By Travis Sharp and Kirk Bansak

North Korea was randomly assigned today to what looks to be the “group of death” in next year’s World Cup in South Africa. In addition to North Korea, the group includes Brazil (ranked 2nd in the world), Portugal (5th), and the Ivory Coast (16th). Last month, the Telegraph reported that Kim Jong-Il has banned World Cup 2010 coverage on North Korean television except for victory highlights.

In other words, no World Cup on TV in the DPRK next year.

In contrast, the United States drew the much more manageable England (9th), Algeria (28th), and Slovenia (33rd). It may be worth checking FIFA’s bylaws to see if the United States can swap its preferable group placement in exchange for North Korean denuclearization. After all, as one wise guy tried to argue while we watched the draw at lunch, regular Americans don’t care about soccer anyway, right?

The head of one regular American is definitely going to explode soon.

NOH believes it is clear that President Obama is responsible for this fortuitous World Cup development. Clearly his diplomacy is making things easier internationally for the United States and more difficult for North Korea. Any assertion to the contrary is intellectually dishonest and fundamentally un-American.

To bolster the security of our critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) yesterday announced its plan to simulate chemical attacks on Boston’s subway system, known as The T. But, Bostonians, do not despair: your activities will not be disrupted, subway schedules will not be altered, and you might not even realize the study is happening…unless you notice the presence of white coats and research gadgets, which could always be mistaken for MIT shenanigans…

Using a harmless tracer gas, the DHS Science & Technology Directorate will team up with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to study airflow characteristics of chemical smoke and gas in dozens of T stations and subway cars. This will take place from December 5 to 11. According to the DHS release, the study will yield “data that will help guide the design of next generation detection systems and enable transportation systems to strengthen evacuation, ventilation and other incident response strategies.”

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s agenda since 9/11 has included expanding its network of chemical sensors, though its bid last year for funding to install more sensors was denied by the Transportation Security Administration, an arm of DHS. Underlying the rejection was skepticism about the effectiveness of sensors in an actual emergency. As TSA spokesman Christopher White explained: “Current chemical detection systems do not warn the traveling public or system operators in a real-time environment that would deter or prevent a catastrophic event or attack…We’re very focused on active items, funding active activities and projects that would deter a terrorist attack.”

But that was back in 2008, and chemical sensor technology has presumably advanced since then. This month’s study will further augment the usefulness of sensors by helping to shape ideas for new designs, to determine ideal placement locations, and to increase understanding of chemical attack dynamics in general.

The potential for chemical terrorism is not simply the stuff of TV thrillers. In 1995, members of the millennial Japanese mystical cult Aum Shinrikyo (now called Aleph) released sarin nerve agent into the Tokyo subway system. Failure to develop an effective delivery system limited its impact, but the attack still claimed twelve lives and injured over a thousand. Scientists recruited by Aum Shinrikyo had previously experimented with biological agents, including anthrax. Thankfully they were unable to get over the technical hurdles involved in weaponizing the pathogens.

Although Aum did not achieve its goal of mass casualties, its 1995 attack revealed frightening possibilities common to all major cities. The vulnerability of Russia’s old chemical weapon stockpiles as well as advances in dual-use technology, such as microreactors, compound those risks. Let’s hope some valuable discoveries will be made in Boston this month.

Via Heather Hulburt, Executive Director of the National Security Network, comes still more evidence that despite what Jon Kyl would have you believe, there was a time not so long ago when some Republicans deemed it ok not to freak out about the configuration of Russia’s nuclear forces or the absence of provisions to verify the size and location of those forces.

In prepared testimony for a July 2002 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Moscow Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chided those who viewed START I as a model of effective arms control:

There are those who do not see the difference in the size of these treaties as a sign of progress. To the contrary, they would have preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions and intrusive verification measures.

These critics operate from a flawed premise: that, absent such an agreement, our two countries would both try to break out of the constraints of this treaty and increase our deployed nuclear forces. Nothing could be further from the truth.

During the Cold War, the stated rationale for arms control was to constrain an arms race. But the idea of an arms race between the United States and Russia today is ludicrous. The relationship between our two countries today is such that U.S. determined—unilaterally—that deep reductions in our deployed nuclear forces are in the U.S. interest.

We would have made these cuts regardless of what Russia did with its arsenal. We are making them not because we signed a treaty in Moscow, but because the fundamental transformation in our relationship with Russia means we do not need so many deployed weapons. Russia has made a similar calculation. The agreement we reached in Moscow is the result of those determinations—not the cause of them.

That is also why we saw no need for including detailed verification measures in the treaty. First, there simply isn’t any way on earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads. Second, we don’t need to. Neither side has an interest in evading the terms of the treaty, since it simply codifies unilaterally announced reductions—and gives both sides broad flexibility in implementing them. Third, we saw no benefit in creating a new forum for bitter debates over compliance and enforcement. Today, the last place in the world where U.S. and Russian officials still sit across a table arguing with each other is in Geneva. Our goal is to move beyond that kind of Cold War animosity—not to find new ways to extend it into the 21st century.

None of which is to suggest that Rummy was right.  Legally-binding, verifiable limits on the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals greatly enhance U.S. security by bringing predictability and stability to U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, giving each side confidence that neither side is attempting to retain a significant strategic advantage, and reducing the chances for misunderstanding and worst-case scenario planning.  While neither side wants to retain all of START I’s verification provisions, New START is likely to include an updated system of procedures so that each side can continue to have confidence that it knows what the other is doing.

Nor should we be cavalier about Russian missile development.  As Daryl Kimball noted in response to news that the U.S. will soon lose its ability to continuously monitor Russian missile production at Votkinsk, “How significant [the loss of Votkinsk] is depends on what other monitoring mechanisms will be worked out.”

Rather, the point is to highlight yet again how remarkably unserious and disingenuous the attacks on New START from the likes of Jon Kyl, Paula DeSutter, etc. have been.

Guest Post by Alex Bollfrass (Click here to read Freezer Burn, Part I)

On to Part II of the discussion of Thomas Schelling’s “A world without nuclear weapons.”

Besides the argument about non-verifiability, Schelling’s main contention against nuclear abolition is grounded in the seemingly limitless power of nuclear weapons – and therefore their irresistible appeal in the case of a major crisis.  Schelling played an enormous role in shaping our understanding of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War – and it shows.  

He relies too strongly on the notion that a handful of nuclear weapons can rule the world as long as no other country can balance them with an arsenal of its own:

[I]f, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible.

This belief in the overwhelming power of the Bomb comes from a reading of WWII that has been convincingly dismantled by Ward Wilson.  In a forthcoming manuscript, Ward points out that the destruction of cities, the one thing nuclear weapons do well, have never won wars.  Think of the US Civil War: Sherman may have burned Atlanta and the Union captured the South’s capital, Richmond, but the war ended only when the Confederate armies were surrounded and faced certain defeat.  Defeating armies is not something nuclear weapons, particularly small numbers of nuclear weapons, are particularly adept at.

In a disarmed world, the major powers would have accepted this line of reasoning; otherwise they would have never agreed to divest themselves of these weapons. They would also have instituted a robust enforcement process beyond the current Security Council arrangements to ensure a swift conventional response to a violation.  This means that they would be both far less likely to attempt to reconstitute their arsenals in a bid to gain an advantage in an impending crisis, nor would they be as spooked about seeing their rival do so as Schelling postulates.  

But even if a crisis would not automatically “go nuclear,” would countries be more likely to break out without the stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence?  No – and that is another assumption about nuclear weapons based on an incomplete reading of history.  Observing that the US-Soviet rivalry never erupted into direct conflict, proponents of retaining nuclear arsenals identify them as the crucial peacekeepers.

A potent antidote to this causal explanation is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s recent piece in Foreign Affairs (subscription required). He offers a full account of why the US and the Soviets never came to blows – without ever invoking nuclear deterrence. This has important implications for the future of US-Russian relations, too.  As discussed in Part I, the U.S. and Russia are the only two countries that could conceivably hide the materials necessary to maintain a near-weapons capability (something Schelling erroneously believes every major power to be capable of). Eternal harmony and love between the two is not necessary.  Instead, a stable geopolitical arrangement would suffice to prevent the emergence of the paranoid escalatory dynamic Schelling fears. In a disarmed world this is a given, because we would not have gotten there without an improvement in relations between the US and Russia and the conclusion of a more stable European security system.  

Although Schelling is correct that “every responsible government” will have a plan to re-arm if necessary, it will also analyze the costs and benefits of upping the nuclear ante before taking this step. This does not mean that making a decision to reconstitute will be ruled out, but it is far from self-evident that the “urge to preempt” is the irresistible temptation that Schelling describes.  

Even in moments of crises, a world without nuclear weapons would therefore be far more stable than he suggests.   How would it compare to the stability of the world today?  We would be rid of the potentially catastrophic risk of nuclear warfare.  This does not eliminate the need for further analysis and study of the merits of global zero.  But Schelling’s reasoning should not dissuade President Obama and other leaders from pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament.

To conclude on a conciliatory note: I may disagree with the Nobel Laureate on the dynamics of nuclear abolition, but there is no question that Schelling and I can find common ground celebrating last week’s disarming first strike against Stanford’s offense. Go Bears!

Alex Bollfrass works for the Unblocking the Road to Zero project at the Stimson Center, where his better angels are fighting a losing battle against the temptations of conference-origin baked goods.