To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bioweapons agents in more and more people’s hands.

In this analysis, Alan Pearson participates in a roundtable discussion, hosted by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, about the impact of scientific advances at the intersection of chemistry and biology and ways to discourage their application for the development of new substances designed to incapacitate or kill.

Historically, bioterrorism threat and risk assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities, consequences, and technology-centric approaches which focus on low-probability high-consequence worst-case scenarios.

Senior Science Fellow Lynn Klotz calls for public debate of policy determinations that he says privilege funding and resources for biodefense over that for naturally occurring infectious diseases and a potential influenza pandemic.