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You are here: Home / Archives for Missile Defense

March 15, 2013

Under Secretary Miller Confident about U.S. Missile Defense Future at Atlantic Council Conference

On Tuesday the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security hosted its annual conference on missile defense. Experts from the United States, Europe, and Asia shared their knowledge and viewpoints on the progress of U.S. and allied missile defense programs across the globe. Of particular note was the attendance of Under Secretary of Defense for U.S. Policy James Miller, who provided the opening keynote address.

“Ballistic missile defense is, without question, one of the most important national security issues we face today,” Miller declared, citing the 2009-2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review as evidence that the Obama Administration is committed to the nation’s missile defense programs. The Under Secretary listed homeland defense as the nation’s top priority, followed closely by regional defense of U.S. forces abroad and assisting allies in developing missile defense systems themselves.

On North Korea, Miller praised the recent UN Security Council sanctions as evidence of the world being “united in their condemnation of the regime’s behavior.” He especially welcomed China’s support.  Miller cited North Korea’s continuing nuclear program and heightened rhetoric as proof that the United States must continue to take decisive steps to defend against North Korean ballistic missile development. Miller likewise called for continued observation of Iran, arguing that the nation’s recent space launch indicated possession of technology needed to one day develop an ICBM.

Miller went on to outline advances being made on the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the system responsible for defense of the U.S. homeland. He also noted an expanding hedge capability resulting from completion of Missile Field 2 and the upcoming completion of another missile field in Fort Greely, Alaska. Miller also announced that per the direction of Congress, the Department of Defense is beginning environmental impact studies exploring the possibility of additional missile fields on the east coast or interceptors in Alaska, though he clarified that this does not mean the U.S. government has decided to go forward with such efforts. “We are initiating studies at the direction of Congress in the event the threat progresses to the point where that makes sense in the future,” he stated.

Miller made it clear that U.S. policy is to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear-armed ICBMs and that the United States is capable of defending against any ballistic missile threat originating from either country. “If they develop ICBMs, they will not be able to threaten the United States. Our missile defenses will defeat them.”

Miller also emphasized ongoing bilateral efforts with allies in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe, including PAC-3 deployment in South Korea and missile defense cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and NATO members. Moving forward, the U.S. will emphasize information-sharing among allies via sensor systems. Miller confirmed that the U.S. partnership with NATO on the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is on track for Aegis BMD 4.01 and SM-3 Block IB system deployment in 2015, and will “evolve toward full capability” in phases 3 and 4 in 2018 and 2020 respectively.

When questioned on Russia’s objection to EPAA deployment, Miller informed the audience that nothing planned poses any threat to Russia’s strategic deterrence efforts. While confident that the EPAA was fully on track for phase 3 deployment, Miller made no explicit guarantee that phase 4 would be pursued, citing budgetary concerns. “We are continuing to look very hard at (phase 4 implementation)…our ability to deploy SM3 IIB has slipped at least two years to the right of what we previously had planned.”

Miller’s confidence about the future of U.S. missile defense may be premature, however. In an article in Arms Control Today, our Senior Science Fellow Phillip Coyle, citing a recent heavyweight report by the National Academy of Sciences, highlighted the technological impracticality of Phase 4 SM3 IIB deployment in Europe. While an East Coast battery might resolve some technical concerns and diplomatic issues with Russia, it could end up costing billions more than the Obama Administration had planned. The total cost of pursuing new regional systems in the Middle East and Asia has also not yet been calculated. Further, a lack of in-house scientific expertise in the Missile Defense Agency and key industrial players raises doubt over whether necessary research can be done on the advanced space-based sensors and detection systems that are essential to an effective missile defense.

Posted in: Missile Defense, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 19, 2013

Does missile defense work?

North Korea’s December 2012 rocket launch and third nuclear test last week has prompted plenty of discussion about the appropriate scope of and funding levels for ballistic missile defense. In my February (2013) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists colu…

Posted in: Missile Defense, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 8, 2013

Does missile defense work?

Published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Online on February 8, 2013. Article summary below; read the full text here. After launching a rocket in December and vowing to conduct a third nuclear test, North Korea followed up last week by saying it would take measures “stronger than a nuclear test” and releasing a bizarre […]

Posted in: Issue Center, Missile Defense, Press & In the News on Missile Defense

February 4, 2013

Senator Rand Paul’s Missile Defense Illusion

We know that missile defense of the U.S. has become an almost religious commitment in the minds of a significant number of our misguided legislators, even though the Ground-Based Mid-Course system we have installed has yet to prove capable of defending the country from warheads launched by inter-continental ballistic missiles…

Posted in: Missile Defense, Nukes of Hazard blog

December 17, 2012

Wonky hodgepodge on missile defense testing, CMRR-NF, and the B61 life extension program

Regular readers of the blog will remember that I’m a big fan of combing through answers to Questions for the Record (QFRs) asked by Members of Congress after full Committee or Subcommittee hearings.

As far as I can tell, the most recent relevant hearing posted on the Government Printing Office’s website are the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s March 6 hearing on the FY 2013 request for missile defense and its April 17 hearing on the FY 2013 request for atomic energy defense activities and nuclear forces programs. Below are a few highlights from the QFRs.

First, on missile defense, this won’t be news to many readers, but the Missile Defense Agency has yet to test the ground based midcourse defense (GMD) system against a target with an ICBM range and doesn’t have any immediate plans to do so:

Ms. SANCHEZ. In response to questions for the record pursuant to our hearing on the missile defense budget last year, you stated: ‘‘No GMD tests against a true intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have yet been conducted.’’ When can we expect MDA to conduct such a test?

Dr. GILMORE. The Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct the first Ground-based Midcourse Defense flight test that will use an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class target during the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. In the just signed Integrated Master Test Plan, Version 12.1, this test is designated as FTG–11.

Second, on the administration’s proposed delay of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and its plan to sustain US plutonium capabilities in the absence of the facility, this is the first time I’ve seen an estimated cost for the alternative strategy:

Mr. TURNER. 1) What is the cost of the alternative plutonium strategy, including modifications to PF–4 and RLUOB, shipping material to DAF and Superblock, cleaning out the PF–4 vault, conducting the pit reuse study, etc.? How much will it cost to implement this alternative plan? To the extent possible, please break down the cost by individual actions/projects needed.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The preliminary Los Alamos cost estimate for execution of the interim plutonium strategy is in the range of $590M–$820M over the next 8 years. This range is the result of a sixty day study to revise the strategy, and NNSA will work with the laboratory throughout the FY 2014 Budget formulation process to refine that strategy and the cost estimate. In the interim, we have provided your staffs with the detailed analysis from the sixty day study.

 Finally, on the B61 life extension program, the Nuclear Weapons Council apparently chose from among seven options for the refurbishment:

Ms. SANCHEZ. 14) Was a cost assessment done for all the alternatives to the 3B option chosen by the Nuclear Weapons Council for the B61 life extension? Why/why not? If so, how does the cost-range for the 3B option compare to the funding range for the 3 other options considered?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Several life extension options were considered and assessed by the NWC prior to the decision to proceed with Option 3B. Of the 6 other options considered, only 4 fully met the military requirements including service life. These options all exceeded the preliminary Option 3B costs by approximately $1.5–$2B. Other options considered but not selected ranged from $1.5B–$4B for various component alteration scopes. These less expensive options had significant shortfalls in the ability to satisfy military requirements. In addition these options still require NNSA to begin a future life extension program in the 2020s. The NWC assessment concluded Option 3B was the most affordable life extension approach that met military requirements and assured no capability gap in our extended nuclear deterrent.

In 2011, the Government Accountability Office gave us a sneak peak of how these military requirements were arrived at, but given the exploding cost of the life extension program, I think its necessary to take a fresh look at the less expensive alternatives.

Posted in: Missile Defense, Nukes of Hazard blog

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