By Lyle Seeligson
The United States and Israel’s war in Iran — ostensibly a conflict over nuclear weapons — is having an unintended, though predictable, side effect: increasing global demand for nuclear power. In response to Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz and skyrocketing oil and gas prices (which will likely stay high even if the conflict eventually winds down), many countries are working to reduce their dependency on foreign fuel imports, including by expanding their nuclear power capacity. As this shift looks inevitable, United States leaders should take steps to ensure this does not also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as manage nuclear security and environmental concerns. To do so, the United States must rebuild its role both as a competitive nuclear exporter and, more importantly, as a staunch advocate for non-proliferation.
Nuclear energy today: A proliferation risk?
Since 2023, nearly 40 countries have pledged to triple global nuclear power capacity by 2050 to provide green energy in response to climate change concerns and, more recently, to meet AI energy demands. The war has only accelerated this transition.
Increased nuclear power production inherently raises non-proliferation concerns. As the world’s demand for nuclear power grows, so does its need for nuclear fuels, which, without proper safeguards in place, could provide cover for the production of fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons. Thorny debates arise over which countries should enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium, and how these fuels are safeguarded against diversion or theft. Additionally, different reactor types present varied levels of proliferation concerns, based on the technology or fuel used in the designs. Finally, the technical knowledge base behind a peaceful nuclear power program can be used to develop nuclear weapons covertly. Building additional nuclear power plants also raises important questions regarding safety, risk management, finance and waste disposal that must be addressed in addition to minimizing proliferation dangers.
It is also true that having a nuclear power program does not necessarily lead to weapons proliferation. Nevertheless, much of the success in keeping these peaceful programs from enabling weapons development is due to the safeguards, scrutiny and regulations of the international non-proliferation regime. If nuclear power is really to undergo a generational build-out, strict non-proliferation standards need to accompany it.
The U.S.-Russia Flip-Flop
The United States has historically played a pivotal role in ensuring that these peaceful power programs aren’t used for weapons. Decades ago, the United States was the primary exporter of nuclear reactors and fuel, and it used this leverage to align the nuclear power industry with non-proliferation goals and make the spread of nuclear weapons much less likely.
However, years of decline in the U.S. nuclear industry have put it on the back foot. Today, Russia dominates the global export market for nuclear reactors. Of the 13 countries currently constructing reactors, nine are using Russian technology. Additionally, Russia supplies more than 40% of the world’s enriched uranium fuel. The shift in large measure is due to Russia’s willingness to overlook proliferation concerns and sell to almost anyone. Moscow has also gained a competitive edge in this market by offering the complete package to states pursuing nuclear power: generous financing, fresh fuel, training, expertise, and eventually decommissioning reactors and managing fuel waste. In return, these buyers are tied diplomatically and economically to Russia for decades.
Russia’s stronghold on the export market raises proliferation concerns due to its history of working with rogue states, like North Korea, that do not adhere to non-proliferation standards or where oppressive government structures or political unrest exist, creating liabilities for nuclear energy safety. Russia also does not require its nuclear trading partners to have in place an Additional Protocol, which is a supplemental agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that allows the IAEA expanded information access and monitoring over a country’s nuclear power program, to verify that it is not being used for weapons production. The United States, on the other hand, customarily does require its nuclear export partners to have an Additional Protocol. This demonstrates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to look the other way at active or would-be proliferators, and to put Russia’s strategic and economic benefit above non-proliferation concerns and global safety. It also undermines any progress to universalize an Additional Protocol requirement for countries looking to obtain nuclear technology — a move the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a consortium of major nuclear-exporting countries around the world) has considered, but cannot do without consensus. The more countries that receive nuclear technology and fuels from Russia without an Additional Protocol in place, the harder it will be to pass this measure. Taken all together, Russia’s failures to maintain the highest non-proliferation standards are troubling, especially in the face of the world’s reliance on Moscow as the largest exporter of nuclear reactors and fuel.
Non-proliferation and nuclear exports: What can the United States do next?
Regaining a foothold in the nuclear export industry with an eye toward promoting nuclear safeguards will not be easy. But if the United States wants to have a say, it must regain its seat at the table.
As a practical matter, the United States needs to compete better. There has been some work on that front (albeit with disputed degrees of success): recent nuclear partnership agreements with Japan and South Korea, and Westinghouse’s planned construction in Poland, Bulgaria and Ukraine. Both the Trump and Biden administrations saw the strategic value of nuclear energy and put funding toward nuclear research and domestic fuel production. Additionally, the United States has made changes to offer financing deals and reduce regulatory burdens for potential nuclear partners. This financial support especially is vital for the United States to compete against state-subsidized giants like Russia’s Rosatom or, increasingly, the China National Nuclear Cooperation. Finally, the emerging small modular reactor market presents a unique opportunity for the United States to regain a foothold in nuclear exports while strengthening guards against proliferation.
However, in its haste to make nuclear deals at home and abroad, the Trump administration has threatened nuclear licensing and safety requirements and demonstrated an alarming willingness to allow non-proliferation standards to slip as it looks to make new nuclear export agreements. This is playing out right now with the recently announced (though not yet public) deal with Saudi Arabia, which potentially will neither require the state to ratify an IAEA Additional Protocol nor abstain from engaging in uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing. This is the wrong path — increasing nuclear competitiveness cannot come at the expense of strict, responsible safety and non-proliferation standards. Instead, the United States should be a model for safety, require the highest non-proliferation standards of its importing partners, including having an Additional Protocol in place, and eliminate their need for enrichment and reprocessing capabilities by building up its own supply of enriched uranium fuel for both domestic and international use. Otherwise, the United States risks undermining the non-proliferation goals and practices it has spent decades upholding.
To be fair, it will be hard for the United States to compete with Russia in the nuclear export realm while still offering deals with less generous financing and stricter export controls. So what can the United States provide to sweeten the deal? In fact, reaffirming non-proliferation goals could just be the edge the United States needs to become competitive in this market again. This leads to the other task ahead: making the United States a desirable nuclear partner by rebuilding its standing as a non-proliferation advocate. This cannot be done through better financing or reducing paperwork. It comes from hard diplomatic work to remind the world what the United States once stood for — a steady, predictable ally and partner, on whom other countries could routinely depend as a bulwark of non-proliferation. In recent years, this status has fallen by the wayside as the United States retreats from its alliances and becomes increasingly unpredictable. This inconsistency makes other nations uneasy, causing them to consider if they, too, need nuclear weapons. By demonstrating that the United States is committed to the non-proliferation regime, arms control and working as a constructive actor for global safety, it can calm the fear that drives countries to develop nuclear weapons in the first place.
The United States’ biggest sell is itself. While the nuclear export deals the United States offers require more stringent non-proliferation standards and export controls of potential partners, it can offset these demands by righting its reputational ship among its allies and advancing nuclear export agreements like the Russians do: as strategic political tools, with all the beneficial economic, diplomatic, and security ties that could accompany a deal with the United States. At the same time, the United States should reinvigorate diplomatic efforts to standardize non-proliferation requirements for all sales of nuclear technology. The recently announced deal with Saudi Arabia illustrates the importance of getting this right.
Nuclear power production is rising across the world. But expanding peaceful nuclear power without recommitting to non-proliferation carries risks of nuclear weapons spreading. The United States can become competitive not just by rebuilding its role as a nuclear innovator, but also by providing other countries with a dependable ally that advocates decisively for a safer world. That will make it a partner states want to work with.
