Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

FOGBANK just won’tgo away.  Writing in today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus revisits the now well-known difficulties NNSA has had in reproducing the classified substance as part of the refurbishment of the W76 warhead.   According to Pincu…

In the latest Arms Control Today, an interesting news piece examines U.S. and Russian obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which requires its 188 ratifying members to destroy their stockpiles of chemical agents and delivery vehicles by April 2012. While both the United States and Russia have made progress, it is unlikely at this juncture that either will meet the deadline.

Though not intentionally flouting an international agreement, the United States could face a diplomatic problem by not meeting its CWC deadline obligation.

Though unlikely, the United States could face sanctions and the stripping of voting rights in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the CWC’s monitoring and membership body. The United States should at the very least expect to face a blast of rhetoric, according to Jonathan Tucker at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Besides the CWC deadline, the United States also faces a 2017 deadline mandated by Congress. This is likely to be missed, too. The United States’ two remaining chemical weapons depots at Blue Grass, KY and Pueblo, CO are expected to have barely commenced destruction by 2017. Complete destruction of their stockpiles is even further off, with current estimates standing at 2020 and 2023, respectively.

Increased funding could help address the problem. The DOD’s Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program is in line to receive $550 million in fiscal year 2010, an increase of $5 million above the Pentagon’s request. This would be a total increase of almost a third from last year’s budget of $427 million. Global Security Newswire recently reported that the ACWA “could collect $1.2 billion in extra funding over several upcoming budgets.”

Russia’s situation poses a more serious challenge to the CWC. About 28,000 metric tons remain in its chemical stockpile, and there are concerns over Russian disposal methods. In some facilities, destruction of the stockpile has slowed after the first phase (when the toxic chemicals are drained from their munitions and neutralized but before the munitions casings and the remaining chemicals are incinerated). Until the weapons casings are destroyed, the risk exists that they could be appropriated and refilled.

Another risk lies in allowing standards to slide on what counts as disarmament. In order to meet the 2012 deadline, Russia already has negotiated with the OPCW to set modified procedures for disarmament that credit Russia short of full destruction. This half-step to chemical disarmament could provide a dangerous precedent in the nonproliferation regime. If a non-signatory country were to accede to the CWC, what would stop them from following Russia’s example and retaining munitions or chemical agents?

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei addressed the holes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and called for international regulation of the nuclear fuel cycle in his July 19 op-ed in the Guardian. The article is a much-needed comprehensive articulation of where the world is going wrong on non-proliferation. Sadly, ElBaradei’s complaints will probably fall on deaf ears.

He says that the five nuclear weapons states undermine the NPT by not taking seriously their obligation to pursue disarmament. Other deficiencies in non-proliferation include lax export controls that don’t effectively safeguard against the shipment of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons, along with gross underfunding of the IAEA. The international community has been coasting and some states have only been doing the bare minimum to prevent proliferation of non-peaceful nuclear technology.

Rogue states like North Korea and Iran create a new set of problems for the next IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. Amano takes office December 1, 2009 and will inherit the looming threat of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The jury is still out on whether enthusiasm for non-proliferation will be sufficient to fuel ElBaradei’s pet project: a global low enriched uranium bank. The bank is meant to replace domestic enrichment programs in non-nuclear weapon states in the long-term. The proposal is still a tough sell to developing nations who view such restrictive initiatives as impinging on their sovereign rights under the NPT.

The world is at a critical impasse where nuclear proliferation is concerned, given the recent explosion of countries seeking nuclear power and domestic enrichment programs. Hopefully, renewed U.S.-Russian commitment to nuclear weapons reductions will spur the rest of the international community to take their non-proliferation responsibilities seriously.

The Naval War College Review just published an article that discusses the hypothetical conditions that might surround Japan’s acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo’s nuclear option” is an interesting assessment of Japan’s potential path to weaponization.

The authors consider rational and irrational reasoning that might take place within the Japanese government and in the public arena, reasoning which ultimately might culminate in some change to Japan’s long-standing “nuclear allergy.” They highlight the lapses in rational judgment that occur when national security and domestic political agendas intersect. They also emphasize regional instability and a wavering U.S. extended deterrent as key factors.

In my humble opinion, the latter two arguments don’t hold up very well. Yoshihara and Holmes cite the relative decline of the U.S. Navy by more than half since the 1980s and Chinese naval modernization as nascent concerns that could spur the Japanese government to begin a nuclear weapons program.

Though China has embarked on significant modernization, its logistical support for its fleet is still deficient, and certainly inferior to the United States. China faces shortcomings in the size and scope of its Navy and its institutional capacity for effective regulation. Even when operating remotely, and despite a reduction from 600 to 283 ships, the U.S. Navy is far superior to the Chinese Navy.

Even excluding the threat of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, China has far too much to lose from launching an attack on Japan. Since the United States has shown no sign that its commitment to defend Japan has lessened, the underlying balance of power in East Asia remains intact despite Chinese military development.

The authors also sail off course when they consider regional tensions that might be caused by the U.S. intention to engage in gradual, mutual nuclear weapons reductions. Here, they underestimate the value of a good old fashioned Disney villain. North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and historically erratic behavior have brought Russia, China, Japan, and the United States together under the banner of combating a common threat. None of these powers will sacrifice global stability and security on the altar of global zero.

All of the security arguments outlined in the article are important factors to be aware of in terms of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan. We don’t want to hang one of our closest allies out to dry, and maintaining the credibility of our joint security pact is critical to our relationship.

However, there is no political constituency in Japan with any meaningful public following that supports an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan. Nor is there any doubt in Japan about the relative strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis regional threats like North Korea. Japan is a leading voice in favor of nuclear nonproliferation and has come out in support of a START follow-on agreement and Global Zero campaign. Given these realities, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” looks to remain firmly entrenched for the foreseeable future.