In their new article on ForeignPolicy.com, Lynn Klotz and Edward Sylvester argue that the race to develop countermeasures to biological weapons might have actually increased the probability of a bioterrorist attack and made it more difficult to achieve the kind of international cooperation that can truly reduce this threat.
U.S.-UAE Nuclear Agreement: Concerns and Reassurances
As the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) creeps toward its implementation date, officials in the Obama administration continue to support the arrangement. The deal’s unprecedented provisions require the UAE both to join the IAEA Additional Protocol before any licenses can be issued and to relinquish its right to enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Congress has only two days left in the review period to derail the agreement, which was spawned during the Bush administration and approved by President Obama earlier this year. There are no indications that Congressional opposition is broad enough to halt forward progress.
Nonetheless, concerns have been raised, including about the UAE’s past and present links to Iran, as was illustrated in the October 7 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs…
Giving testimony in support of the deal were Van H. Vann Diepen, State Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Hon. Janet Sanderson, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs; and Dr. Harold McFarlane, Chairman of the International Nuclear Energy Academy.
The three witnesses expressed unequivocal confidence in the benefits of the deal, repeatedly referring to it as a new “model” for all future civilian nuclear agreements and describing the UAE as a key nonproliferation partner for the United States. In fact, their testimonies articulated support so unequivocally that they were almost unconvincing. It seemed a bit like unbridled optimism.
Yet as soon as the witnesses began to address the concerns raised during the question period, as opposed to ignoring the concerns as they had during their opening statements, their cases became much more persuasive. The witnesses used points of opposition to their own advantage. Instead of simply discounting critiques, they demonstrated that some of the major concerns were more relevant to their own position than to that of the opposition.
Here are some of those major concerns, voiced by Subcommittee members, and the witnesses’ responses to those concerns:
1. It is imprudent to increase nuclear know-how in the world’s most volatile region prior to the establishment of an effective regional nonproliferation regime.
The lack of an effective regional nonproliferation regime is certainly worrisome, and the U.S.-UAE deal will contribute to establishing that regime. The deal includes bilateral provisions and related support for domestic legislation that will govern UAE activity across the board, not just in its dealings with the United States. These types of unilateral and bilateral actions will serve as a foundation for an integrated nonproliferation regime.
2. Despite safeguards, providing nuclear material and expertise to the UAE necessarily makes it a greater proliferation risk. The more material and expertise any country has, the more it could potentially export.
This may be true, but if the UAE is truly seen as a proliferation risk, we would best guard against that possibility through the safeguards that we will be afforded by this deal. After all, the UAE will make deals with other countries in any case.
3. The dual-use dilemma is ever-present. The line between peaceful nuclear use and nefarious nuclear use is vague, which renders any nuclear deal risky.
The dual-use dilemma is absolutely a problem, which is precisely why this sort of deal is so valuable. The line between peaceful and nefarious nuclear use can be made more distinct by specific measures. Based on the agreement’s mandated technology, the safeguards in place, and other provisions, the deal will effectively create a distinct nuclear line. Given the comprehensiveness of the agreement, this will be a straightforward process.
4. The UAE could be a proliferation risk in the future if Iran obtains nuclear weapons. The UAE seems quite cooperative today, but what about tomorrow?
There is absolutely a greater risk of proliferation in the future if Iran obtains nuclear weapons. This is precisely why we need to “lock countries in” today to norms and agreements that promote nonproliferation.
Despite these assurances, which were persuasive and provide solid ground for the deal to stand on, we must continue to temper our optimism. Healthy skepticism need not end even after the decision is made.
Transfer of nuclear materials and technology should never be treated lightly. One topic that has not received sufficient attention is what the UAE will do with its nuclear waste. Plans for the UAE’s nuclear waste have still not been clarified. In the off-chance that the UAE decides eventually to break its pact and pursue reprocessing capabilities, they will be that much closer to nuclear weapons-usable materials if nuclear waste remains in the country. This demands continued vigilance, even if the deal seems to be the right way to go.
You Must First Invent the Universe
As one of history’s most successful popularizers of astronomy and astrophysics, an award winning author, and an entrepreneur in the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, the late Carl Sagan is a true legend. Now, with the help of a passionate fan, Dr. Sagan has made a remarkable debut into the world of music video. Check it out (h/t Wired):
Sagan was an active board member of Council for a Livable World, our sister organization, for many years. Respect.
More Republican Shenanigans on New START
Over at the Plank, friend-of-NOH Barron Youngsmith takes Republicans to task for arguing that the START follow-on treaty is somehow going to drastically limit U.S. programs to place conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and bombers (i.e prompt global strike, etc.) As Barron notes, this is baloney…
In its unfortunate paper on the START follow-on agreement, the Senate Republican Policy Committee argued:
It seems, unfortunately, that…President Obama capitulated to the Russian view in the Joint Understanding, providing that the “legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty” should have provisions on….“the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.” Russia is likely to use this language in an attempt to have the START follow-on agreement limit…U.S. development of a prompt global strike capability.
At their July summit meeting in Moscow, President Obama and President Medvedev agreed that the START follow-on agreement will limit each side to no more than 1,500 to 1,675 warheads on no more than 500 to 1,100 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Republican’s have latched on to the lower bound of the delivery vehicle limit, arguing that the U.S. will be forced to eliminate essential nuclear and conventional systems in order to get down to 500.
Well, no. The range for delivery vehicles contained in the Joint Understanding is best viewed as the opening positions of the two countries. While we probably can’t go all the way down to 500 delivery vehicles, at least during this round, we should be able to go well below the upper bound of the proposed 500-1,100 limit without making any significant changes to our current force structure. Here’s how.
According to the latest START data exchange, the U.S. has 5,916 warheads attributed to 1,188 delivery vehicles. In reality the U.S. “actually” deploys approximately 2,200 warheads on approximately 850 delivery vehicles.
This discrepancy is attributable in part to the fact that while the U.S. has converted its B-1 bomber force and four (out of 18) Trident submarines to conventional-only roles, they still count against the START I limits because the Treaty counts force levels based on the total number of warheads each delivery vehicle could carry, not on how many warheads they actually do carry. For example, though the converted subs no longer carry nuclear-armed SLBMs, they still count under START I.
In order for these and other systems that no longer have a nuclear role not to count under the START follow-on limits, the U.S. will have to reassure Russia that they will not be refitted with nuclear warheads and Russia will have to agree to looser counting and elimination rules. This shouldn’t be too heavy of a lift. As the Brookings Institution’s Steven Pifer notes, START II, which was signed in 1993 but never entered into force, already provides a way to deal with conventional bombers. The U.S. and Russia should also be able to agree to measures that allow Moscow to verify that the converted Trident subs do not contain nuclear-armed SLBMs and could not be refitted with them quickly.
Though more complicated, U.S. plans for a conventional prompt global strike capability should also be able to be accommodated in the follow-on agreement. Given the difficulties associated with distinguishing between a nuclear and a conventional payload, Russia is likely to insist that strategic systems be counted whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. According to Pifer, “it would be far more straightforward to treat all warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs as nuclear and thus limited under the new treaty. As long as the number of conventional warheads is relatively small and the overall warhead limit is in the range of 1,500 to 1,675, this should have minimal impact on the U.S. strategic nuclear force.”
The bottom line is that assuming the U.S. and Russia can agree to new elimination, counting, and inspection rules, which should be doable, the U.S. can live with a delivery vehicle limit of around 800, which comports with the number of nuclear-armed systems it actually deploys and would not require it to eliminate bombers, missiles, and subs that have been converted to conventional roles (since they would not count against the limit under the new counting rules) or prevent it from deploying a limited prompt global strike capability. Imagine that: After a sustained and at times difficult dialogue, the two sides to a negotiation agree to an end result that is somewhere in the middle of their respective opening positions. Per Barron’s point, the U.S. could probably go even lower if it deactivated some of the 24 missile tubes on each of our ballistic missile subs, although that might be a bridge too far for this round of negotiations.
Of course, all of these issues will become much more difficult as the U.S. and Russia begin to entertain reductions below the limits outlined in the Joint Understanding. But for now, the goal is to (1) ensure that limits and verification measures are placed on the two largest nuclear arsenals on the planet by far and (2) make an initial, modest down payment on even deeper nuclear reductions in the future.
India Nuclear Debate Demands Watchful Eye
On August 26, senior Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam publicly questioned the success of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Calling the thermonuclear experiment a “fizzle,” he endorsed the need for new tests. It has been over a month, but the controversy surrounding his comments has yet to subside. The New York Times even published an editorial yesterday warning adamantly of the danger of new Indian tests. This raises an important question: just how deep are India’s pro-test roots?
Every once in a while, a high-profile government official (or ex-official) will make a half-baked comment implicating his or her country in controversial activities or intentions. Such comments are generally rebuffed by national authorities who clarify the nation’s “official” position. Though attention grabbing, these comments must be taken with a dozen grains of the finest sea salt.
For example, Brazil’s Vice President Jose Alencar told journalists on September 25 that Brazil should advance a nuclear weapon development program. Other officials quickly moved to dissociate Alencar’s personal view from governmental policy. Nothing has come of this impetuous statement, and we can reasonably expect that nothing will.
But not all provocative views are so easily quelled. This appears to be the case with K. Santhanam’s claims. His comments represent the first time a nuclear scientist involved in the 1998 Indian tests has denied the official government stance that the tests were sufficient. Though a wide range of high-ranking officials — including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar, Home Minister P. Chidambaram, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, and former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra — promptly repudiated Santhanam’s statement, the debate rages on, thanks in large part to “a powerful but small group of nuclear scientists, diplomats and military experts who wish to prevent Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from supporting Obama’s call [for the CTBT].”
In the immediate wake of the U.S.-drafted UNSC resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, India reiterated its opposition to both the NPT and CTBT. This gesture surely satisfied K. Santhanam and his gang, but their influence on India’s position was likely negligible. India has long opposed the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime, and it was fully expected to uphold its contrarian stance.
As the world gets closer to the possibility of an effective CTBT, Santhanam’s persistent voice is disquieting. India has articulated its continued resistance to the CTBT as a stance of principle, not of subversion. Santhanam’s claims, however, indicate that opposition to the CTBT may already be (or soon become) part of an actual desire for more tests. Even if Santhanam’s pronouncement does not ultimately prompt tests, his claims could fracture the domestic consensus required for CTBT ratification.
President Obama may be worried about U.S. domestic politics thwarting the CTBT, but he should pay attention to political challenges abroad as well. India is one of the nine CTBT hold-outs whose ratification is compulsory for the treaty to enter into force. Without exaggerating the dissent, Obama must work with the Indian government to repel the Santhanam position, lest it become the ultimate stonewall to the CTBT.
