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The Center Joins Bipartisan Calls for Common-Sense Standards for Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

(UPDATE 1/25 5:00 PM: Elaine Grossman over at Global Security Newswire reports today that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in the beginning phases of negotiating a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that may not contain restrictions on reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium on Saudi soil. Stay turned, as this issue is not going away!)

The Cable’s, Josh Rogin recently addressed the growing concern among lawmakers and non-proliferation experts from both parties about ongoing U.S. negotiations with other countries on civilian nuclear cooperation.

The concern is prompted by news reports last summer and fall alleging that the U.S. is negotiating deals with Jordan and Vietnam that won’t include restrictions on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing, which could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Lawmakers and non-proliferation experts are calling for all such agreements to mimic the 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which prohibits enrichment and reprocessing on UAE territory…  

According to Rogin’s summary:

[House Foreign Relations Committee Chairwoman] Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, wants to reform the Atomic Energy Act by requiring a vote in Congress before a civilian nuclear deal, like the 123 goes into effect.  In addition, she wants to make a pre-condition in which, a country must meet a number of requirements before even considering a deal.

Representatives Ed Markey (D-MA) and Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) introduced a resolution denouncing the 123 agreement between the United States and Russia. Both representatives are put off by Russia’s cooperation with Iran and believe that until they stop their correspondence on nuclear issues with Iran, we should not concede to a nuclear cooperation agreement.

Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Russ Feingold (D-WI), Daniel Akaka (D-HI) and John Ensign (R-NE) also wrote a letter to President Obama demanding the United Arab Emirates (UAE) standard be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation deals.

In a final bi-partisan effort in November, non-proliferation experts on both sides of the aisle also wrote a letter to President Obama echoing the previous letter on UAE standards for all civilian nuclear deals.

The Center also put together a letter to President Obama calling for consistency in civilian nuclear deals.  The letter states:

We understand that the U.S. stands to benefit from improving bilateral ties with Jordan and Vietnam. However, we believe that a “region-by-region” approach to commercial nuclear cooperation would be counter-productive for at least five reasons:

• First, it would undercut the precedent set by the UAE agreement, thereby weakening the global norm against the spread of enrichment and reprocessing.
• Second, a deal with Jordan that allows indigenous enrichment and reprocessing could prompt Abu Dhabi, as stipulated in the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement, to renegotiate the terms of the agreement if it determines that a U.S.-Jordan pact contains more favorable terms.
• Third, it will likely encourage other allies and partners to insist on the right to enrich and reprocess in future nuclear cooperation agreements and open the U.S. to charges of applying “double standards.”
• Fourth, it could increase the likelihood of forging nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Vietnam, if it does not already exist, while facilitating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
• Fifth, it could undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations.

While the bipartisanship on this issue is welcome, NoH can’t help but notice that some of the GOP voices now criticizing the Obama administration for its negotiating position were nowhere to be found when the George W. Bush administration negotiated the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which didn’t exactly strengthen the NPT.

Experts Reject Zero Enrichment Push Ahead of Talks in Istanbul

As a new round of P5+1 talks with Iran are just getting underway in Istanbul, the following letter has been released by a group of experts including Columbia professor and former National Security Council staffer Gary Sick, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador John Limbert, and former British Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton.  The letter urges the US to “reinvigorate diplomacy” by engaging with Iran more persistently, broadening the US-Iranian dialogue, and above all, setting realistic objectives.  The group advocates that the US be prepared to recognize a peaceful Iranian enrichment program following the establishment of more effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, including the Additional Protocol.

Text is below and after the jump:

As the United States prepares for the upcoming round of multilateral talks with Iran, it is imperative that the Obama Administration reinvigorate its diplomacy by pursuing engagement with Tehran more persistently, setting realistic objectives, and broadening the US-Iranian dialogue.  Diplomacy is the only sustainable means of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, avoiding the dangerous folly of military confrontation in the Middle East, and enabling progress in other critical areas of US interest, such as Afghanistan and the human rights situation within Iran.

Reinvigorating diplomacy means seeking to engage Iran more persistently.  The upcoming Istanbul meeting is only the fourth meeting on the nuclear issue involving both the United States and Iran, and no breakthrough can be expected without additional talks. Fortunately, time exists to pursue a diplomatic solution.  Both US and Israeli officials have made public statements recently acknowledging that Iran remains years away from having the capability to construct a nuclear weapon.

Reinvigorating diplomacy also means pursuing realistic objectives. Unrealistic outcomes, such as insisting that Iran cease uranium enrichment entirely, however desirable, must be set aside.  Focus should instead be placed on establishing monitoring and verification mechanisms that can ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is, indeed, used solely for peaceful purposes.  Secretary Clinton stated in December that the United States would be prepared to recognize a peaceful enrichment program on Iranian soil.  This is a productive step to achieve a satisfactory compromise for which the Administration should be commended.

Finally, reinvigorating diplomacy means addressing issues with Iran beyond the nuclear file.  Tehran presents challenges and opportunities in many other areas of importance to US national security, including the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq, drug trafficking, and the human rights situation in Iran itself.  The US should seek common ground in all areas of interest and not hold progress in one area hostage to resolution of others.  Indeed, progress on human rights or Afghanistan may create a better climate for progress on the nuclear issue. The US engagement agenda must be expanded to reflect this.

Diplomacy with Iran will not be easy and no quick fixes should be expected. Iran must also negotiate in earnest and make the serious compromises necessary for resolution of the nuclear issue.  The concerns of the IAEA, the P5+1, and the international community more broadly must be addressed by Iran on the basis of transparency and cooperation.  Resolving decades of enmity between the US and Iran will require that both sides work to create openings for successful engagement.

Only reinvigorated diplomacy holds the promise of bridging the many divides between the US and Iran and achieving a sustainable solution that prevents a disastrous military confrontation, prevents an Iranian bomb and the additional proliferation that would follow, and protects the human rights of the Iranian people.

Barry Blechman, co-founder, the Stimson Center?
Professor Juan Cole, University of Michigan ?
Sir Richard Dalton, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; Former British Ambassador to Iran ?
Debra DeLee, President and CEO, Americans for Peace Now?
Jonathan W. Evans, Legislative Representative for Foreign Policy, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Professor Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii ?
Chas W. Freeman, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and President, Middle East Policy Council
Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (USA, Ret.) Chairman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Col. Sam Gardiner (USA, Ret.)?
Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association ?
Amb. John Limbert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Firuzeh Mahmoudi, Executive Director, United4Iran?
Paul Kawika Martin, Policy Director, Peace Action ?
Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy?
Robert Naiman, Executive Director, Just Foreign Policy?
Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council?
Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Professor Paul Pillar, Georgetown University?
Jon Rainwater, Executive Director, Peace Action West?
Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, Director, Mennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington Office?
Professor Gary Sick, Columbia University?
Professor John Tirman, Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for International Studies

Duyeon Kim On Arirang News: 2011 U.S.-China Summit & N. Korea

On January 20, 2011 (22:00 KST, 08:00 EST) South Korea’s global broadcaster Arirang News interviewed Duyeon Kim, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferaiton, about the U.S.-China Summit with regards to the North Korean nuclear issue. Click here for the video.

Obama & Hu: Hit or Miss

Opinions are split on whether one should hope that Wednesday’s U.S.-China summit will help jumpstart diplomacy on the long dead-locked North Korean issue. Will it be clouded by other pressing issues like the economy? Does the U.S. have leverage? Will China move on North Korea? Will the summit end in symbolic formalities or tangible results?

But the reality is that this is perhaps the Obama administration’s only real chance to make a difference since both countries will soon begin preparations for leadership transitions in 2012. The most effective way to move Beijing is to persuade the Chinese president himself by an American president, head-to-head.

The summit’s joint statement will provide essential clues about the direction of diplomacy on North Korea. But the two leaders are walking into the summit oceans apart on some key points on mechanics. (Click “read more”)

President Hu Jintao has made Beijing’s position clear in his latest joint interview to the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal – he wants to first resume the Six Party Talks and then discuss all matters of concern including Korean tensions. Washington, on the other hand, wants inter-Korean dialogue to precede the Six Party Talks as well as a sincere North Korean gesture to denuclearize prior to negotiations.

Perhaps one of the biggest sticking points is North Korea’s recently unveiled uranium enrichment program. Beijing fails to publicly acknowledge the existence of the facility and has defended Pyongyang’s right to use nuclear energy. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said “We’ve never seen North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility… The situation is unclear right now.”

But Washington wants to work with Beijing to put an end to the North’s uranium enrichment program, which has clearly violated UN Resolutions and Six Party agreements. The two sides could revert to dealing with the uranium enrichment issue at the Six Party Talks, but the question is how to get there?

The fundamental challenge is persuading Beijing to move Pyongyang. China’s top policy priority is its own peaceful development, which it believes will only be achieved if there is regional peace and stability. This is particularly crucial as Hu Jintao hands over the reins to Xi Jinping next year. This means Beijing will be especially reluctant to aggravate Pyongyang as it fears instability in North Korea could cause spillover effects in Chinese territory.

The window of opportunity for Obama and Hu to find a lead and create an environment conducive for progress on North Korea will become increasingly narrow after the summit. President Obama needs to prod Hu to help contain further North Korean provocations and help create an environment for inter-Korean dialogue and eventual six nation dialogue.

This year and the next will be an attractive time for North Korea to engage in more provocations as Washington, Seoul and Beijing become preoccupied with leadership transitions in their respective countries. It will be an appealing time for Pyongyang to shake the U.S.-South Korea alliance as well. It will also be an opportune time for Pyongyang to show its “might and power” as it approaches its own 2012 deadline – perhaps with a bang or a barrage of fireworks, or both.

Until now Washington has maintained a reactive, rather than proactive, approach to the North Korean dilemma. Its will to make progress may have grown after revelations of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program.

Still, Iran overshadows North Korea on the White House policy agenda.

Resolving the North Korea issue is imperative to break the precedent for other rogue actors like Tehran who aspire to follow the Pyongyang model. But how far will the Obama administration go with just two years left in office packed with competing policy priorities?

As for the first step in the future of diplomacy on North Korea, Wednesday will determine whether the summit will be a hit or miss.

Senate Schedule = Oxymoron

ox•y•mo•ron = a combination of contradictory or incongruous words

(as cruel kindness)

People frequently ask – well, at least congressional wonks– what is the Senate schedule? When will it consider a piece of legislation or when might a vote occur?

The correct answer to these questions usually is, “Who Knows?” That’s because the Majority Leader usually does not know. The Republican leader does not know. The other 98 Senators do not know.

Take recent predictions by the people most directly interested in getting a handle on the Senate schedule during the recently concluded lame duck session: 100 Senators.

Arizona Senator Jon Kyl (R) told MSNBC on November 18, “I think there is no chance that [the START] treaty can be completed in the lame duck session.”

Hmmm. Turns out there was a chance.

Take another Kyl prediction on December 3: “The defense bill containing language allowing for repeal of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy banning openly gay service members is dead for the year because there simply isn’t enough time for the Senate to consider it in the lame-duck session.”

He was technically correct, but the defense bill and the “don’t ask, don’t tell” proved very much alive when phoenix-like, both were approved as separate measures before the end of the session.

However, it’s not as if Democrats are wiser than Republicans. On December 6, Roll Call reported Majority Whip Dick Durbin saying the prospects of the Senate considering the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty during the lame-duck session are growing increasingly dim.

The dimness turned into bright light.

South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham (R) was definitive on chances of completing New START. According to the December 10 CQ Today, “Asked Dec. 9 if beginning consideration of the accord on Dec. 14 or Dec. 15 would be sufficient, Graham exclaimed, ‘No!’”

Guess what: the New START debate began on December 15 and concluded on December 22.

Nebraska Sen. Ben Nelson’s powers of prognostication took a hit on December 14, the day before the treaty came up, saying on December 14: “The Senate does not have enough time to take up the accord before the lame-duck session concludes.”

Oh yes it did.

Kyl was back with an incorrect assessment on December 14, snidely opining that Majority Leader Reid’s prediction that the treaty would pass the Senate was inaccurate: “I will resist the temptation to go over the record of things where the Majority Leader had predicted something prematurely.”

Reid was correct in his prediction; it was Kyl who was premature.

On December 15, Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander (R) angrily criticized Reid and the Democrats for bringing up the treaty so late in the session: “This is a last-minute Christmastime stunt that puts a major arms-control treaty in jeopardy.”

Hmmm, the “stunt” propelled the treaty to victory rather than putting it in jeopardy and Alexander voted in favor.

Divining the schedule also is a challenge because of Senators’ threats to launch delaying actions, only to pull back at the last moment. South Carolina Sen. Jim DeMint (R), in a National Review blog, suggested he would filibuster the new START Treaty: “I will use every tool available to oppose an attempt to rush the debate over the START Treaty during this lame-duck session of Congress.”

Yet when the Senate began consideration of the treaty, that tool was left in the toolshed.

A demand to read the 2,000 page Omnibus Appropriations Bill also disappeared when the bill did not obtain the required 60 votes to bring it up. It was estimated that it would have taken 64 hours to read the entire measure.

Of course bad predictions about Senate behavior extend well beyond the 100 Senators.

This  author predicted more times than he can count that either Kyl and the Obama Administration would come to a deal on nuclear modernization (in which case the treaty would easily be approved) or Kyl would prevent a final vote on the treaty.

Ooops.

The world’s greatest deliberative body may also be its most unpredictable.

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