Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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What is Scarier Than Ghost, Goblins & Witches? Nukes!

Witches, ghosts and goblins haunt the stories and movies that we watch this time of week. However, if you truly want to be afraid, it’s worth remembering that terrifying weapons with the power to destroy our planet haunt humankind every day.

Today, there are an estimated 17,000+ nuclear weapons in the world, each of which is larger than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in seconds. Pakistan and India continue to develop and grow their nuclear arsenals, while North Korea may be preparing a new nuclear explosive test.

Meanwhile, some in Congress are failing to allow breathing room for diplomacy with Iran, which is our best hope to prevent a war that would make Iraq seem like a skirmish – a truly horrifying outcome. Recent research by the Center found the current sanctions regime to be effective and a need for Congressional patience in allowing their leverage to take hold.

But like all great Halloween stories, there is some hope to be had. In 2009, the number of nuclear weapons that could instantly be targeted at a U.S. or Russian city was reduced by the thousands. “The Center continues to educate Congress and the general public about opportunities to ensure national security while eliminating overly dangerous, extremely expensive and outdated weapons systems,” said executive director, John Isaacs. Yet the number that could be instantly targeted at the U.S. remains at 1,550 which is more haunting than The Conjuring.

In our modern time, it is not only countries with nuclear weapons that should be concerning but also the potential for a terrorist organization to gain access to these weapons and materials.

As in any great horror movie, the hero must act to prevent terrible things from happening. To do that, the U.S. in 2004 launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), which has successfully rid ten countries of their dangerous nuclear materials. However, like Death’s scythe, budget cuts have come to target the program, slashing millions from one of the most effective nuclear non-proliferation programs in decades.

While effective programs come under the pendulum in Edgar Allen Poe’s imaginary pit, billions are wasted every year on defense programs that do not enhance national security.

As Center chairman and former president of National Defense University, Lt. General (USA ret.) Robert Gard argues in an OpEd for The Hill, “Many years of pouring money from federal coffers into unnecessary defense programs has not increased security. It has, rather, contributed significantly to our federal deficit and retarded the current economic recovery; and we must not permit the military-industrial-Congressional complex to continue pushing us down this path.”

So, tonight as you watch Dracula, Frankenstein or Jason, it is important to remember that some scary things cannot be packed up and put in the attic until next year.

Syria’s chemical weapons disarmament shows promise but challenges remain

Significant progress toward dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile has been made in a short period of time, but significant challenges and a looming deadline remain. The disarmament process provides several lessons to be learned, and the deal which made disarmament an option offers key insights into the viability of diplomatic solutions to difficult problems.

In just under a month, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has inspected 21 of the 23 chemical weapons sites reported by the Syrian government. The two remaining sites have not yet been accessed by inspectors due to security concerns.

Syria submitted its formal program declaration three days prior to the October 27 deadline set by the Executive Council of the OPCW. The number of sites initially inspected diverged greatly from international estimates. However, Syria’s formal declaration has revealed a total of 41 facilities, including 18 for production and 12 for storage, at the 23 locations being inspected – a number much closer to original expectations. The possibility that the Assad regime may be concealing sites is just one of the many challenges facing OPCW inspectors, the United States and other nations in their efforts to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons.

    When the OPCW was tapped as the party responsible for overseeing the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons in a time of civil war, many expected that the small organization would be overwhelmed. However, the inspectors have made staggering progress in verifying Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile.  Inspectors have visited 21 sites and rendered inoperable almost all of the vital equipment necessary to weaponize Syria’s chemical arsenal. Additionally, the 27 inspectors have surveyed the 1,300 ton stockpile of precursor chemicals and nerve agent. The final two sites have proven to be more challenging to survey owing to their location in rebel-controlled territory.

For its part, the U.S. has contributed $1.5 million in assistance from the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to purchase ten armored vehicles to transport inspectors. An additional $6 million has gone toward the overall disarmament effort. The U.S. has also been trying to find locations to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Officials have approached Norway which initially considered the proposal but later determined that it lacked the necessary infrastructure to destroy the weapons before the deadline.

Denmark has since offered funds and assistance in the destruction of hundreds of tons of the stockpile, according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Suggestions have also been made that Russia’s naval base at Tartus, Syria could be a possible location for the neutralization of the stockpile; in fact, an initial proposal, which was rejected by Russia, suggested shipping the precursor agents from the Tartus base to Russia for destruction. As of right now, no location has been determined.

With the site inspection phase of the disarmament process rapidly coming to a close, what can be learned so far?

The most obvious lesson is that the international norm against the use of chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the outrage and subsequent calls for action against Assad and Syria. Calls for military action led to the next lesson learned: diplomatic options always exist if one looks hard enough. The ongoing disarmament process, the mechanism for which was worked out between the United States and Russia, is not without challenges but it has led to significant progress in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons program without the use of military force.

Of course, trying to conduct weapons inspections in the middle of a civil war is dangerous. The final two declared weapons sites have yet to be inspected due to security issues, and United Nations inspectors came under sniper fire in September while trying to investigate the site of the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack. In its recent press conference, the OPCW admitted that it has not yet ventured into rebel-held territory.

Destroying a 1,300 ton chemical weapons stockpile is an enormous undertaking. Few countries in the world possess the necessary infrastructure to neutralize a weapons stockpile that is arguably the largest in the Middle East; even fewer countries are willing to take on such a burden. The schedule for destroying Syria’s massive stockpile is ambitious and incredibly tight. Maintaining security for chemical weapons facilities, overseeing weapons transportation to destruction facilities and destroying the weapons in a timely manner are all further complicating factors. Moving the weapons will also present challenges because the Chemical Weapons Convention forbids the international movement of weapons, so exceptions will need to be made for such an option to proceed.

The coming weeks and months will reveal whether or not Assad will make good on his commitments to destroy Syria’s chemical arsenal. The success of the disarmament process depends upon the truthfulness of the Syrian regime in disclosing all of its chemical weapons facilities, which some reports indicate could possibly be as high as 50. However by the actions of the OPCW Executive Council and United Nations Security Council, a mechanism has been put into place for addressing opposition to site inspections as well continuing verification of Syria’s compliance.

The U.S.-Russia deal demonstrates that diplomacy is a valuable tool and though it won’t be easy, provides the best hope to eliminate the Syrian chemical-weapons threat.

Unnecessary Plans for US Nuclear Weapons Complex Leave Scientists Concerned

The Obama administration and Congress are faced with some important decisions regarding the US nuclear weapons complex in the next few years. Attempting to influence the powers that be, the Union of Concerned Scientists released an extensive 92-page report last week titled Making Smart Security Choices: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex. Co-authored by our Senior Science Fellow Phily Coyle, the report presents both a critical assessment of the current plans for the complex and a set of cost-effective and realistic recommendations to sustain its essential missions. Below are some of the major recommendations:

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should refurbish existing nuclear weapon types rather than manufacture new weapon systems or new designs using existing parts. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) declared that United States “will not develop nuclear warheads”.  The NNSA’s long-term strategy to modernize US nuclear warheads, also known as the “3+2” strategy, would result in the development of weapons that are “new” in every meaningful sense of the term. These new types would be seen as breaking the “no new” pledge and would have damaging international repercussions. In contrast, refurbishment of existing weapon types would comply with the NPR while providing a far more cost-effective alternative to the 3+2 plan.

Congress and the NNSA should make better use of non-nuclear testing of existing weapons to ensure their safety, reliability and security. The NNSA does not currently place a high enough value on the testing of different weapons systems, which is evident by the testing back log over the past decade. A lack of testing can increase the risk that defects in a weapon go undetected.

The ‘Stockpile Stewardship Program’ that helps the US gain a better understanding of how nuclear weapons work should be aligned with the needs of ongoing life extension programs. Some of the research conducted under this program is not directly related to ongoing life extension programs. Specifically, this entails reassessing the utility of a number of existing facilities including the Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF) in Nevada and the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.

Steps must be taken to minimize the risks associated with the disposal and storage of weapons-grade materials. The US currently possesses large stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that it does not require for military purposes. These stocks represent a security risk insofar as they are liable to theft and can be used to build nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium stocks should be downblended to ensure they are no longer military grade, while plutonium stocks should be safely sealed within secure geological repositories.

The US should continue dismantling its nuclear warhead stockpile and provide adequate verification mechanisms. Reductions in the respective nuclear weapons stockpiles of the US and Russia strengthens US national security. The administration and Congress should ensure that the US has the capacity to safely disarm, while at the same time establishing adequate disarmament verification mechanisms. The infrastructure at the Pantex Plant in Texas where nuclear weapons are dismantled is aging and the NNSA, in light of this, should attempt to dismantle existing weapons quicker. Funding should also be increased for research on nuclear arms reduction verification and, more specifically, warhead-level verification.

Although the report doesn’t provide an exhaustive cost savings analysis of its recommendations, significant savings could clearly be found if these recommendation were implemented. Many programs and facilities mentioned for closure encompass costs in the billions of dollars. Such savings are surely welcome considering that the Obama administration plans on spending over $60 billion just for five warhead life extension programs over the next 25 years.

Both the administration and Congress would be wise to give these recommendations some serious consideration. Their implementation would lead to a more rational nuclear weapons complex by cutting extraneous facilities and programs that necessitate unnecessary costs while securing its long-term viability.

Pentagon pushes for billions to refurbish nuclear bombs

I’ve written my October Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists column on the misbegotten B61 life extension program (LEP). Here’s how I begin:

At an estimated cost of more than $11 billion, the life-extension program for the B61 bomb would be the most ambitious and expensive nuclear warhead refurbishment in history. Concerned by this massive (and still growing) cost and skeptical of the need for a program of such breadth, two of the Senate’s appropriations subcommittees—Energy and Water, as well as Defense—slashed allotted spending on it in their respective fiscal 2014 funding bills.

Worried that their favorite refurbishment program is on the ropes, the Pentagon and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have launched a counteroffensive with an assist from supporters in Congress. The lobbying effort will be on full display on October 29 at a hearing hosted by the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee. It will include testimony in support of the life-extension program from the head of US Strategic Command and high-ranking representatives of the NNSA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The case against the proposed B61 life extension is simple: It is unaffordable, unworkable, and unnecessary. In addition, it is premised on assumptions about demand for nuclear bombs that may no longer be valid 10 years from now, when the program is scheduled to be completed. It would be foolish to spend $11 billion on an overly ambitious overhaul, when the future of at least half the weapons is uncertain and more cost-effective alternatives are available.

Read the whole thing here.

As I note in the column, the B61 is set to take center stage at a House Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing tomorrow afternoon. Expect the Pentagon/NNSA witnesses to expound all manner of arguments about how the current LEP of record is the cheapest LEP that meets military requirements to extend deterrence in Europe and Asia and ensure continued delivery by the B-2 bomber, would allow for a reduction in the size of the stockpile of nuclear gravity bombs (including the potential retirement of the earth penetrating B61 mod 11 and the aging B83 strategic gravity bomb), reduce long-term B61 life cycle costs, increase the safety of the refurbished weapons, obviate the need for an unplanned B61 life extension program in the 2020s, and is impossible to ditch at this point because NNSA has already dumped so much time and money into it.

Let’s set aside for the moment the fact that all of these arguments have major flaws (for example the B61 is already arguably the safest nuclear weapon in the stockpile; the Pentagon/NNSA have not provided a guarantee that the mod 12 would lead to the elimination of the B83; because the expected life of the mod 12 is only 20 years NNSA already has a second (!!) life extension program for the B61 on the books that is scheduled to begin in 2033 and could always move that date up a few years as a follow-on to a less ambitious LEP than the mod 12 if necessary; as of June 2013 NNSA had only spent $300 million on engineering work for the mod 12; NNSA has an ignominious history of launching into major protects only to determine later that it had overstated requirements and ignored more cost-effective alternatives; etc.).

The most important question that needs an answer is how NNSA plans to complete its proposed scope of work by 2019 given the current budget environment. Because as of now it’s not clear how the agency can do so.

A Change in Action to Follow Iran’s Change in Tone?

It has been a busy and interesting several weeks since President Obama’s United Nations General Assembly speech on September 24. Here’s a breakdown of the events that have taken place since and a look at what a plausible and mutually beneficial endgame we might expect to see.

•    On September 26, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. Kerry emerged from the meeting pleased but did not shy away from the many challenges ahead.

•    The next day, Iranian Ambassador Reza Najafi and his team of negotiators met with International Atomic Energy Agency officials led by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts. Details were scarce, but Nackaerts did say that the talks were “very constructive.”

•    Later that day, President Rouhani made history by breaking the 34 year silence between Iranian and U.S. heads of state when he spoke with President Obama by phone. Afterward, President Obama suggested that deeper ties might be possible if the two sides are able to come to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program.

•    On September 30, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Obama at the White House where he advocated for the strengthening of sanctions if Iran continues its enrichment program.

•    The following day, Netanyahu gave his UN General Assembly speech. He criticized Iran and President Rouhani saying, among other things, “Rouhani thinks he can have his yellowcake and eat it too.”

•    On October 2, the Iranian parliament, including many members loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, announced their support for Rouhani’s diplomatic approach.

•    That same day, EU leaders hinted that they may drop abandonment of enrichment from their negotiating demands in Geneva.

•    On October 6, Iran called on the West to put a new negotiating offer on the table. Secretary of State Kerry responded the following day by saying Iran must first address the U.S. offer put forth in February which includes ceasing enrichment of uranium to 20% and handing over some current uranium stockpiles to Western powers.

•    On the October 6, Pres. Obama quoted U.S. Intelligence estimates that it would take Iran about a year to make a nuclear weapon if it so desired.

•    On October 9, Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani reported in an Associated Press interview that Iran might be willing to hand over some of its 20% enriched uranium stockpile. Iranian negotiator Abbas Araghchi said on the October 13, however, that Iran is not willing to ship its uranium surplus abroad.

•    On October 10, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) began drafting a bill that would give the President the authority to go to war with Iran if negotiations fail. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) announced that he would allow some time for negotiations to take place but will only be able to wait until the end of October before going ahead with a sanctions bill targeting Iranian oil sales. Several Senate Democrats both on and off the Banking Committee have also voiced opposition to the easing of sanctions.

•    On October 12 it was announced that Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman would lead the U.S. delegation accompanied by Adam Szubin, the U.S. government’s foremost expert on sanctions.

•    P5+1 talks took place on October 15 and 16. You can see a full rundown here. The talks were encouraging and the parties agreed to meet again on November 7 and 8.

•    In the meantime, on October 28, Iran will meet with International Atomic Energy Agency negotiators to discuss possible inspections of nuclear facilities.

Short and long term goals
The confidentiality of the Geneva talks has caused rumors to swirl about Iran’s possible offer; an Iranian source has come forward saying that Iran is willing to convert its 20% enriched uranium to fuel rods while also relinquishing plutonium-laced spent fuel from the still under construction Arak heavy water facility. While this would certainly be good news if true, no offer has yet been made public by any of the parties involved, and it is important to note that Iran’s real offer may not resemble the rumored offer.

A short term goal of negotiations should be to outline early confidence building measures and agreement on the contours of a broader, longer-term agreement. Such an agreement would likely need to include limitations on enrichment levels to no more than 5%, the dismantling of Fordow (or at the least a very tight inspection schedule), limitations on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and the number of enrichment centrifuges commensurate with its realistic civilian nuclear power needs, and submission to full inspections (scheduled and unannounced) from the International Atomic Energy Agency. In return Iran will expect significant sanctions relief.

These concessions combined with early confidence building steps such as the relinquishment or conversion of all 20% enriched uranium while the negotiation process on a long-term agreement is ongoing  could go a long way toward demonstrating that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for peaceful purposes, as the country suggests. These concessions would also, hopefully, reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran and might allow for improved relations. Even if a deal is reached, however, it would remain imperative to continue inspections to ensure that Iran does not attempt to acquire breakout capability after sanctions are lifted.