but it failed on a voice vote.  Lamborn’s amendment passed on a voice vote.

2. Turner (R-OH) amendment (#102R): Nuclear use policy; Result: PASSED 30 – 28

As expected, Turner proposed a sense of Congress amendment on the revised Negative Security Assurance in the Nuclear Posture Review that would limit threats of nuclear retaliation against countries that sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  According to Turner, the sense of Congress would return the U.S. to the policy that if our nation is attacked, we will use any and all means necessary to defend ourselves.  The amendment language argues that the NPR weakens U.S. national security by taking options off the table in response to a chemical, biological, or conventional attack.  

Larsen (D-WA) offered a substitute amendment stating that the assurance in the NPR will strengthen U.S. security and that all options are still on the table to deal with states such as Iran and North Korea that are not in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.

There was extensive debate on both Turner’s amendment and Larsen’s substitute.  The Larsen substitute failed by a roll call vote of 28-30.  The Turner amendment passed by a roll call vote of 30-28.  Turner could be seen jubilantly pumping his fist after the roll was announced.

The Democrats were hurt by the fact that Reyes (D-TX), Brady (D-PA), and Garamendi (D-CA) were not present for the vote.  Reyes was apparently attending a celebration for the President of Mexico with President Obama (he came in late wearing a tuxedo). Brady was absent because his wife was having surgery.  It’s still not clear where Garamendi, who has a nuclear weapons lab in his district, was.  The other Democrats who voted in favor of the amendment were from conservative districts.

3. Langevin (D-RI) substitute amendment for the  Turner (R-OH) amendment (#100R) on Missile Defense Hedging Policy; Result: PASSED 32 – 25

Turner offered an amendment on the Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe to ensure that it will be the policy of the U.S. to deploy long-range missile defense in Europe, ensure that blocks II-A and II-B of the Phased Adaptive Approach will intercept ICBMs coming from the Middle East, continue development of the two-stage GBI interceptor as a hedge, and refurbish missile field 1 at Fort Greely, Alaska to deal with the growing long-range missile threat.  Turner argued that the amendment was based on the fact that there is a gap in the hedge regarding U.S. long-range missile defense capabilities whereby an Iranian ICBM threat could materialize by 2015 but block II-B of the phased adaptive approach won’t be ready until 2020.

Langevin offered a substitute amendment which conditioned the deployment of missile defenses in Europe and the U.S. on the completion of operationally realistic testing. Langevin’s substitute also strikes the requirement in the original amendment pertaining to missile field 1 in Alaska.

The Langevin substitute passed by a vote of 32-25, thereby defeating the original Turner amendment.

4. Turner (R-OH) amendment (#106R-2): Future changes in the U.S. force structure in Europe and Congressional Notification requirements; Result: PASSED BY VOICE VOTE

Near the end of the HASC mark, Turner proposed an amendment on U.S. forces in Europe modeled after the Lamborn amendment on further strategic forces reductions below the levels in New START.  The amendment states that any notification of relocation of U.S. forces, including nuclear forces, in Europe must support U.S. national security, assess whether relocation will have any impact on U.S. security commitments, address the current security environment, etc.  The amendment asks for a report assuring that potential changes in force structure and the supporting infrastructure will satisfy the commitments undertaken by the U.S. pursuant to NATO, addresses the current security environment, and contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

After a short period of the debate, the amendment passed by a voice vote.

Nonproliferation Funding:

On funding for the Department of Energy’s nonproliferation programs, the Committee authorized the original budget request of $2.7 billion.  The Committee also fully funded the request of $522.5 million for the Department of Defense’s Cooperative threat reduction program.  There was no debate on this funding.  For the first time in a while no money was added to nonproliferation because the budget request already represented a significant increase over what was authorized in FY 2010.

A few thoughts on the proceedings:

-The good news is that the amendments were policy statements and not on money.  Were Reyes, Brady, and Garamendi actually present for the vote, the Turner amendment on nuclear use policy would surely have failed.
-The bad news is that the result can affect the narrative of progress on nuclear weapons issues. The message sent was that the House Armed Services Committee thinks that the President’s Nuclear Posture Review damages U.S. national security.
-If last year is any indication, Kyl is likely to offer similar amendments when the Authorization bill hits the Senate floor.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

May 20, 2010

Center Chairman General Gard Publishes Op-ed on Military Support for Nuclear Agenda

Center Chairman General Gard has written an op-ed on the support of military leadership for the President’s nuclear weapons agenda published today by the McClatchy-Tribune news service. The article, GOP critics vs. the Pentagon, appeared in Lexington, Kentucky in the Lexington Herald-Leader

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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