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Window of Opportunity to Change U.S. Nuclear Spending Trajectory

You might not have noticed, but the U.S.’ plans to replace our aging nuclear weapons triad have been in the news a lot lately. Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget. The issue has prompted a demand for Obama to explain his shift from the inspiring Prague speech in 2009 to a long list of expensive nuclear modernization plans.

And some major voices have gotten into the mix. Defense One published an article from the Council on Foreign Relations recently that offers a summary of the current modernization plans, the debate surrounding them, and the emerging solution suggested by a growing number of nonproliferation advocates.

Some key points:

•    Current plan could cost up to $1 trillion in the next three decades.
•    Deterrence does not require a constantly growing arsenal.
•    Unfortunately all three legs (Air, Land and Sea) are planned for modernization around the same time.
•    The Ohio-Class submarine replacement program is expected to soar to over 50% of the Navy’s total budget in the coming 30 years, edging out other programs.  
•    The Air Force foresaw the probable consequence of replacing the Minuteman III Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and opted to use existing technology to modernize the current fleet instead.
•    There are a growing number of calls from within and outside the government for a re-assessed plan that takes current budget constraints into account.
•    This is a window of opportunity for President Obama to redirect our nuclear spending.

More details

Feeling the pressure, the White House is reviewing the current approach. The plan below claims to reduce spending while maintaining the existing defense structure (previous suggestions included the elimination of one of the three legs).

The chart below summarizes the article’s discussion including the systems slated for modernization, the estimated year of retirement, the current plan, estimated cost, and the proposed solution.

some text

(Based on Defense One/ CFR article)

The above chart doesn’t include many of the other areas “up for modernization” including: nuclear warhead life-extension programs; the production of a warhead that would work for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles; and upgrading Energy and Defense Department systems that all add to growing costs.

While it seems difficult to implement change, the article highlights this information as a pivotal opportunity for the Obama administration. Making a responsible adjustment to current plans would allow the President to maintain the current structure, save money, and leave office with the legacy of moving towards a reduction in our reliance on nuclear weapons.

With important nonproliferation conferences ahead, including the 2015 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty in New York, these decisions hold extra weight; if my NPT simulation course at the Monterey Institute taught me anything, it’s that U.S. nonproliferation actions (positive or negative) will drive the direction of negotiations.

Panetta’s Loose Words Warrant Washing His Mouth Out With Soap

This month, former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta – he of minimal loyalty to his bosses — published his memoir “Worthy Fights,” in which he criticizes Obama’s national security strategies and in particular how the administration has dealt with Iraq and Syria.  

In his book, Panetta decries the “Red line” debacle of 2012 when President Obama said that the use of chemical weapons in Syria was a “red line for us.” Panetta suggests that Obama’s failure to enforce the red line, when chemical weapons really were used a year later, undermined U.S. credibility amongst Syrians and the rest of the world.

Ironically, Panetta’s book makes a serious semantic blunder of its own when Northeast Asian news outlets took a keen interest in this sentence:

“If North Korea moved across the border, our war plans called for the senior American general on the peninsula to take command of all U.S. and South Korean forces and defend south Korea – including by the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary.”

The sentence garnered attention from South Korean media and even prompted a response from Pyongyang, which promised to bolster their nuclear deterrent to counter the U.S. policies toward North Korea.

World order hanging in the balance of your every word is pretty difficult, isn’t it, Mr. Panetta?

The importance of rhetoric cannot be overplayed. Need you be reminded of the infamous “16 words” (“the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”) spoken by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address that were used to justify war in Iraq.

Or Ronald Reagan’s joke before a Saturday radio address: “My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

Panetta’s words are alarmist. Threatening the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack only heightens the importance of these weapons that should only serve as a nuclear deterrent.  

If there is a North Korean conventional attack on South Korea, the United States has ample non-nuclear means at its disposal to respond. According to Lt. General (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Chair of the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, U.S. conventional weapons would be sufficient to defend South Korea from North Korean forces.

Gard writes, “Stopping the attack of poorly trained and ill-equipped North Korean forces does not require the use of nuclear weapons.”

He goes on to say, “Should North Korea be able to bypass the demilitarized zone by moving some troops by air or through tunnels into South Korea, an option that has been threatened, they obviously would have to be killed or captured by conventional means. Employing nuclear weapons in densely populated South Korea brings to memory the parallel concept of destroying a city in order to save it. And since the war plan for defense of South Korea envisions invading North Korea and seizing Pyongyang, the capitol, attacking the North with nuclear weapons would endanger our own troops, as well as causing massive casualties on the long-suffering North Korean population.

“There is no justification for threatening to break the generally accepted barrier between the use of conventional high explosive munitions and nuclear weapons in the defense of South Korea. The only practical utility of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter their use by other nations against our vital national interests and, by extension, against our allies,” concluded Gard.

Perhaps Panetta’s ill-considered words deserve the old bar of soap to the mouth treatment a la Ralphie in “A Christmas Story.”  

Center’s Ed Levine: Why Iran’s Nuclear Past Shouldn’t Be a “Showstopper”

As the deadline for a deal to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran approaches, there is news that the U.S., its negotiating allies, and Iran are 95% there. However, the final 5% (the ‘Red Zone’ for you American football fans) is always the toughest to complete. Amongst the final bargaining points is whether Iran should completely disclose the nature and scope of its past nuclear activities.

Al- Monitor has published an article by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’s own Edward P. Levine addressing the role that past “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program,” otherwise known as “PMD,” should play in ongoing negotiations. Levine, a member of the national advisory board for the Center and former senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer, is optimistic that Iran’s “past nuclear activities need not be a showstopper.”

“While this issue is rightly a matter of concern, it should not be a litmus test of whether a comprehensive agreement can be reached,” states Levine. Contrary to some in Congress, who believe Iran cannot be trusted without full disclosure of its previous nuclear activities,  Levine insists the P5 +1 can use informed, conservative estimates to assess Iran’s breakout potential in constructing a comprehensive deal.

Levine suspects admissions by Iran may be the final piece of the deal, only exposed after an agreement has been signed and some level of sanctions have been mitigated. This, however, should not limit the terms of a final agreement, as Levine explains:

“Rather than expecting a sudden and complete conversion to nuclear honesty and peaceful intentions on Iran’s part, we  can emphasize verification rights in the comprehensive solution and tie any P5 +1 commitments to the IAEA’s continuing confidence that Iran is fulfilling all of its commitments in the agreement.”

Through intensive verification practices and informed, conservative estimates for Iran’s breakout potential, Levine insists Iran’s nuclear past need not restrict a deal that could provide a safeguard for the future.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/authors/edward-p-levine.html#ixzz3GL3UCgyo

Why Iran Should Have the Political Will to Stay at the Negotiating Table

The most recent news out of Vienna is that the P5+1 and Iran are 95% of the way to an elusive nuclear deal. With less than 40 days to the November 24th deadline, both sides still need to resolve issues around the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, how long the deal will last, how quickly Iran will see sanctions relief, and the possible military dimension to Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear activities. These outstanding points of contention will need to be addressed, and concessions will need to be made, leading some to question Iran’s will to stay at the negotiating table.

The United States, the European Union and the United Nations implemented sanctions in 2010 that by 2012 had hit Iran’s economy incredibly hard.  Inflation rose to 45% in 2012-2013, oil export proceeds dropped, and the rial, Iran’s currency, lost 60% of its value. Nevertheless the Islamic Republic has adjusted to new sanctions and its economy is predicted to grow moderately in 2015. Iran’s GDP is expected to rise 2 percent  in 2014 and 2015, at roughly the same pace as the U.S. economy.

The present not-so-bad economic reality may suggest that Iran can afford to throw in the towel on nuclear negotiations, but it doesn’t take into account the whole picture.

As much as the Iranian regime likes to paint the U.S. as the big bad wolf, Western sanctions are not exclusively responsible for the estimated 31% of Iranians living below the poverty line. The current destitute condition of the everyday Iranian is the result of  widespread corruption and mismanagement from the Ahmadinejad era compounded by an influx of sanctions since 2010. Although sanctions may have played a role in bringing Iran to the table, they wouldn’t have been necessary if hardliner conservatives in Iran and the U.S. hadn’t let relations deteriorate so dramatically post-2003.

Sanctions have worked to destabilize domestic politics and isolate Iran from the global economy, yes, but what about the average Iranian citizen?

SANCTIONS HURT GRANDMA AND NEW BABY, TOO

Although specific sanctions are not placed directly on Iran’s medical industry, backlash from financial isolation has directly affected access to medicine and medical devices.

Sanctions against Iran are supposed to include legal loopholes to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.  Even so, the import of lifesaving medicine from the West is nearly impossible. According to a 2013 study carried out by the Wilson Center, “Iranian patients find it increasingly difficult and expensive, if not impossible, to obtain some of the medicines they need. When they do fill a prescription, they risk amplified side effects and reduced effectiveness because Iran is forced to import more and more medicines, or their chemical building blocks, from India and China, thereby replacing the higher quality products from Western manufacturers.”

I spoke with an Iranian citizen whose grandmother needed back surgery. The doctor was to replace one of her vertebrae with an artificial vertebra. The high quality artificial bone, which before the latest bout of sanctions was easy to obtain in Iran, was impossible to find. Instead the doctor had to use a version made in China. Even the doctor was skeptical of the safety of the device.

In another example, new parents are having trouble obtaining Neocate, a baby formula for infants with milk allergies. Parents in Iran have to wait in long lines and pay exorbitant prices for the only brand of formula their children are safe to consume.

Iran has had to increase imports of lower quality drugs and medical devices from China and India.  Furthermore, U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies often patent their drugs. Meaning the West is the only place certain drugs are manufactured thus Iran can’t look to the East for alternatives.  

In accordance with the Joint Plan of Action, the U.S. and EU have rolled back sanctions on petrochemicals, gold, and precious metal exports. The U.S. has also suspended sanctions on Iran’s automotive industry and associated services and “Establish[ed] a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenue held abroad.” While the recent sanctions rollbacks have helped stimulate the economy, the benefits have not yet reached Iran’s pharmaceutical and medical industry.

The sanctions relief that would result from a nuclear deal this year would allow the average Iranian access to the high quality Western medical goods they need. But ultimately, the only person Rouhani needs to persuade to nail down a deal is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has thus far maintained hardliner resistance to cooperating with the West. That said, the Iranian political apparatus isn’t impervious to influence from below, despite the regime’s undemocratic nature. Pressure from the Iranian people on the regime should not be underestimated as motive for Khamenei to make compromises on a deal. Keep in mind that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was spearheaded by student groups and the urban middle class.

Because of this pressure from below, Iran should have a vested interest in resolving the nuclear issue with diplomacy and with haste. Although the timeline of sanctions relief is still being debated in negotiations, it will be a key feature of any nuclear deal. The sooner the P5+1 and Iran come to an agreement, the faster the average Iranian will see tangible relief from the consequences of sanctions.