- Klotz L.C. (2021) “Rationale and Science Behind Likelihood-weighted Consequences as a Measure of lab-created Influenza Risk (pandemic update).”
- Klotz L.C. and Cross G. A. (2020). “Perspectives on the Biological Weapons Convention.”
- Klotz L.C. (2020). “The pandemic risk of an accidental lab leak of enhanced flu virus: unacceptably high.”
- Klotz L.C. (2020). “Rationale and Science Behind Likelihood-weighted Consequences as a Measure of Lab-created Influenza Risk.”
- Klotz L.C. (2019). “The Biological Weapons Convention protocol should be revisited.”
- Klotz L.C. (2019). “The risk of lab-created potential pandemic influenza”
- Klotz L.C. (2019). “Is there a role for the Biological Weapons Convention in oversight of lab-created potential pandemic pathogens?”
- Klotz (2019). “Human error in high biocontainment labs: a likely pandemic threat.”
- Klotz (2019). “Comparative Pandemic Risk: A Natural Influenza Pandemic vs. The PPP Research Enterprise”
- Klotz L.C. (2019). “Minimum Estimate of Number of Laboratories in the Influenza PPP Research Enterprise”
- Klotz L.C. (2018) “The False Promise of Herd Immunity: Herd Immunity Might Not Protect Against Lab-Enhanced 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Viruses”
- Klotz L.C. and Koblentz G. D. “New pathogen research rules: Gain of function, loss of clarity”
- Klotz L.C. (2016) “Concerns over OSTPs recommended policy guidance”
- Klotz L.C. (2016) “Addendum to my February 23 Commentary for the March NAS meeting on GOF: Toward absolute probabilities for escape from a laboratory”
- Klotz L.C. (2016) “Commentary for the March NAS meeting on GOF: Toward absolute probabilities for escape from a laboratory”
- Klotz L.C. (2015) Commentary in advance of the NSABB September 28, 2015 meeting: “The Potential Pandemic Influenza Research Enterprise”
- Klotz L.C. (2015) In advance of the NSABB January 2016 meeting “A Commentary and Analysis of Chapter 6 in Gryphon Scientific’s Report: Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research”
- Klotz L.C. (2015) “Danger of the Potential Pandemic Pathogen Research Enterprises,” mBio 6(3):e00815-15. doi:10.1128/mBio.00815-15.
- Klotz L.C. (2015) “Comments on Fouchier’s Calculation of Risk and Elapsed Time for Escape of a Laboratory-Acquired Infection from His Laboratory,” mBio 6(2):e00268-15. doi:10.1128/mBio.00268-15.
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2014) “Opinion: The consequences of a lab escape of a potential pandemic pathogen,” Frontiers in Public Health: Infectious Diseases, Vol. 2, August 2014, p1-3
- Klotz L.C. (2014) “The Human Fatality and Economic Burden of a Man-made Influenza Pandemic: A Risk Assessment,” A Report by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2013) “Opinion: The Fatality Burden,” The Scientist, December 17 2013,
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2013) “Managing Risks That Endanger Health,” Huffington Post blog, Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2012) “The Unacceptable Risks of a Man-made Pandemic,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: web edition
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2012) Several short pieces and comments in “Deliberating Over Danger”
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2012) “Worry about lab infections,” Nature Vol 481, No. 19 (January 2012) p258
- Klotz L.C. (2011) US Report in “BioWeapons Monitor 2011,” BioWeapons Prevention Project, 2011, p105-137
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2011) “Dangerous Acquaintances,” Huffington Post blog
- Klotz L.C. (2011), “SARS in the City,” GENEWATCH, Volume 24 Issue 2, 2011
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2010) “Resurrecting History’s Pathogens: No Oversight for a Dangerous Business,” Huffington Post blog, 2010
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2010) “Trust But Verify? Not This Time: For Biological Security, Transparency Is Best Policy,” Huffington Post blog, 2010.
- Klotz L.C. and Sylvester E. J. (2010) “Crying Wolf: The Terrorist Crop-Duster,” Huffington Post blog, 2010
- Klotz, L.C. and Pearson, A. (2009) “BARDA’s Budget,” Letter to the Editor, Nature Biotechnology, Volume 27, Number 8, August 2009, p698-699
- Klotz L. C. (2008), “Response to Epstein’s Commentary,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 6, Number 1, December 2008
- Klotz L. C. (2007), “Casting a Wider Net for Countermeasure R&D Funding Decisions,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 5, Number 4, December 2007
- Klotz L. C. and Wheelis M. (2003) Chemical Incapacitating Weapons Are Not Non‑Lethal. Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons
- Klotz L. C., Furmanski M., and Wheelis M. (2003), “Beware the Siren’s Song: Why “Non‑Lethal” Incapacitating Chemical Agents are Lethal,” Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons.
- Klotz, L. C. (2002), “The Biological Weapons Protocol as A Health Care Intervention,” Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, March 2002.
- Klotz L. C., Chevrier M. L., Dingerdissen J.J., Pritchard L, Rosenberg B. H., Wheelis M. and Woollett G. R. (2000), AImplementing the Biological Weapons Protocol in the United States: What It Means to the Biopharmaceutical Industry,@ BioPharm, August 2000, p 46-48.
- Klotz L. C. (2000), A Means for Protecting U.S. Industry within an effective Compliance Regime for the Biological Weapons Convention,@ DePaul Business Law Journal, Vol. 12 Fall/Spring 1999/2000, Nos. 1 and 2, p 329-350.
- Klotz L. C. and Sims M. C. (1998), A Challenge Investigation Voting Procedures for a BWC Compliance Regime, @ The CBW Conventions Bulletin, October 1998.
- Klotz, L. C. (1997), Evasion Scenarios and Countermeasures, @ in The Utility of Sampling and Analysis for Compliance Monitoring of the Biological Weapons Convention, @ Monterey Institute for International Studies, Monterey CA, February 1997.
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