by Farah Sonde
Thousands of employees at the U.S. Health and Human Services Department were abruptly laid off on April Fool’s Day this year. These layoffs, coupled with funding cuts to programs intended to bolster biosecurity, will constitute a devastating blow to the United States’ ability to fight against biological threats, including the potential weaponization of a biological agent. In light of these developments, it is time to explore the ways labs and scientists can keep the momentum going when it comes to facing biological threats without a unifying federal strategy.
The uneven response to the COVID pandemic, from lacking personal protective equipment (PPE) to inadequate federal guidance and tracing protocols, exposed gaping holes in our biosafety and biosecurity preparedness efforts, but these issues are now only some of many. Efforts by HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to discredit vaccines have contributed to the acceleration of a measles epidemic in Texas, with confirmed measles cases in more than 10 states. The defunding of USAID and other grants toward development-based programs has also set the stage for the increased international spread of diseases like tuberculosis. More than 44 million people nationwide are suffering from long COVID symptoms, leaving a large chunk of the U.S. population immunologically vulnerable. The United States withdrawing from the World Health Organization (WHO) will prove detrimental to international public health efforts and will decrease transparency and communication on biological threats worldwide when the country needs it the most. America is immunologically compromised, and we are failing to combat the spread of diseases that have naturally developed. The deliberate spread of a biological agent is poised to cause severe damage to our population and as such our nation’s security.
All of these changes on the federal and international stage have led to an environment of confusion for scientists about which regulations regarding biosecurity to follow. An NIH policy providing oversight on conducting federally funded research on specific biological agents and toxins was previously scheduled to go into effect May 6, 2025. On May 5, 2025, an executive order was issued requiring, amongst other directives, to “revise or replace” the 2024 policy in 120 days. It is also unclear whether the 2024 NIH policy has been scrapped or when a new policy will be enforced. This lack of communication until the last day before this policy was intended to be enforced has yet again left scientists confused on what is expected from them by the federal government. Additionally, a Biden-era executive order mandating the use of screened DNA has been rescinded by the Trump administration. Scientists have neither the tools nor the federal guidance to ensure biosecurity efforts in their own labs, and this lack of transparency could be disastrous for researchers working with sensitive materials or information.
If the United States is underprepared for another pandemic, it is even more underprepared for a deliberate biological attack on American shores. Additionally, the federal government has deliberately undermined science with dire consequences. Before President Donald Trump’s inauguration, Greg Koblentz, a member of the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security, joined forces with other scientists to call for a new biosafety and biosecurity agency in the federal government. Six months into the second Trump administration, it seems that sorely needed regulation on biosecurity concerns is not part of its agenda for the next four years.
Assuming that the administration will continue its current trend of obfuscation and deregulation, the United States is uniquely vulnerable today to the effects of a biological weapon. In the trio of weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons are often critically overlooked. However, a lack of staffing, funds and communication make the country vulnerable to biological attack, especially in a moment when AI models and dual-use technology have made the know-how behind creating a biological weapon easier to access. The Trump administration’s reckless provocations these past few months have created new enemies and strengthened old ones. The stakes of this security threat have never been higher.
During this period of turmoil, labs and individual scientists can take different approaches to uphold biosecurity standards. As a proactive measure, industry labs that provide DNA synthesis can independently implement the requirements that would have been enforced in the Biden-era executive order. They can also consider joining the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC), a collective of companies and organizations dedicated to upholding and promoting thorough screening practices. While the tools for screening CNS orders can be cost-prohibitive, organizations like the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) and SecureDNA are providing tools to screen DNA that industry players can use free of charge. Implementing thorough practices now can ensure that, in this vulnerable time, DNA data cannot be obtained for malicious purposes.
Scientists are under mounting pressure to deliver results with limited funding and resources. However, if principal investigators (PIs) find the time and resources to do so, implementing better biosecurity standards in the lab can go a long way toward ensuring safer field practices. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) previously endorsed the implementation of the International Standard for Biosafety and Biosecurity (ISO 35001) as a biorisk management tool that can be integrated into current systems. Last year, the Division of Laboratory Systems (DLS) encouraged labs to reach out and ask for access to the ISO protocol. While its integration puts a short-term burden on scientists and labs to change their current management systems, the boon of greater biosafety in this moment cannot be understated.
However, if scientists are unable to implement these standards in the lab, there are other ways individual scientists can further biosecurity efforts. Numerous papers have analyzed and documented the need for greater biosecurity education in life sciences programs across the country. Educators can use preexisting papers to help shape the structure of these biosecurity classes. Even without the creation of separate courses focused on biosecurity, incorporating biosecurity and biosafety education into current curricula can ensure that young scientists are cognizant of the many risks in life sciences research if or when federal prospects for regulation have improved.
Lastly, scientists can use their own voices to call for greater biosecurity efforts federally. A quick perusal of the opinion pages for Science and Scientific American magazines show few, if any, articles on biosecurity concerns with life sciences research. Additionally, more easily found articles on agricultural biosecurity focus on the prevention of disease outbreak rather than the concerns present in a lab environment. While focusing on disease prevention is incredibly important, especially with the increasing spread of bird flu, the guidance of Secretary Kennedy makes it clear that disease prevention is not a concern of this administration. What has been a persistent concern for the Trump administration are nuclear weapons and the implementation of tariffs to “strengthen our national and economic security.” By leveraging the current focus on the Trump administration and communicating the myriad security issues that arise from gaps in biosafety, scientists may be able to recapture the attention of the federal government and bring back momentum toward regulations that have lapsed on a federal level.
An ill America is not a strong America. By taking initiative to promote and communicate the necessity of biosafety protocols, industry players, labs and individual scientists can turn the tide of investment in public health and promote a stronger national security policy.
