Behold the latest anti-“New START” talking point: the Russians are cheaters!  So alleged NoH BFF Sen. Jon Kyl in an October 19 speech on the Senate floor:

Finally, I will refer again to the issue of Russia’s multiple-warhead RS-24. In this case, it appears the Russians have cheated–if not in the letter of the START agreement, at least in its spirit–by converting one of their existing missiles, the TOPOL-M, to this new multiple-warhead variant.

However, if you look at the 2005 Section 403 Report, which is also known as the Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report, prepared by the State Department’s VCI Bureau, there are a litany of other outstanding issues regarding Russia’s failure to comply with START.

Let’s start with the RS-24.  

Russia has tested and developed a new, multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27 (known as the RS-24). However, START I would prohibit the RS-24 because it does not conform to the Treaty’s definition of a new type of missile. Since START I limits the SS-27 to a single warhead, a multiple-warhead version would violate the Treaty. Russia plans to begin deploying the missile in December 2009 to coincide with the expiration of START I. Russian officials argue that the RS-24 is central to maintaining the credibility of the Russia deterrent, in part because it will be able to penetrate U.S. ballistic missiles defenses.

First, provided that Russia does not deploy the RS-24 while START I is still in force, it is not technically a violation.  Kyl does have a point, however, in noting that Russia’s pursuit of the RS-24 may contravene the spirit of START I. According to Pavel Podvig, though Russia has tested the RS-24 with more than one warhead, it has been exploiting a technicality whereby it can declare the missile a “prototype” until it has been flight tested 20 times.  So long as the missile remains a prototype, Russia does not have to attribute any warheads to it.  In any event, New START is likely to amend START I to allow for the deployment of the RS-24.  

Second, the Bush administration did not make an issue out of Russia’s development of the RS-24, perhaps because it never really had any desire to extend START I in the first place.  As former Bush administration official Ambassador Linton Brooks noted recently, “The fact that the Secretary of Defense in the last administration said both publically and privately that we didn’t care [about the RS-24] may have suggested to them [the Russians] that it was ok….We had a long time…to call them on that and we as a government chose not to.”

Regarding alleged Russian compliance violations, the 2005 report cited by Kyl states that “a significant number of longstanding compliance issues that have been raised in the START Treaty’s Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) remain unresolved.”    

While Congress is supposed to receive a compliance report every year, VCI, which during the Bush administration was led by Paula DeSutter, completed only two from 2001-2009, the first in June 2003 and the second (and last) in August 2005.  The 2005 report contained far more detail about Russian implementation of START I than previous reports, claiming, among other things, that Russia was not allowing the U.S. to effectively monitor and verify some Russian warheads and missiles.  

Yet Russia has also raised unresolved issues pertaining to its inability to verify the number of warheads on U.S. Trident II missiles.  Compliance concerns on both sides have existed for some time, which is precisely why the JCIC exists.

As Arms Control Today observed at the time, the 2005 report “contrasts sharply with the Bush administration’s casual verification approach to its May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. The administration did not negotiate any verification measures for the treaty because it claimed to have confidence that Moscow would limit its warheads by the treaty’s terms.”  It’s telling that some of the same conservatives who supported the SORT approach are now accusing the Obama administration of being weak on verification.

Fortunately, there is at least one Republican Senator who understands that some relatively minor questions – in the grand scheme of things – about compliance with START I should not be used as a cudgel with which to beat the Russians (and the Obama administration).  In a Senate floor speech delivered yesterday, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) had this to say about alleged Russian cheating:

Some skeptics have pointed out that Russia may not be in total compliance with its obligations under START.  Others have expressed opposition to the START Treaty on the basis that no arms control agreement is 100-percent verifiable.  But such concerns fail to appreciate how much information is provided through the exchange of data mandated by the Treaty, on-site inspections, and national technical means.  Our experiences over many years have proven the effectiveness of the Treaty’s verification provisions and served to build a basis for confidence between the two countries when doubts arose.  The bottom line is that the United States is far safer as a result of those 600 START inspections than we would be without them.

Right on!
 

As the Obama administration closes in on an agenda for bilateral talks with Pyongyang, it looks as though the United States and South Korea are back on the same page after a protracted spell of miscommunication…

The State Department still has not indicated if it will accept Pyongyang’s invitation for a visit by U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth. A senior South Korean official told the Korean Hankyoreh newspaper last Friday, however, that “Special envoy (Stephen) Bosworth will visit North Korea next month.” It was unclear at the time if the report had any concrete truth behind it.

But yesterday, the Korea Times quoted South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Wi Sung-lac, saying that the United States is “expected to make a decision soon on the date and agenda of bilateral talks with North Korea.” This statement has been corroborated by The Cable, which reported that the United States has already put forth a proposal. This report came a day after North Korea expressed impatience.

The United States has yet to make any formal public announcements about an agenda. Yesterday, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly limited his comments on the matter to the status quo policy. “We are willing to have bilateral talks with the North Koreans if these talks are conducted in the context of the Six-Party Talks and if they lead to the resumption of the Six-Party Talks,” Kelly said.

But the statements made by Wi Sung-lac and the unnamed senior South Korean official indicate that the South Koreans are aware of a U.S. plan, probably even more than they let on. Since North Korea began insisting on bilateral talks, the United States has uneasily assumed a vanguard diplomatic role. Each member of the six-party talks has accepted the prospect of bilateral talks provided that the goal is to revive the six-party negotiations. Yet this approach has not been without anxiety.

South Korea has been gently pushed to the side despite President Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” proposal. Last month, South Korean media highlighted a potential rift between the United States and South Korea, perhaps exaggerating at times for fear of being relegated to the periphery. In light of this uneasiness, it is a relief that the United States and South Korea are no longer refuting or overlooking each other’s public statements.

Also noteworthy is the seeming coordination between South Korea and Japan. In response to Pyongyang’s announcement on Tuesday that it has reprocessed all of its 8,000 spent nuclear rods and made “significant achievements” in producing another atomic bomb, South Korea and Japan both used the word “regret” to express their outlook on the matter. It may simply be coincidence, but it seems possible that they coordinated this careful word choice to present a calculated and unified message.

Remember when Gen. Chilton brought an old-school vacuum tube to a meeting with the Wall Street Journal and reportedly suggested that this technology cannot be replaced without building new nuclear warheads?  Remember when Jeffrey Lewis and I argued that vacuum tubes have nothing to do with the RRW debate?  Remember when Gen. Chilton told Global Security Newswire’s Elaine Grossman that we were “confused, frankly” (i.e. we didn’t know what we were talking about)?  Remember when John Harvey, the former head of NNSA’s policy planning staff, and the Washington Times’ Bill Gertz revealed that it was Gen. Chilton who was in fact confused?  Of course you do!  Well, the saga continues.  

Via friend of NoH Nick Roth, Energy Secretary Steven Chu and NNSA Administrator Tom D’Agostino honored the Kansas City Plant’s 60-Year anniversary at DoE headquarters yesterday (the Kansas City Plant produces the non-nuclear components for U.S. nuclear weapons).  Both Chu and D’Agostino were presented with “historic” artifacts to commemorate the occasion.  Chu’s plaque contained, wait for it, two “1960s-era” vacuum tubes and the “RF-IC based multi-chip module” (i.e. a modern semiconductor device).  Head over to NNSA’s website for some great pictures and a video (yes a video; wonkporn at its finest!) of the event. *For the record, D’Agostino was presented with an “orginial watch clock key” which security patrol would use to document entry into and exit from secure areas during the first few decades of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

In presenting Chu’s plaque, Kansas City Plant officials stated that it

“contains…1960s-era vacuum tubes from the B61 radars that are currently deployed in today’s stockpile.  Next to it is the RF-IC based multi-chip module for the next generation radar applications.  The use of the new technology will greatly reduce the radar size and manufacturing cost while improving its reliability.” [emphasis mine]

So now the Kansas City Plant is also on record as stating that vacuum tubes are in “the B61 radars” (actually only some of the B61 radars).  The radar, you will recall, is a non-nuclear component located outside the physics package.  Methinks its long past time for Gen. Chilton to either admit that he misspoke in suggesting vacuum tubes can only be replaced via an RRW-like approach or declare that the Wall Street Journal grossly misinterpreted what he said.  

UPDATE Nov 5 by Travis: Kingston erred greatly by not titling this post “Chu Tubes.” Here’s a better pic:

Laser isotope separation (LIS) is starting to gain attention in the nonproliferation community because Global Laser Enrichment, a partnership led by GE-Hitachi, plans to use LIS in its proposed uranium enrichment facility in Wilmington, North Carolina. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing a license request for the facility.

At this point, it appears that economics is the main driver behind LIS. While avenues that make power generation cheaper are understandably alluring, the Unites States ought to first stop and check for hazards before it dives headfirst into LIS.

Since LIS is difficult for the IAEA to detect due to smaller facilities, lower energy consumption, and the potential for increased economic efficiency vis-à-vis other enrichment methods, the spread of LIS as a form of uranium enrichment constitutes a proliferation risk.

LIS can be conducted in the type of non-industrial-sized facility which might go undetected by signals intelligence, whereas current methods can be spotted from satellites. According to technical experts, if scientists were given adequate time – 1 or 2 years – they could produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon using the LIS method even without the benefit of an industrial-sized LIS plant. The combination of potential imperceptibility and a short timeline raises the specter of an aspiring nuclear weapons state developing a breakout capability before the international community even knew covert enrichment was occurring.

By providing implicit economic incentives, the incorporation of LIS technology into the U.S. nuclear fuel fabrication process may encourage other nations to incorporate this technology into their own domestic fuel production industries. The commercialization of LIS is likely to bring the technology to market, whether it is in the style of NASDAQ or A.Q. Khan.

On the other hand, if the United States can adjust the cost-benefit calculations of nations looking to start or expand their nuclear programs by building economies of scale around less proliferation-sensitive technologies, it will be able to profit from the expansion of nuclear power while not encouraging clandestine enrichment activity.

The Center recently has done a lot of work on LIS, including sending letters to both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Hill on the proposed North Carolina facility. At a recent briefing the Center organized with CNS, James Acton noted that with the rebirth of the nuclear industry, it is imperative that more attention be paid to proliferation-sensitive technologies such as LIS.

Acton outlines the self-monitoring that needs to take place, referring to it as “technological restraint,” in his new article in Survival. He argues that the negative externalities of producing nuclear power are too often dismissed. Just as carbon cap-and-trade programs are attempting to incorporate a negative externality into the fossil-fuel energy industry, so should the proliferation risks of sensitive technology be incorporated into the nuclear power business. Until such incorporation occurs, Acton concludes, the government and the people will continue to bear the costs.

For more information on LIS, watch Jeffery Eerkens explain how it can improve the technical and economic inefficiencies of uranium enrichment and read the Los Alamos primer on Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX).