by Ivan Siluianov*
Today, the world is inundated with 3D-printed guns, which are used in major armed conflicts, terrorist attacks, and homicides. While UN member states are trying to address the impact of these weapons, one question arises: Are 3D-printers — barely regulated and widely accessible — capable of enabling the production of components for nuclear weapons to the same extent as they do for guns and firearms?
By permitting the layer-by-layer construction of three-dimensional items from digital designs, 3D printing opened up new possibilities, ranging from quick prototyping and customization to the fulfillment of elaborate sensitive designs. Further progress in 3D printing high-strength materials could undermine the security of the nuclear cycle — the only existing path to both peaceful nuclear energy and weapons programs. The nuclear industry has been utilizing the technology extensively. In 2020, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) successfully printed components of a nuclear reactor core able to withstand high temperatures. One of the concerns is that as the technology matures, the link between 3D printing and WMD may take more disruptive forms, especially in cyberspace. Large language models and AI may enable actors to modify design files to produce DIY components anywhere without leaving any traces for regulators.
Recent research suggests that nine out of the 33 additive manufacturing (AM) techniques to date could be considered “high risk,” with Selective Laser Melting and Electron Beam Melting being capable of producing materials with advanced properties. These devices are compatible with maraging steel, a material known for high strength and toughness, which makes it attractive for manufacturing centrifuges used in both peaceful and military nuclear cycles. Thus far only a handful of American companies have succeeded in operating the high-risk machines capable of printing high-strength metals.
How should policymakers respond to the fast advancement of non-traditional manufacturing? One way for the international community to ensure that AM technology does not end up being used for malicious purposes, the development of WMD in particular, is to strengthen control of the export of feedstock materials, metallic powders, and, most importantly, the transfer of intangible data files. The existing export control regimes adopted some formal provisions related to AM; however, their implementation is often contingent on national regulation and compliance standards.
At the same time, the private sector remains an innovator of AM technologies. In February 2023, American 3D printing company 3D Systems Corp was charged with a $27 million fine for emailing sensitive design drawings of military electronics to its then-subsidiary company in China, violating export control regulations requiring licenses for export of any items designed or developed for military purposes. With such violations becoming commonplace, policymakers must determine how governments together with the private sector could prevent the proliferation of military-grade technologies without strangling the AM industry. Deeper industry-state cooperation in this regard presents great opportunities for improving export controls while avoiding imposing unnecessary restrictions on the rapidly developing industry.
Collaborative efforts between industry stakeholders and regulatory bodies have always been crucial to ensuring responsible trade practices, compliance and the effective management of dual-use technologies. At present, the Wassenaar Arrangement, which aims at controlling the export of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, provides the industry with a list of advisory questions. It contains queries related to the product being exported, the end user and end use of the product, finance and contract conditions, and shipment details. While such guidelines promote vigilance among companies, they engage too few states outside the arrangement who might benefit from further guidance on export control of materials like maraging steel, as well as the safety of digital print files. The participating states should consider expanding outreach to AM companies operating advanced ‘high-risk’ printing machines at home and advise the industry on specific export-control matters in accordance with national legislation. States may opt to revise the list of advisory questions to the industry and include more specific queries on the security and export of digital files and “high-risk” printing machines, as well as materials associated with them. In particular, governments should enforce tighter controls on AM technology itself, rather than only on exports of AM products.
What are the incentives for the industry to seek cooperation?
The European Union and the United States are ramping up their efforts to keep the export control legislation up to date with the growing AM industry. As national legislation progresses, the private sector will have to toe the line or receive big-check fines for export control violations. For the industry, closer government-industry cooperation would come with information dividends (access to export control deliberations and on international forums) and, perhaps, opportunities to influence legislation.
In addition, working in tandem, the government and AM industry would reap benefits from fostering a non-proliferation culture within the burgeoning industry that has not been exposed to the regulatory bureaucracy, unlike other “sensitive” technology sectors, such as aerospace and medical industries. The dangers of AM applications to the proliferation of WMD are only beginning to be understood, and governments and industry need to cooperate to spread awareness of the dangers and mutual interest in minimizing them. For instance, the Wassenaar Arrangement participating states may help certain AM companies with capacity-building, sponsoring training programs, and conducting tabletop exercises in export control regulation, ethics, and cybersecurity. Such cooperation would positively impact the internal security environment, encouraging private-sector actors to tackle vulnerabilities and strengthen internal compliance measures. It is instrumental to also involve states remaining outside of the export-control regimes by establishing platforms between governments and industry for youth and senior leadership to elevate a culture of security and non-proliferation within 3D printing companies.
Without restrictions on the AM industry like increased or updated export controls, there’s no other way to ensure companies or bad actors won’t produce components of weapons of mass destruction, and that’s a risk we simply can’t afford to take.
*Editor’s note: Writing for the Center’s new Next Up in Arms Control series, Ivan Siluianov is a UN Youth Champion for Disarmament and graduate student at Georgia Institute of Technology pursuing a master’s in International Affairs.
