by Mathew Montiel*
How do we govern knowledge? Can we control knowledge? If I gave you blueprints for an LGM-35 Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, could you build it?
Thankfully, most of us could not. But it’s not because we can’t figure it out; it’s because there are still significant gaps between expertise, infrastructure and materials that separate knowledge from capability. The threat we face today is that these gaps are closing.
Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have showcased the increasing role of missile technology to deliver conventional munitions and highlighted the potential threat of the proliferation of missile technology when used to deliver, or threaten to deliver, weapons of mass destruction. International treaties, multilateral export control regimes and UN regulations have all focused on controlling missile technology: complete missile systems, guidance systems, re-entry vehicles, space launch vehicles, propellants and related technology. However, in an era defined by dual-use technology, artificial intelligence and additive manufacturing, these efforts are now ineffective.
Jonathan Yet Wing Soong transferred specialized aeronautics software to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which has ties to China’s military. In 2023, 3D Systems Corporation transferred sensitive aerospace data to its subsidiary, Quickparts Inc., in China. This year, China is sending Iran thousands of pounds of ammonium perchlorate, which could be used to manufacture up to 800 missiles. Russia has continuously shown its ability to obtain controlled missile components, UAVs and related systems by exploiting gaps in the current export control system involving dual-use items.
The threat now lies in knowledge, technical expertise and open-source data that can enable malicious actors to circumvent traditional barriers to weapons development. This is precisely why the future of global security relies on controlling what people have, what they know and how they can employ it. This is where Intangible Transfers of Technology (ITT) come into play.
Intangible Transfers of Technology is the transfer of two types of technological knowledge: technical data and technical assistance. Technical data can be described as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs, specifications, manuals and instructions that are written or recorded. Technical assistance includes instructions, skills, training, working knowledge or consulting services.
Hyuk Kim, a consultant at 38 North at the Stimson Center, writes, “As a country’s WMD program evolves toward a mature phase, proliferators’ interests shift from procuring one-time-use physical items to acquiring sensitive technologies.” These sensitive technologies are often knowledge that is essential to the effective development, use and maintenance of missile systems, the preferred delivery system for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Given the diffusion of information on WMDs, controlling delivery system technology has become a vital element of non-proliferation. This controlled knowledge may come in the form of training from foreign experts, manuals detailing maintenance of missile technology and manufacturing equipment, or scientific collaboration that may indirectly benefit a missile systems program.
Additionally, this type of transfer is not physical, making it extremely hard to track, even harder to control, and only needed once. Once the knowledge is received, it can be retained, utilized and proliferated, all from a single transfer. Iranian-German professor Hamid Reza Karim at the University of Agder was found to have transferred knowledge to Chinese researchers that could be used to develop hypersonic cruise missiles in 2015, and was subsequently expelled from Norway. This is one of dozens of cases of intangible transfers of technology aiding the development of a state’s missile program. While nuclear weapon design theory has been widely published, the engineering of reliable, long-range missile delivery systems remains closely guarded and technically demanding, making them the most vulnerable in a scenario involving the proliferation of ITT. The solution must focus on how adaptations to an existing export control regime can be created to stop the proliferation of knowledge on missile technology and related systems.
Today, great powers compete for dominance on the global stage and regional wars split the international community. This makes the environment unsuitable for new export control regimes that require trust, close collaboration and a unified goal. However, existing regimes already have the infrastructure to house and implement new regulations regarding the export of ITT related to missile technology.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal agreement between countries to deter the proliferation of missile technology. In the MTCR restricted material annex, recommendations on controlling ITT are brief and often ineffective. Under current U.S. export controls, government-funded research programs are required to get permission before sharing technical data or assistance with a foreign national, regardless of supplier or end-user intent.
Although this system could serve as a foundational model for basic international controls on ITT, it is not in any way sufficient. The controls do not encompass academic collaboration, foreign direct investment channels or non-government funded research.
Therefore, the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology annex, the listing of what participating governments should control, should include a third category designed to identify and provide control guidance on the diffusion of missile technology knowledge. This can be done by a partner state of the MTCR, preferably an original G7 member, submitting a proposal during the annual plenary meeting.
The proposal will include guidance on identifying sensitive expertise, evaluating it for its potential damage in the case of diffusion, and implementing controls and safeguards to ensure the expertise does not fall into the wrong hands. Sensitive expertise in the proposal will be defined under human and technical expertise, meaning researchers and subject matter experts (SMEs) in missile technology will fall under human expertise, and missile formulae, engineering designs, specifications and manuals will fall under technical expertise. The proposed annex category should outline clear guidance for implementing the controls and safeguards. But how would these regulations work, and how do we address the ethical concerns that come with them?
The controls and safeguards on researchers and SMEs would be determined by their knowledge’s potential to aid a foreign missile program. A risk assessment framework guided by a centralized checklist from the MTCR will evaluate the risk that the expert may pose should their expertise be obtained by a foreign state. Following the risk assessment, states may decide what security measures or restrictions the expert may have when traveling to certain countries like Iran, China, North Korea, Pakistan or India. Suppose an individual with controlled knowledge/expertise has applied for a research visa in one of these countries or plans to travel abroad for professional or personal purposes. In that case, they must obtain an export license for any knowledge/information they plan to share and may be subject to a federal clearance process.This would not be a travel restriction against people with missile expertise, but rather a licensing procedure to be followed before potential sharing of sensitive, government-controlled information.
Although human transfers of sensitive expertise are concerning and deserve action, the most common and difficult to detect form of illicit transfer is through online communications. With this in mind, the proposal will primarily comprise internal compliance mechanisms and technical data safeguards.
Internal compliance mechanisms would implement export control compliance programs at universities, research labs and private companies working with sensitive technical data. The programs would include mandatory training on export control regulations, pre-approval for technical data-sharing and data classification protocols.
Technical safeguards would require deploying data loss prevention software (DLP) that would detect and block unauthorized transfers of controlled documents outside the network. Instead of the traditional use of key works in DLP software, the detection will be based on classification of the document.
States would also be required, within a reasonable timeframe, to move all or most of their research and development of missile technology or related systems, including missile or space-related startups and small companies, into secure environments and issue security clearances to those working with sensitive knowledge and technology. All technical expertise used in developing a missile system will either have to be stored on secure systems monitored by the DLP software or be a physical copy and be unable to leave the facility. These measures would need to be standardized among all MTCR partners.
The MTCR is not legally binding and does not contain an enforcement mechanism. However, this can be beneficial. Without enforcement or set laws pressuring or forcing countries to adopt new regulations, states are allowed to introduce new controls and safeguards gradually, making it more likely for signatories of the MTCR to comply.
With the idea of knowledge governance and control comes ethical and legal questions about censorship, equity and scientific freedoms. It must be clear that any export controls or safeguards applied to experts and researchers will not hinder academic freedom. On the contrary, they aim to preserve it, ensuring that peaceful, collaborative research can continue to thrive safely and responsibly worldwide. Frameworks that restrict the diffusion of sensitive expertise must be put in place with the same caution and rigor we apply to the restrictions on chemical, biological, nuclear or missile materials to ensure they are comprehensive and allow scientific innovation to continue.
The threat of intangible transfers of technological knowledge is very real and extremely dangerous. The international community must begin dialogue to build infrastructure that effectively detects, tracks and interdicts transfers of expertise, technical data and technological assistance. Currently, systems in place by the United Nations, multilateral export control regimes and international treaties are failing at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by allowing these transfers to occur continuously. It is now critical that the international community recognize the dangers of ITT and act swiftly and effectively to reform organizations such as the MTCR to combat the threat.
While long and uncertain, the road to controlling the proliferation of WMDs is not possible without a better understanding, better control and stronger governance of the information that makes destruction possible. If we fail to govern this knowledge, we may be governed by what it creates.
*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, Mathew Montiel is a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service studying U.S. foreign policy and national security. He holds a B.A. in international relations from the University of Texas at Austin and is interested in emerging technologies and nonproliferation.
DISCLAIMER: Next Up in Arms Control is a way for the Center to present an opportunity for dialogue and provocation through the thoughtful exchange of ideas and opinions on new or different ways to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear threats. Opinions are the authors’ alone and not necessarily reflective of Center’s positions on the issues addressed.
