In the last few years, one of the main topics of speculation regarding a potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program has been Israel’s likely response to an Iranian nuclear bomb.
China’s Nuclear Weapons – Tempering Fears with a Dose of Reality
Several reports about China’s nuclear weapons program have come out in the past few weeks, and they are causing imaginations to run wild and some fears to grow beyond the realm of reality. The fact is that China has indeed been modernizing its arsenal, but it is important to put this modernization in perspective and to not overstate the Chinese nuclear threat.
The primary source of the panic is a map supposedly detailing Chinese nuclear attack plans in the event of conflict that would leave 5 to 12 million Americans dead. This “plan” and the map have made their rounds on many major news sites. Fortunately, a little detective work by the Federation of American Scientist’s Hans Kristensen has revealed that the map wasn’t even produced by the Chinese government. Instead, it seems to have been part of a slideshow posted on a military technology website unaffiliated with the Chinese government.
The map was released around the same time that the Chinese government unveiled details about their development of a small fleet of ballistic missile submarines. These details caused even more dramatic stories about how these submarines could attack U.S. cities with JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles. Aside from the fact that no Jin-class submarines have ever sailed on deterrent patrols, there are several major technical problems that prevent this from being reality.
First, according to Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, the current fleet of three Jin-class subs is not currently armed with nuclear weapons because China’s Central Military Commission forbids the mounting of warheads on missiles unless they are about to be used (this doctrine has, so far, extended to submarine launched ballistic missiles as well). This means the submarines leave port with no ability to fulfill their purpose as a deterrent. Second, China’s submarine fleet is incredibly loud and easy to track. The Jin-class is reported to be louder than Soviet submarines that were built 30 years ago. Third, the JL-2 missile only has a range of about 7,200 km. If the missiles were actually armed with warheads; they would be able to threaten U.S. bases in the region but would be unable to reach any major U.S. cities. To even target Washington, D.C., the submarine would have to sail almost to Hawaii without detection. Navy Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, has summed up these shortcomings quite effectively: “For a submarine-launched ballistic missile to be effective it has to be accurate, and you have to be stealthy and survivable and I’ll leave it at that.”
China is also expanding its arsenal of land based ballistic missiles; however, some of this expansion is temporary as certain systems are being developed to replace older missiles like the DF-3A and DF-4 which were deployed in the 1970s and 80s, respectively. Even with the 2007 unveiling of the DF-31A, which has a range of 11,000 km and the under-development DF-41, which has a range of 13,000 km, China will only have around 50 (out of about 240-300 total) land based missiles capable of reaching the continental United States. The usefulness of these missiles, however, is limited because firing them at the U.S. would mean firing the missile over Russian territory, which could provoke a nuclear response from Russia.
The modernization of nuclear weapons by a foreign power is rightfully bound to cause some concern; however, much of the media reporting has painted the picture of a possible doomsday scenario that could happen today or tomorrow, and this is simply not the case. As Gregory Kulacki has noted, “under the counting rules of the New Start agreement between the United States and Russia, the size of China’s nuclear arsenal would officially be counted as zero. This is because the several hundred warheads China is believed to possess are not mated to the missiles that can deliver them, but are kept in storage, like the several thousand warheads the United States and Russia each hold in reserve in addition to the 1,550 each of the two nuclear superpowers are allowed to deploy under the treaty.”
It is also important to remember that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is more than enough to deter any actual attacks from China against the U.S. homeland, forward deployed U.S. troops, and U.S. allies. The United States has almost 2,000 warheads mounted on missiles that can reach China compared to the 45-50 warheads that can reach the United States, and this fact is well known by the Chinese government.
In other words, it is by no means time to bring back the nuclear attack drills taught in American schools during the Cold War, nor is it necessary to consider expanding our own nuclear program because of China.
Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Worry About a Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear Transfer
In recent years, a number of analysts and former government officials have argued that Saudi Arabia would feel pressured into pursuing its own nuclear deterrent should Iran, a country that the Saudis view with contempt and fear, develop its own nuclear arsenal. In light of the Kingdom’s inability to domestically develop such a capability in a short amount of time, the concern was that Saudi Arabia would purchase a nuclear weapon from its long-time ally Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons program was partly financed by the Gulf kingdom.
Claiming this “conventional wisdom” was “wrong”, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argued in its February 2013 report “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds a Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” that a nuclear weapon transfer from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely should Iran ever attain a nuclear weapon. Aside from the lack of hard evidence of any assurance from Pakistan that it would sell its weapons to Saudi Arabia, both countries would face significant disincentives to ever follow through with such a transaction.
On the Saudi side, it would face a harsh backlash from the international community. Saudi Arabia is a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory and its contravention of this treaty and the norm it encapsulates would likely cause many countries to issue far-reaching and damaging economic sanctions against the Gulf kingdom. The US-Saudi security relationship, upon which the country is so dependent for its military security, would also be nullified, and Israel might consider a reactionary strike against Saudi Arabia, similar to those against Iraq in 1981.
Pakistan would face a similar international backlash. Although it is not an NPT signatory, its actions as a nuclear weapons proliferator would also contravene accepted international proliferation norms and likely result in far-reaching economic sanctions. In light of Pakistan’s weak economy and political institutions, it would suffer considerably if such sanctions were issued.
Taken together, the CNAS report concludes that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have no incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons transaction in the event of Iranian weaponization.
Nine months later, doubts have been raised on this assessment following the publication of a BBC investigative report claiming that unnamed NATO sources confirm the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear agreement. In the report’s own words, Pakistani nuclear weapons “are now sitting ready for delivery” to the Gulf Kingdom.
Along with the “recent ‘rift’ between the US and Saudi Arabia and ambiguous statements from Saudi officials regarding the existence of this nuclear arrangement, the report has helped resurrect fears about the prospect of a Riyadh ready to go nuclear. Just yesterday, Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal wrote with full confidence that, should Iran go nuclear (which he believes they will), “Saudi Arabia will move swiftly to acquire a nuclear deterrent from its clients in Islamabad.”
So, should we doubt the CNAS assessment of the situation? Will Saudi Arabia attain a nuclear weapon from Pakistan?
The answer to both questions is no. Even if the arrangement does exist, which the CNAS report originally doubted, the prospect of Pakistan transferring a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia any time soon is as slim as it was before.
Why? Because the array of disincentives facing both countries that the CNAS report identified in February still remain nine months later. If Riyadh purchased a weapon from Islamabad, both countries would still suffer from the damaging effects of the international backlash that would result. The costs continue to vastly outweigh the benefits.
Even if Iran attains a nuclear weapon and begins to act aggressively towards Saudi Arabia, it is not clear that a nuclear transfer would likely follow. While the Kingdom may seriously consider the acquisition of a nuclear weapon to defend itself in such a scenario, Pakistani incentives are unlikely to change. In comparison to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is not threatened by Iran or its ambitions in the wider Middle East. The benefits of selling a nuclear weapon would remain low in the face of high costs and so while Saudi Arabia may come to favor a transfer, Pakistan would likely refuse it.
Thus, the CNAS report’s overall assessment remains valid in light of these new findings. Regardless of whether a nuclear arrangement exists between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the likelihood of a nuclear transfer remains low for the foreseeable future. There are many justified fears concerning the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This just isn’t one of them.
Iran-sanity: Addressing some of the criticism lobbed at the deal
First, a celebration. The US and its allies have signed a deal that curbs Iran’s nuclear program – much to the surprise of most skeptical onlookers, including myself. Not that I haven’t been working at this subject for at least six years, but at this point, we’ve all seen so many deals fall apart that a new moderate President and a historic phone call and could only go so far to stoke hopes that this could be the day.
And yet it was. The P5+1 managed to secure unprecedented transparency measures and stop Iran’s nuclear program in its tracks, taking the country from the brink of nuclear breakout to a dormant state that allows a significant amount of additional time to secure a final deal.
The first-step measure will require Iran to convert half of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to oxide, dilute the other half; install no new advanced centrifuges; cap its 3.5 percent stockpile; and halt all activities associated with its plutonium reactor at Arak.
And all this for, let’s be honest, a pretty insignificant amount of sanctions relief. As former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Paul Pillar points out, “any imbalance in the deal is markedly against Iran and in favor of the P5+1.”
It’s hard for non-proliferation experts to imagine any other reaction to this deal – an early holiday gift, you might say – than pure glee.
Unfortunately that glee hasn’t yet transferred to everyone else.
Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted on Saturday, “Unless the agreement requires dismantling of the Iranian centrifuges, we really haven’t gained anything.”
Sen. Marco Rubio said that it would make a nuclear-armed Iran more likely, not less, and called on Congress to vote on tougher sanctions.
And Sen. John Cornyn, the No. 2 Republican in the Senate, mind you, even managed to work a little healthcare snipe into his criticism when he tweeted, “Amazing what WH will do to distract attention from O-care.”
But perhaps the most extreme, and important, denouncement of the nuclear deal came from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called the deal “a historic mistake.”
Of course, not everyone in Israel agrees. Israeli stock prices rose to a record high on Sunday. And Amos Yadlin, the former head of the IDF’s Military Intelligence, and Ehud Yaari, a veteran and widely respected Arab affairs analyst, welcomed the deal.
And despite Netanyahu’s comments, it is hard to see how the deal signed this weekend does not increase the security of both the US and its greatest allies, particularly Israel.
But let’s take this piece-by-piece. Netanyahu and others make a few claims that aren’t quite accurate.
First, Netanyahu argues that the deal leaves Iran “taking only cosmetic steps which it could reverse easily within a few weeks, and in return, sanctions that took years to put in place are going to be eased.”
The sanctions relief included in this package is a pittance compared to the sanctions still in place, and focuses primarily on easing the consequences of the existing measures on Iran’s middle class. Relief focuses largely on cars, airlines, and students abroad – these issues are useful politically to an Iranian regime dealing with an unhappy population, but they do not provide a window for nuclear advancement.
And on this point, you might remind me. What, exactly, is the point of sanctions if not to serve as leverage to gain a deal? This was the plan all along.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon adds, “The President sees wisdom in placing trust, however limited, in a regime that has repeatedly violated international norms and put America’s security at risk.”
John Kerry said it, we’ve said it, it should be obvious but it clearly is not: this kind of deal is not about trust. It is about the exact opposite.
As Fred Kaplan points out here, “The thing about this agreement is that—like all well-written accords between countries with good reason to distrust one another—it doesn’t require trust.”
What level of trust are we putting in Iran if we allow their nuclear program to continue, without daily inspections, for even one more day while we pile on sanctions and wait? Intrusive daily inspections are the only means the US and the international community have to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is not moving forward more quickly than we think. Intrusive daily inspections will ensure that Iran does not have the chance to build a bomb, a lack of them will not. It’s a simple, fact-based concept. Blindness does not allow us better sight. We are better off now than we were before this deal.
Then there’s this from Sen. Bob Corker: “I think people are very concerned that the interim deal becomes the norm, and that’s why I’ve crafted legislation to hold the administration and the international community’s feet to the fire over the next six months to ensure that this interim deal is not the norm.”
This deal is not a new norm; it’s a window for negotiations, and it has a very explicit expiration date. The deal will expire in 6 months. If, at that time or at any time in between, Iran screws up, the consequences will be worse than ever. Not only will Congress have the full backing of the administration to move forward with tough new sanctions, it’s also likely that they won’t be far from an authorization for the use of military force.
This argument also applies to those arguing for a new round of sanctions that doesn’t kick in for six months. How long do we really think it would take to pass a bill if this deal starts to go south? It won’t be hard. But the dangers associated with passing new sanctions now (derailing the agreement, isolating the US from the rest of the P5+1, unraveling the entire sanctions regime) are far greater than the risk that Congress might lose a few hours in its rush to pass new legislation if the time comes.
Of course I could spend all day rebutting the criticism lobbed at the deal, and it’s likely I’ll need to do a lot more over the next six months. But for now, I’m just happy that at least I know we’re a little bit safer today than we were last week.
Now we can all go back to talking about the rollout of that website that ruined our day.
Gut reactions to the first step Iran deal
Late last night (or early this morning Geneva time), the P5+1 (the United States, China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran reached a historic first step agreement that if successfully implemented would verifiably halt Iran’s nuclear progress and provide a much larger window into Iran’s nuclear program and activities than we have ever had. The deal is a significant blow to Iran’s ability to make weapons grade fissile material without detection. Simply put, it is a win for U.S. national security, the security of its allies, and nonproliferation diplomacy.
Below is a brief outline of the details of the initial, six-month agreement and what it means. You can read the White House fact sheet on the deal here.
The deal halts and rolls back the most proliferation sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is required to halt all enrichment above 5% and, according to the White House fact sheet, “dismantle the technical connections” to enrich beyond that level. In addition, Iran must dilute or convert to a form than cannot be further enriched its accumulated stockpile of uranium enriched to 20% . As of the most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran had stockpiled nearly 200 kilograms (kg) of uranium enriched to 20 percent. This material is a big proliferation concern because, while uranium is not considered weapon-grade until it is enriched to about 90 percent, most of the work has occurred by the time it reaches 20 percent. Approximately 240 kg to 250 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent, when further enriched to weapon-grade, is enough for one bomb. Last year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the accumulation by Iran of one bombs worth of 20% enriched uranium would be a “red line” for Israel. The first step agreement effectively neutralizes this threat.
The deal stops Iran’s enrichment progress. The agreement prohibits Iran from installing or activating additional centrifuges beyond those that are already spinning, making additional centrifuges except for those needed to replace damaged machines, and increasing its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium “so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.”
The deal includes unprecedented transparency measures. Notably, the deal provides the IAEA with daily access to Iran’s enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow and access to centrifuge assembly facilities and centrifuge component and storage facilities. To reiterate, this is unprecedented, and the greater access is also an important (but by no means sufficient) step toward increasing our ability to deter and detect the construction of undeclared/covert Iranian nuclear facilities and sites.
The deal freezes work on Iran’s heavy water reactor near Arak. According to the White House fact sheet, Iran has committed to no further advances of its activities at Arak and to halt progress on its plutonium track.” Kudos to the French for driving a hard bargain on this point.
In return for these significant Iranian concessions, the deal provides Iran with limited, proportional, and reversible relief from some sanctions in the amount of approximately $7 billion. The much-stronger sanctions on Iran’s oil and banking sectors would remain in place as leverage to secure a final deal.
The deal provides time and space to test Iranian intentions and negotiate a more encompassing agreement that places even more stringent verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear capacity, addresses the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, and more. As the White House fact sheet notes, “Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.”
The first step deal agreed to last night is a remarkably strong agreement without which Iran would continue to advance its nuclear progress and march toward a breakout capacity. In assessing the deal it is vital to keep in mind the nuclear advances Iran could have made over the next six months in the absence this cap on its nuclear program and the much larger window into the program we now have because of the deal. If after six months we are unable to reach a more permanent deal with Iran we will be no worse off than we are now; in fact we will be better off because of the additional time this agreement buys.
The criticism some are already making that the deal “only” marginally increases the time it would take Iran to dash to a bomb (if it were to decide to do so) is misplaced. This is precious time and the agreement’s transparency and monitoring measures significantly increase the odds that any dash to make weapons grade would be detected.
Ultimately, Iran’s nuclear program is highly unlikely to be stopped by more sanctions or U.S. military force. The purpose of sanctions was to bring Iran to the table, not stop its program – and this is what has transpired. While the deal isn’t perfect, it is much more stringent than many thought or predicted and puts us on the best path to placing even stronger and more intrusive constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. Calls for more sanctions or insisting that the initial and/or final agreement must require that Iran permanently cease enrichment makes it much more likely that the outcomes we’re trying to prevent (i.e. unconstrained Iranian nuclear development; a nuclear-armed Iran; a US war against Iran; or all of the above) come to pass.
Finally let me end with a note of caution. While we should applaud this first step, the hard diplomatic work is far from over. The important verifiable caps contained in the initial deal are low hanging fruit relative to the imitations the United States will ask of Iran and the sanctions relief Iran will ask of the United States and others after six months. Moreover, a diplomatic freeze on Iran’s program has been achieved before, but it wasn’t sustained. This is a good, meaningful first-step. But much more work remains.
