This week, talks between Iran and the P5+1 regarding Iran’s nuclear program will resume. All eyes are on Geneva, given that the first series of talks was reportedly the most productive and positive that the two sides have had in quite some time.

To help us better understand why the last round of Geneva talks was significant, I’ve written a piece in The National Interest analyzing that negotiation. I focus on the ways in which these talks represented a welcome improvement over the past decade of negotiations with Iran, which have too often been characterized by unrealistic demands, an unwillingness to focus on the most important issues, and an inability to link interim progress with long-term goals.

Here’s an excerpt:

“Finally, a crucial, if subtle, shift in the two sides’ approaches has been a greater willingness to look at the ultimate goals of the talks—what commentators like to call the ‘endgame’—and to work backwards from there to determine interim steps. To an outside observer, this may seem like an obvious way to negotiate, but as Trita Parsi pointed out, the West in particular has studiously avoided discussions of the ‘endgame’ in an effort to maintain the upper hand in past negotiations. Now, that could be about to change.”

Have a look at the full piece, here.

It has been a busy and interesting several weeks since President Obama’s United Nations General Assembly speech on September 24. Here’s a breakdown of the events that have taken place since and a look at what a plausible and mutually beneficial endgame we might expect to see.

•    On September 26, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. Kerry emerged from the meeting pleased but did not shy away from the many challenges ahead.

•    The next day, Iranian Ambassador Reza Najafi and his team of negotiators met with International Atomic Energy Agency officials led by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts. Details were scarce, but Nackaerts did say that the talks were “very constructive.”

•    Later that day, President Rouhani made history by breaking the 34 year silence between Iranian and U.S. heads of state when he spoke with President Obama by phone. Afterward, President Obama suggested that deeper ties might be possible if the two sides are able to come to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.

•    On September 30, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Obama at the White House where he advocated for the strengthening of sanctions if Iran continues its enrichment program.

•    The following day, Netanyahu gave his UN General Assembly speech. He criticized Iran and President Rouhani saying, among other things, “Rouhani thinks he can have his yellowcake and eat it too.”

•    On October 2, the Iranian parliament, including many members loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, announced their support for Rouhani’s diplomatic approach.

•    That same day, EU leaders hinted that they may drop abandonment of enrichment from their negotiating demands in Geneva.

•    On October 6, Iran called on the West to put a new negotiating offer on the table. Secretary of State Kerry responded the following day by saying Iran must first address the U.S. offer put forth in February which includes ceasing enrichment of uranium to 20% and handing over some current uranium stockpiles to Western powers.

•    On the October 6, Pres. Obama quoted U.S. Intelligence estimates that it would take Iran about a year to make a nuclear weapon if it so desired.

•    On October 9, Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani reported in an Associated Press interview that Iran might be willing to hand over some of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile. Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi said on the October 13, however, that Iran is not willing to ship its uranium surplus abroad.

•    On October 10, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) began drafting a bill that would give the President the authority to go to war with Iran if negotiations fail. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) announced that he would allow some time for negotiations to take place but will only be able to wait until the end of October before going ahead with a sanctions bill targeting Iranian oil sales. Several Senate Democrats both on and off the Banking Committee have also voiced opposition to the easing of sanctions.

•    On October 12 it was announced that Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman would lead the U.S. delegation accompanied by Adam Szubin, the U.S. government’s foremost expert on sanctions.

•    P5+1 talks took place on October 15 and 16. You can see a full rundown here. The talks were encouraging and the parties agreed to meet again on November 7 and 8.

•    In the meantime, on October 28, Iran will meet with International Atomic Energy Agency negotiators to discuss possible inspections of nuclear facilities.

Short and long term goals
The confidentiality of the Geneva talks has caused rumors to swirl about Iran’s possible offer; an Iranian source has come forward saying that Iran is willing to convert its 20% enriched uranium to fuel rods while also relinquishing plutonium-laced spent fuel from the still under construction Arak heavy water facility. While this would certainly be good news if true, no offer has yet been made public by any of the parties involved, and it is important to note that Iran’s real offer may not resemble the rumored offer.

A short term goal of negotiations should be to outline early confidence building measures and agreement on the contours of a broader, longer-term agreement. Such an agreement would likely need to include limitations on enrichment levels to no more than 5%, the dismantling of Fordow (or at the least a very tight inspection schedule), limitations on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of enrichment centrifuges commensurate with its realistic civilian nuclear power needs, and submission to full inspections (scheduled and unannounced) from the International Atomic Energy Agency. In return Iran will expect significant sanctions relief.

These concessions combined with early confidence building steps such as the relinquishment or conversion of all 20% enriched uranium while the negotiation process on a long-term agreement is ongoing  could go a long way toward demonstrating that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for peaceful purposes, as the country suggests. These concessions would also, hopefully, reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran and might allow for improved relations. Even if a deal is reached, however, it would remain imperative to continue inspections to ensure that Iran does not attempt to acquire breakout capability after sanctions are lifted.

Though we still don’t know many details of the most recent round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran, and won’t for some time (both sides have agreed to keep the proposal Iran reportedly presented at the talks to themselves) word coming out of Geneva has been mostly positive.

After two days of discussion, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton called the talks “intensive and important,” and “the most detailed we’ve ever had.”

One senior US administration official speaking not for attribution even went so far as to say, “I have been doing this now for two years and I have never had such intense, detailed, straight- forward, candid conversations with the Iran delegation before.”

The talks are the first since the election of Iran’s new, more moderate, President Hassan Rouhani, and represent the first true test of the waters between the two sides. Recent positive events, including a historic phone call between Rouhani and US President Barack Obama, the first between Iran and the US in more than 15 years, have lent an additional air of cautious optimism to the conversation. But much has yet to be done before we have a clear idea of the outcome. Diplomacy takes time, and in many ways, we’ve only just begun.

In addition to talks between Iran and the P5+1, the US and Iran reportedly held “useful” bilateral talks on Tuesday evening, following on a recent meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry in New York. The meeting in New York marked the first time the two sides have engaged in bilateral discussions since 2009, when Iran’s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili sat down for a one-on-one “sidebar” discussion with then Under Secretary of State William Burns. The addition of such talks bodes well for the future of negotiations, since the US holds the majority of the cards pertaining to sanctions relief.

The two sides will meet again in Geneva for talks on Nov. 7 and 8, with nuclear and sanctions experts meeting in the meantime to discuss technical issues. And no doubt, the discussion on the outside will continue, even in absence of firm details outlining the progress we can expect to see.

In a letter to Obama, a group of six Democratic and four Republican U.S. senators recently called for the immediate suspension of all enrichment as a precursor to suspending the implementation of additional sanctions on Iran. While Iran’s enrichment capacity is rightly a concern, Colin Kahl and Ali Nader astutely point out here that the goal of zero enrichment is unrealistic. Most serious analysts (as they note) would agree.

Nonetheless, demands for additional sanctions increased in Congress Wednesday, as Senator Marco Rubio jumped to introduce a resolution calling for new sanctions, and reaffirmed the message that no sanctions relief be made available until Iran has abandoned enrichment.

“No one should be impressed by what Iran appears to have brought to the table in Geneva” Rubio said. “Tehran has broken its word far too many times to be trusted. Due to its complete disregard for previous international agreements, we must take a firm stand in all negotiations regarding the nuclear capabilities Iran is permitted to retain.”

The resolution comes just weeks after the US’ lead negotiator, Wendy Sherman, asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold off on additional sanctions to allow the P5+1 to test whether Rouhani’s delegation could deliver on the promise of a deal.