Guest Post by Alex Bollfrass (Click here to read Freezer Burn, Part II)

News broke last week that prosecutors are asking to have William Jefferson (D.-Louisiana) locked up for some 13 years.  You may remember that he stashed about $90,000 in dirty money in his freezer.

If you thought that a bribe to a foreign vice-president was the most unappetizing thing stuffed in with the pie crusts, read Thomas Schelling’s “A world without nuclear weapons?” in the current issue of Daedalus (gated). In his telling, one of the major barriers to a world without nuclear weapons is his refrigeration capacity:

“[E]nough plutonium to make a bomb could be hidden in the freezing compartment of my refrigerator.”

While this observation about the size of the plutonium in a nuclear bomb may be true, it tells us little about the feasibility of nuclear disarmament.  

Schelling’s point is that if sufficient fissile material for a bomb is small enough to fit into a freezer, an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons could never be verified.  But hiding weapons is only part of a cheater’s problem.  There are additional formidable obstacles that would prompt anyone contemplating reconstituting or developing nuclear weapons in a disarmament regime to think very carefully.

Cheating on a disarmament agreement could happen in one of three ways:

1. Cheating at the outset and retaining undeclared warheads or fissile materials;

2. Clandestinely producing the materials for a nuclear arsenal after disarmament had been accomplished;

3. Diverting declared materials from nuclear energy facilities or from left-over fissile material stocks.

The last method is roughly equivalent to grabbing the money and dashing for the casino door.  The ploy would be immediately uncovered as all such facilities and stockpiles would be safeguarded far more closely than ex-Congressman Jefferson’s “take” in any self-respecting disarmament regime.  Such a cheater’s gain, if any, would be short-lived.  Either the other signatories would undertake collective action with conventional military forces to stop the program, or those with the potential capabilities would rearm themselves, leaving the world no worse off than it is now. A rearmament effort triggered this way would be unfortunate, but unlikely. Furthermore, it would be comparatively stable because the governments would be building a defense-oriented deterrent, as opposed to seeking a coercive advantage.

The middle course of action? Check with this bloke. With on-site challenge inspections and national means of verification, such an action would likely be discovered relatively quickly, just as the Qom facility was uncovered and has every covert weapons program to date.  The world may not have acted on South Africa’s or Israel’s or Pakistan’s covert weapon programs, but the United States and others were certainly aware of what was going on – even without an on-site challenge inspection scheme.  

The first option, Schelling’s path, is only available to the nine countries that already have enough unsafeguarded plutonium or highly enriched uranium to make a bomb: China, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States.

In practice, the majority of these countries would almost certainly be caught.  Their holdings of materials are modest enough that their declarations of weapons and stocks could be confirmed with great certainty using a combination of forensic verification techniques.  The only two exceptions are the US and Russia, both of which produced massive amounts of fissile material during the Cold War. For these two exceptions, the margin of error that could reasonably be expected from thorough verification procedures amounts to several hundreds of bombs worth of uncertainty. If we agreed to implement nuclear disarmament tomorrow, we or the Russians could presumably squirrel away at least several dozen bombs (or at least the fissile materials to make them).

Will this prove to be nuclear disarmament’s fatal vulnerability – a la Siegfried’s exposed back?

It need not be. That margin of error can be reduced by an increase in transparency, coupled with the healing powers of time. Long before moving to the White House, Steve Fetter wrote “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament” as the Stimson Center’s Occasional Paper #29 in 1996. He identified a remedy, which is worth quoting at length from the paper:

A data exchange could help build confidence between the parties even before the accuracy of the data was verified. An early exchange of data is particularly important because it would force governments to make decisions about compliance with reporting requirements well in advance of possible disarmament agreements. A government that possesses thousands of nuclear weapons and has made no near-term commitment to disarmament is less likely to be suspected of falsifying records or hiding weapons than a country that has few weapons and is obliged to eliminate the remainder, simply because a country with thousands of warheads would have little incentive to cheat.

It is also important to begin verifying declarations as far in advance of a disarmament agreement as possible. As the number of nuclear weapons falls into the hundreds, states would be far more likely to have confidence in a declaration whose accuracy had been verified for years and for tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, than one whose verification had begun only recently and only after thousands of warheads had been dismantled. Failure to verify the dismantling and consolidation of the huge US and Russian nuclear stockpiles could undermine severely the two sides’ confidence in a declaration made later about much smaller numbers of weapons. There is little pressure for warhead-verification today because current and planned stockpiles are so large as to make existing uncertainties unimportant. But unless the nuclear powers begin now to describe and verify their warhead stockpiles, when the need for verification is not pressing, they will have failed to lay a foundation that is strong enough to bear the weight of a disarmament regime.

Data on the history of stockpiles and the operation of warhead-related facilities cannot be verified directly, of course, but it could be checked for internal consistency, and for its consistency with archived intelligence data. If, for example, US satellites had detected the movement of nuclear warheads from a particular Russian facility on a particular date in the past, this could be checked against the records exchanged between the two countries. Indeed, such records should improve the value of archived data by confirming or contradicting past interpretations by intelligence agencies. The fact that countries would not know what intelligence information might be available would act as an incentive to provide complete and accurate data.

As with declarations on delivery vehicles, data on the current status of nuclear warheads would be verified by regular and short-notice inspections of declared facilities, combined with challenge inspections to verify the absence of warheads at other locations. For example, inspectors could count the number of warheads in a particular storage bunker and compare this to the number listed in the data exchange.

If President Obama sees nuclear disarmament as a serious destination, and not just rhetorical decoration for traditional arms control and nonproliferation, these kinds of early transparency measures should be included in the next round of negotiations with the Russians. So should tactical nuclear weapons.

In the most optimistic abolition scenario, ex-Congressman Jefferson would find himself released into a world contemplating the final destruction of the remaining nuclear weapons when he retires as ex-convict Jefferson several decades from now. That is a long time to devise technologies and procedures for verifying US and Russian fissile material stocks. Whether the nuclear-armed countries of that era will have the confidence to take such a leap depends on how seriously we prepare for this possibility in the next few years.

Alex Bollfrass works for the Unblocking the Road to Zero project at the Stimson Center, where he occasionally comes across suspiciously plutonium-like materials in the office refrigerator.

The October-November 2009 issue of Survival includes an excellent back and forth on the merits of a nuclear “no first use” declaratory policy (hat tip: PONI).  The exchange is in response to Scott Sagan’s article supporting such a policy in the June-July 2009 issue.

As the most hackneyed saying in the blogosphere goes, read the whole thing.  And if you’re interested in some further discussion on the arguments of one of Sagan’s interlocutors, well, you know what to do.

Bruno Tertrais raises a number of objections to Sagan’s case, most of which Sagan ably rebuts in his reply.  Yet Sagan did not challenge two points made by Tertrais that I think merit a response.

A “commitment trap”?

In his seminal article on no first use in the Spring 2000 issue of International Security, Sagan wrote:

current nuclear doctrine creates a “commitment trap”: threats to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack are credible, because if CW or BW are used despite such threats, the U.S. president would feel compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons to maintain his or her international and domestic reputation for honoring commitments.

Sagan reiterated this point in his Survival article, which prompted the following response from Tertrais:

But why would there be such a trap as long as there is no promise of a guaranteed nuclear response?  That is precisely the point of “calculated ambiguity”….I cannot believe, moreover, that an American president would see “reputation” as a reason to take the most dramatic military decision a Western leader has had to take since 1945.

Is Tertrais’ disbelief warranted?  I think the more compelling logic is on the side of Sagan here.  In fact, Tertrais himself appears to concede that reputation is something to be taken seriously in international politics.  

For instance, one of the cudgels he yields against no first use is that it could carry significant “non-proliferation costs”: allies covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella might doubt the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, thereby leading them to develop their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs. Put in another way, a no first use policy would call into question the U.S. commitment to live up to its reputation as the ultimate guarantor of Japanese security.

If reputation is a reason why the U.S. should not abandon calculated ambiguity, how can Tertrais be so certain that no American president would view reputation as a reason to use nuclear weapons?  These are different cases, to be sure, but in the event of a North Korean chemical or biological attack on Japan, couldn’t the perceived need to make good on a pledge to meet deterrent commitments to Japan put immense pressure on the President to respond with nuclear weapons – even though there was no firm promise to respond in such a way?  

Sagan spoke to this pressure in more detail in his 2000 essay:

The problem here is one of degree: it is unlikely that any U.S. president would respond with nuclear weapons to a very small-scale chemical or biological weapons attack; yet a president’s belief that his or her statements, or those of subordinate officials, had created a commitment in the eyes of allies and future adversaries could tip the balance between nuclear and conventional response in more serious contingencies. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more important or valid reason for using nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological weapons attacks. [emphasis mine].

Would no first use leave the U.S. vulnerable?

According to Tertrais, the answer is yes:

[no first use] would signal those adversaries who would take such a commitment seriously that they could do anything to the United States or its allies without ever facing the risk of a nuclear response, using chemical weapons against our forces on a battlefield, raining down conventional ballistic missiles on our homelands, or launching biological munitions against our populations.

This is a straw man of what a no first use policy is all about.  As Sagan notes in his Survival article, “declaratory policy is not about making ‘promises’ about future restraint; it is about signaling intent and therefore shaping the expectations of allies and adversaries alike, even if some residual uncertainty remains.”

Look, even if the United States were to adopt a no first use policy, its nuclear arsenal is still on the table, so to speak.  This existential reality is something potential adversaries would have to take into account when considering whether to attack the United States with WMD or advanced conventional weapons.  The point is that the more U.S. leaders and government officials loudly and publically suggest that nuclear weapons remain relevant for various contingencies, the more likely it would be to actually use them in the event of such a contingency – because of the commitment trap.

By Kirk Bansak and Andrew Riedy

Quibbling with the conventions of op-ed form and style aside, PONI’s critique of our article on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty makes a few points that merit a response.

Chess Not Checkers

Since 1998, no country except for North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, and other countries have continually reaffirmed their intention not to test. This 11 year period without nuclear weapons testing represents 17 percent of the entire Atomic Age. PONI may think this insignificant, but we believe it says something powerful about the non-testing status quo that exists today among responsible stakeholders in the international community.

We’d like to address the red herring advanced by PONI that ratification of the CTBT would require the United States to “lock itself into permanently forswearing nuclear tests,” as PONI writes. The text of the Treaty states explicitly that “Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”

If a situation developed where national survival was at stake, the United States could give six months advance notice and withdraw from the CTBT. Of course, if a crisis erupted and the United States did not feel it had time to provide six months notice, it could withdraw immediately in violation of the Treaty and take whatever steps it deemed necessary to protect itself.

We do not mean to suggest that U.S. adherence to its CTBT obligations ought to be purely cosmetic. But there is no CTBT Police that is going to put the U.S. nuclear arsenal under lock and key if the Senate approves the pact. Since scientific experts have affirmed repeatedly that the nuclear arsenal can be reliably maintained for decades without testing, doesn’t it make sense for the United States to ratify the CTBT – thus gaining the political and security benefits therein – while remembering that if things get nasty, U.S. leaders are free to do what they need to do?

Bipartisan Consensus

Our op-ed states that there is a growing bipartisan consensus in support of the CTBT among “experts.” PONI contests this assertion by citing uncertainty within the Posture Commission and the U.S. Senate and goes on to state that the CTBT has become a “lightening rod internationally.” Senators are almost without exception not experts, so that rebuttal is off target. Apropos the international scene, the CTBT may be a litmus test by which non-nuclear weapons states judge the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation (discussed below), but that has nothing to do with the growing consensus amongst U.S. experts to which we were referring (which was clear from the context, we think).

So that leaves the Posture Commission, which did disagree on the Test Ban. Thank God the commissioners are not the only U.S. experts on the block. What about two-thirds of the former secretaries of state and defense and national security advisers? Check mark.

Entry into Force

PONI: “The problem, however, is that even if you get the U.S., China, and Indonesia on board , India and Pakistan will be tough although not impossible to get.  Even more difficult is the task of convincing Egypt, Iran, Israel, and North Korea all to ratify which is probably why the Strategic Posture Commission opponents of CTBT concluded there is a ‘near zero’ chance of entry into force.”

While we’d prefer to see entry into force, we still think there is value in having the United States, China, and possibly India and Pakistan ratify the Test Ban even if other holdouts like Iran and North Korea refuse and thus prevent entry into force. Such a result, while disappointing, would put the United States visibly in the nonproliferation camp and array even greater international political pressure against outlaw nations.

As Kingston explained recently, ratification by the United States and China, the only two hold-out nations on the UN Security Council, “would further strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, encourage other holdouts to ratify, and could activate a provisional entry into force of the treaty (along with the valuable verification and on-site inspection provisions that go with it).”

Horizontal Proliferation

PONI: “CTBT would, at most, only constitute an ‘effective freeze’ on some qualitative aspects of nuclear arsenals that could be upgraded via testing in countries that have ratified the treaty after it enters into force…the CTBT itself in no way prevents horizontal proliferation.”

Negotiation of the CTBT was a critical quid pro quo in getting non-nuclear weapons states to approve the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It is irrelevant for PONI to write that the CTBT “in and of itself in no way prevents horizontal proliferation” because the Test Ban does not operate as a single isolated mechanism. The Test Ban is part of the jumbled, beautiful political morass known as the international nonproliferation regime, which is anchored by the NPT.

Although CTBT ratification by each individual nation was not part of the 1995 quid pro quo, the importance of the Test Ban to non-nuclear weapons states suggests that the continued dormancy of the CTBT may reduce their confidence in both the NPT and the nonproliferation regime writ large. If nuclear weapons states build bigger and better nuclear arsenals (i.e. qualitative improvements), isn’t it clear that non-nuclear weapons states may lose confidence in the NPT and potentially seek to acquire nuclear weapons of their own?

There is a link between vertical and horizontal proliferation – it is the NPT’s grand bargain that nuclear weapons states will disarm in exchange for non-nuclear weapons states promising not to go nuclear. If you think the NPT has achieved even limited success in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, then you should consider supporting the CTBT, which enhances the nuclear weapons states’ performance of their NPT obligations and thus solidifies the political transaction that underpins the entire nonproliferation regime. There is no guarantee that non-nuclear weapons states will always hold up their end of the bargain, but the international community and individual nations have ways of dealing with that problem.

By ratifying the CTBT, the United States potentially enhances horizontal nonproliferation in exchange for a vertical nonproliferation pledge that will not affect its fundamental ability to protect itself during a crisis. Sounds like a good deal to us.

While the United States has chastised both Iran and North Korea for their human rights abuses, it has typically kept the issue separate from denuclearization talks. Yet some experts recommend integrating human rights into broader discussions, as opposed to pursuing single-variable negotiations, in order to create valuable synergies within the diplomatic process.

At an event hosted by the National Iranian American Council on November 4, Ambassador Thomas Pickering emphasized the value of integrating human rights into current U.S. outreach to Iran. In his view, introducing more items for discussion broadens the range of diplomatic possibilities and increases chances for success. As opposed to a “grand bargain” with a rigid a priori formula, Pickering proposed a “grand agenda” with the goal of squeezing as many goodies as possible into the final package.

Ambassador John Limbert expounded upon this point, recommending a “firm but polite” approach with Iran. He explained that while “chest-bumping” moralistic statements by the West have proven unsuccessful, a calculated play of the human rights card could create a dilemma for the Iranian regime, which would run the risk of discrediting itself if it did not respond positively to ostensibly well-intentioned concern for its population. Nonproliferation and human rights might be simultaneously strengthened in this type of approach.

Similar reasoning has been applied to the standoff with North Korea. In a New York Times op-ed, Andrei Lankov recommended cultural and informational exchanges to plant seeds for the eventual emergence of North Korean civil society. Another recent report also recommended outreach, including academic and economic exchanges, in order to “spur better behavior by Pyongyang while helping its impoverished citizens.” Of course, the United States would have to reassure North Korea that these exchanges were not a backhanded attempt at regime change. Providing full transparency of all activities would help.

Lankov makes a strong case for the people-to-people strategy: “This is a well-tested approach: It is, essentially, the one that allowed liberal democracies to win the Cold War…it was the West’s economic prosperity and political freedom that irrevocably undermined popular support for Communism.” That may be true, but it is unclear whether or not sociopolitical reform will lead regular Iranians and North Koreans, let alone the ruling regimes, to support denuclearization or other policies more amenable to U.S. interests.

While the human rights-denuclearization link is compelling and policymakers should hope for its effectiveness, there are a few assumptions that are difficult to swallow. The first is that the American government and public will be patient enough to await the positive effects of the approach. The second is that the two regimes will be open to American engagement with their economies and populations. The latter assumption can more reasonably be made vis-à-vis Iran, which has, despite heinous crackdowns, shown concern about sustaining domestic popular support since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In contrast, North Korea is a totalitarian state with a constitution based on a “military first” (songun) ideology and a public both barred from electing their leaders and isolated from the outside world.