By Lyle Seeligson
The need to address nuclear terrorism remains urgent. So why is the federal government cutting funding for the programs that prevent foreign and domestic terrorists from causing a nuclear disaster?
According to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre director, “the threat [of nuclear terrorism] has never been so high as it is today.” For a terrorist group, acquiring a nuclear weapon would be a difficult challenge, but as our world becomes more friendly to proliferation and global arsenals grow, this possibility increases.
Nuclear energy expansion inherently brings increased stores of nuclear material with it, which a sophisticated terrorist group could steal to create a crude weapon. As nuclear energy grows, so does the number of facilities that can be a target for a terrorist attack. Imagine the irresistible pull for a terrorist organization at the thought of inciting its very own Chernobyl or Fukushima.
More probable (though less catastrophic) is the possibility that terrorists would use other radiological materials, like cesium or cobalt, to make a “dirty bomb.” Rather than causing a nuclear explosion, this type of device uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material — sowing less death and destruction, but still achieving the goal of mass panic. Unfortunately, these materials can be found relatively easily in a wide range of civilian facilities around the world given their medical, agricultural and industrial uses. These materials are also not uniformly subject to strict security standards.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is not just present, it is growing. Congress must immediately work to restore critical funding to prevent these disasters before it’s too late.
Federal Budget Cuts to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Much of the U.S. government’s efforts to prevent and monitor for both state-level nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is housed in the Department of Energy’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). This office protects and secures nuclear and radiological materials and facilities around the world and reduces the prevalence of dangerous nuclear material. These efforts are focused on the front end of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, to stop bad actors before a disaster can occur. On the back end, the office also houses the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program — the experts who are prepared to respond to a nuclear attack or accident, in the terrible case that such an event does happen.
Despite the indispensable nature of this office to American safety, its funding has steadily declined in recent years. Between 2024 and 2026, DNN’s budget decreased by more than $200 million. The threats of nuclear terrorism have not abated since 2024 — just the funding to address them. For 2027, the Congressional appropriations> process could bring DNN’s budget down by almost another $300 million. This year’s defense budget is the largest in U.S. history. Given the magnitude of the danger, the calculus of how funding is allocated seems off.
Proponents of the budget will point out that this year’s funding included necessary increases to DNN’s counterterrorism program. While NCTIR received a vital funding boost, strengthening our ability to respond to nuclear terrorist attacks after the fact — a capacity we hope to never use — the other DNN programs focused on preventing >these attacks in the first place have seen drastic cuts.
Reducing “Foreign Aid” or Hampering Our Safety?
The argument for cutting this funding relies primarily on the desire to “reduce dependency on the United States” by foreign countries for these efforts. However, halting U.S. funding does not mean that other nations will step up to fill that role — DNN works with more than 100 countries, all of which have different capabilities and funding reserves to carry out this work themselves. Besides, the primary direct recipients of this funding are actually at home: most of DNN’s money goes to U.S. laboratories, universities and contractors.
An isolationist approach also ignores the fact that nuclear security does not end at our borders. Monitoring for nuclear and radiological material at U.S. borders and ports has greatly improved since 9/11, but this does not mean that there are no holes in this system, or that this monitoring technology is always implemented properly. It only takes slipping one improvised weapon into the country on a truck, in a shipping container, or along a railroad to bring about a disaster. We must work internationally to prevent a disaster at home.
As nuclear security expert Graham Allison coined it, nuclear terrorism is “the ultimate preventable catastrophe.” Through billions of dollars in funding and close coordination with our international partners, the United States enhanced nuclear security and stymied nuclear terrorism around the world. But we cannot expect our hard-earned “luck” to continue. During the appropriations process, Congress must restore DNN funding at least to its 2024 levels, if not higher. It’s vital that we properly fund programs that prevent nuclear terrorism — because we do not want to face a world in which our luck runs out.
