Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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Introducing our New Associate Director of Development

Introducing Stephanie Somerman, our newest addition to the Center staff who joins the team as the new Associate Director of Development. Meet Stephanie:

While working for two years on the Pentagon Budget Campaign, a project of the Center/Council, and closely with Angela on the Campaign’s steering committee, I am eager to now split my time, lending a hand to the Center/Council development team.  I have sat just down the hall from most of the staff and work closely with Laicie and John on the Pentagon spending issue.  I am looking forward to diving deeper into all areas the Center/Council work on and finding innovative ways to have an impact in the larger peace and security community.  This includes seeking out new sources of funding and different angles we can take, building on the strong foundation of advocacy and policy the Center/Council have built over the past half a century.  Although double duty is tough, I am glad to be able continue to support the Pentagon Budget Campaign coalition in addition to this new role.

I arrived in DC a little over two years ago after 27 months as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Ukraine.  Living in southern Ukraine, I worked with two small NGOs to further develop their organizational capacity including writing grants, project design and management plus strategic planning.  My background is in non-profit management with a focus on policy/advocacy based non-profits.  As an alumnus of the University of Michigan and Ford School of Public Policy where I received my Masters in Public Policy, I also ran a small non-profit research firm at the University where I wrote and implemented with a team of students large scale grant projects from the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health and Census Bureau.  I am also a proud founding member of the Roosevelt Institute Campus Network at the University of Michigan where I worked with my fellow students to write and advocate for student policy solutions to local and federal problems.

With a rich experience in leading, organizing and developing non-profits, I am happy to tackle new challenges.  I hope to take this opportunity to grow my development and operational skills further and build toward a more peaceful national security strategy.

The Unaffordable Arsenal

 Top government officials are in agreement that current plans to rebuild our nuclear arsenal (to the price tag of at least $355 billion over the next decade and up to $1 trillion over the next 30 years) are overly ambitious and likely unaffordable. Add in a defense budget that’s already stretched thin, always-looming budget caps and sequestration, new international security challenges like Russian expansion in Ukraine, terrorist expansion in Iraq and Syria, and the Ebola virus in Africa, and it’s safe to say the US budget is burning its ‘defense candle’ at both ends.  

The Arms Control Association (ACA) has released a report on just this issue, urging the “executive branch, Congress, and the American public to rethink current plans to rebuild U.S. nuclear forces in the years ahead.”  The nuclear shopping list is a long one: new ballistic submarines, new nuclear-capable bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new air-launched cruise missile, and an upgrade to five nuclear warhead types. By paring down that list, ACA has highlighted some commonsense solutions to save roughly $70 billion dollars in the next decade. A summary of ACA’s recommendations follows.

Strategic Submarines – SSBN(X): Save $16 billion/10 years
A 2013 report by the CBO analyzed the option of reducing the SSBN(X) force to 8 boats. Under this scenario, the Navy would still have a robust deterrent and be able to deploy the maximum number of warheads at sea, consistent with the New START treaty.

Long-Range Bombers – LRSB: Save $32 billion/10 years
Because the current US bomber fleet will operate into the 2040s-50s, there is no urgency for a renovation. By delaying the LRSB until the mid-2020s, the USAF can free up $32 billion dollars for other projects that have more urgent funding needs.

Air-Launched Cruise Missile – ALCM: Save $3 billion/10 years  
The recently rebuilt gravity bomb (B61-12) gives our current bombing fleet the capability to drop nuclear weapons, drawing the need for a new air-launched cruise missile into question. Not only is this weapon unnecessary, as our submarines are capable of launching a nuclear ballistic missile, but it would serve as an effective bargaining chip on the international stage. Discontinuing our ALCMs as part of a global ban on nuclear-armed cruise missiles would eliminate the growing threat of a Chinese or Pakistani cruise missile while simultaneously saving at least $3 billion dollars in development and procurement costs.  

B61 Life Extension Program – LEP: Save $4 billion/10 years
The B61 Life Extension Program is designed to extend the lives of 400 gravity bombs for tactical (front lines) and strategic (reserves) purposes. The two most costly portions of the program are a consolidation plan of four versions of the bomb into one and the refurbishment of some of the nuclear components. This program has faced budget pressures in Congress and would be better served by scaling back the program to update our strategic reserve bombs while allowing our tactical bombs in Europe to age out gracefully.  This or other reductions to the program, such as discontinuing the 4-in-1 modification plans for the bomb, will allow for cost savings up to 4 billion dollars over the next decade.  

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles – ICBMS: $16 billion/10 years
The Air Force’s 450 ICBMs are scheduled for maintenance to ensure their reliability through 2030. The Air Force is expected to decide by 2016 whether they will employ incremental modernization of the missiles, or scrap the current design and create new ones. A 2014 RAND study sponsored by the Air Force to analyze options for the ICBM determined that incremental modernization would both meet the US’s nuclear deterrent needs and be the most cost-effective. The USAF would save at least $16 billion dollars by forgoing a new missile and an additional $84-$219 billion (not included in above projections) by forgoing potential mobile-basing options which have been considered ineffective since the 1980’s.

These options illustrate ways to safely trim the bloated nuclear budget while maintaining our nuclear deterrent. This creates a win-win scenario for the Department of Defense, which will preserve the nuclear arsenal from uncontrolled cuts as a result of an overly ambitious budget and secure funding for its conventional forces. In a world where nuclear exchanges are most commonly associated with global destruction, these nuclear exchanges to the budget are both sensible and necessary.

Greg Terryn is a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Obama’s Mixed Bag on Nuclear Weapons

By Angela Canterbury and Sarah Tully

President Obama has long talked the talk of reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons, but the administration has been slow to walk the walk in terms of nuclear weapons reductions in recent years.

A recent study by Federation of American Scientists pointed out that in terms of number of stockpiled warheads and percentage of reduction, Obama has done less than all other post-cold war presidents.

President George W. Bush reduced the U.S. nuclear stockpile by 50% during his tenure in office, surprisingly, qualifying him for the prize of greatest nuclear disarmer by percentage since 1945. President Bush senior claims second prize with 41% reduction. President Eisenhower had the greatest escalation of all time with an increase of 2,117%, although the times were certainly different back then and the United States was starting from a small stockpile. Meanwhile, President Obama has retired 507 warheads or a 10% reduction of the total stockpile.

However, it’s important to put these numbers into context.

Throughout his presidency, Obama has reduced our nuclear weapons stockpile each year. While stockpile numbers diminished more drastically under President Clinton and President Bush, President Obama took on the job when the stockpile was the smallest in decades. For instance, President Bush reduced the nuclear weapons stockpile by 5,304; which is 654 more nukes than the total of 4,650 nuclear weapons the U.S. has today.

The Obama administration got a strong start on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. In his 2009 foreign policy address in Prague president Obama spoke of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” In 2011, he secured the historic New START Treaty with Russia which necessitates significant nuclear weapons stockpile reductions on both sides and calls for more rigorous verification and inspection protocols.

The three Nuclear Security Summits initiated by President Obama helped to focus world attention on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. According to a New York Times editorial, “[s]ince Mr. Obama took office, he has pushed the international community to improve nuclear security.  The result is that 14 countries have eliminated their nuclear materials stockpiles and 15 others removed or disposed of portions of theirs.”

It is also looking more and more (fingers crossed) like the U.S. and its negotiating partners, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Germany collectively known as P5+1, are close to a historic deal with Iran to prevent it from getting a nuclear bomb.

He’s certainly done well. Just not quite as well as advocates of reducing nuclear weapons stockpile size and importance would have hoped.

For one, Obama’s record on investing in nuclear non-proliferation programs hasn’t been great as of late. According to a July 2014 analysis of the Obama administration’s security spending out of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the administration chose to cut the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) non-proliferation programs by $399 million and increase spending for weapons activities by $534 million. This was the second straight year of reductions in the U.S. non-proliferation budget.

And this reduction in spending to rein-in nuclear weapons has been met by an increase in spending on nuclear weapons.

In order to get the go-ahead from opponents in Congress on the New START Treaty with Russia, Obama agreed to spend $84 billion in nuclear weapons modernization over the next decade, a number the Congressional Budget Office estimates will likely come in at $355 billion with others estimating $1 trillion over 30 years. This is unnecessary spending on modernization that isn’t needed to meet today’s threats.

Nevertheless, the President did try again for nuclear reduction in 2013. But Vladimir Putin, President of the only country besides the U.S. with thousands of nuclear weapons, rejected Obama’s 2013 proposal to cut Russian and U.S. deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the 1,550 agreed upon in New START, down to 1,000.

But the deal hasn’t been sealed yet. Ultimately, the President’s legacy on nuclear issues depends on what gets done over his last two years in office.

The President still has a chance to make strides on the nuclear front. Both Russia and the U.S. have to cut their deployed nukes stockpile to 1,550 by 2018 under the New START accord. Obama could accelerate those reductions in the next two years without waiting for 2018. He could also scrap some of the expensive and arguably unnecessary modernization plans like fitting the F-35 for a nuclear weapon and building a new generation of land-based missiles.  

Those of us who are working to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons are eager to see Obama do more and fulfill his Prague promise.

Front and Center

FRONT & CENTER

An update on arms control, national security & politics from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

October 11-October 26 WHAT’S NEW:

An Evening in Boston
Save the date: On the evening of November 6th, we’ll be in Boston for a night of expert analysis, substantive discussion, and fun! We’ve invited Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, among other notable speakers, to lead our Election Forum and Reception on the Future of National Security. Best part? It’s free! We hope you can join us. Space is limited, so RSVP today.

READ:

Growth in Pentagon Spending Since 2001
We’ll start with the good news: the overall trend for the U.S. defense budget is on a downward slope. That said, the U.S. is spending $7-10 million per day on its new war in the Middle East against the Islamic State, meaning Congress may decide to up the ante in Fiscal Year 2015. Check out our reporton the center site to learn more. [10/20]

2001-2015 budget

Window of Opportunity to Change US Nuclear Spending:
“Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget,” writes Katie McCarthy on the Nukes of Hazard blog. That’s why, rather than modernize the triad, the time is now to reassess exactly what we need and what we can afford. [10/24]

But What About Grandma?
It’s a well-known fact that Western sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran were key in bringing the Iranians to the negotiating table. What’s less well-known is exactly how these sanctions have impacted your everyday Iranian citizen. Sarah Tully provides a few personal accounts of the effects of these sanctions and the domestic pressure that has arisen. Rouhani may have no choice but to stay at the table until a deal is reached. [10/21]

BE SOCIAL:

Infographic: Not Getting a Deal Won’t Make Us Any Safer
Remember BiBi’s infamous “red line?” Well, this week, one former US official put the kibosh on Israel’s “no deal is better than a bad deal” rhetoric. The highly respected former Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat told the Jerusalem Post that failing to get an Iran deal should not be considered a success. We loved Eizenstat’s argument so much, we made an infographic. Don’t forget to share it on Facebook, Twitter, or by email! [10/24]

No Iran Deal Is Not a Success

It’s better this way

Two years ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood before the UN General Assembly in New York, and before the world, with a cartoon bomb. He warned that Iran was dangerously close to acquiring enough 20 percent enriched uranium for one bomb.

Much like Wile E. Coyote, Israel knew it was standing just a little too close to the fuse.

All Looney Tunes references aside, Netanyahu’s point was well taken. It was just two years before that Jeffrey Goldberg warned the world of an impending attack that had the potential to draw the U.S. into yet another conflict in the Middle East. Netanyahu was, quite literally, illustrating the fact that when Iran’s program reached a critical mass, Israel would be forced to react.

Today we have, in fact, found ourselves in yet another conflict in the Middle East, but not the one we thought. Iran, long the problem child of the region with an expanding nuclear program and intransigent leader, has not only inked an interim agreement with world powers constraining its nuclear program, so far it has bucked all expectations by complying with the deal.

But negotiators have less than a month to agree on a path forward, and some have speculated (including Netanyahu himself) that no deal at all might be better than a deal that comes to some compromise on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Contrary to this belief, the facts speak for themselves. Thursday, former undersecretary of state Stu Eizenstat told The Jerusalem Post, “No deal is not a success, because it means an unrestrained use of centrifuges, the Iranian plutonium plant at Arak continuing, no intrusive inspections, no elimination of 20-percent enriched uranium, and less likelihood of eliminating weaponization.”

Eizenstat warned that, “[A deal] would not be a bouquet of roses. It has a lot of thorns in it. But the alternative is nothing but thorns.”

His words echo remarks from current undersecretary of state and P5+1 negotiator Wendy Sherman, delivered the same day, that:

…the world is clearly better off now than it would have been if the leaders on both sides had ignored this opening. With all that is going on in the Middle East today, an Iranian nuclear program that was not frozen but instead rushing full speed ahead toward larger stockpiles, more uranium enrichment capacity, the production of weapons-grade plutonium, and less transparency would hardly have been a stabilizing factor.

Sherman then went into further detail, specifying that the administrations goals in reaching a final agreement:

Our goal now is to develop a durable and comprehensive arrangement that will effectively block all of Iran’s potential paths to fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Such an arrangement would bar Iran from producing fuel for a weapon with either uranium or plutonium. Through inspections and monitoring, it would also offer the best method to prevent the covert processing of these materials and make any effort by Tehran to turn away from its obligations so visible and so time-consuming that the attempt would not succeed.

Sherman’s and Eizenstat’s comments drive home the fact that failure to reach an agreement would take the U.S. and the world back to a state of unrestrained, unverified progress toward an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Safeguards implemented as part of the current agreement allow access that ensures Iran’s nuclear program remains under lock and key. Some might argue that to sign a deal with a country we do not trust is irresponsible or naïve, but it is precisely because we do not trust Iran that we must have a deal.

To walk away from that access would simply be too much of a risk.