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Project Sapphire: a model for defense by other means

David Hoffman’s chapter on Project Sapphire in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Dead Hand reads like a spy-thriller novel — complete with a young American diplomat protagonist, angry Russians, a top-secret “Tiger Team” and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to make 24 nuclear bombs.

Project Sapphire was the first major success of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which passed just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In November 1994, a team of 25 Americans transported 1,322 pounds of HEU from the Ulba metallurgical factory in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee to be blended down to low-enriched uranium.  The operation was an enormous success thanks to the cooperation and discretion of the Kazakh and American governments.

In 1994, “the Russian nuclear establishment was showing the same signs of deterioration as the rest of the country.” Fissile material across the country “was stored in rooms and warehouses easy for an amateur burglar to crack;” the 90 or 91 percent-enriched Uranium 235 (nearly weapons-grade) was kept “safe” by what was described by the American diplomat protagonist Andy Weber as “a Civil War padlock.”

The dismal standard of safety and security of nuclear material at the fall of the Soviet Union lends to the fact that threat of nuclear war isn’t our greatest danger, loose nuclear material and weapons are.

Since Project Sapphire, Central Asia and specifically Kazakhstan have become a world leader in non-proliferation efforts. In 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads and the world’s largest bioweapons plant. By 2001, Kazakhstan was free of nuclear weapons; and in 2009, all five Central Asian republics ratified the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) treaty.

At the 20th anniversary event commemorating Project Sapphire at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), David Hoffman and Andy Weber, along with Laura Holgate (Senior Director of WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the National Security Council) spoke of last year’s removal and destruction of chemical weapons from Syria under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the “child” of Project Sapphire and an example of how interagency cooperation and technical experts working together has made the world a safer place.

The destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and Project Sapphire were as much logistical successes as examples of how diplomacy is just as important to our security enterprise as military action. Speaking at the Department of Defense in March 1995, former Defense Secretary William Perry spoke of Project Sapphire as “defense by other means.”  

Projects like the National Nuclear Administration’s (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) established in 2004 have demonstrated the power of defense by other means.In the past 10 years, the GTRI has shut down 49 HEU reactors in 25 countries and disposed of more than 4,100 kilograms of HEU and plutonium.  But some of the most difficult countries to extract from, such as Belarus and South Africa, still have weapons-usable nuclear materials.

In his historic 2009 Prague speech, President Obama reinvigorated efforts to secure rogue nuclear materials:

“Today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set up new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, [and] pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.”

The administration surged funding for the GTRI after the President’s 2009 and since, funding for non-proliferation programs such as GTRI has been on the decline. For the third year in a row the FY 2015 budget request for the NNSA was slashed.

While it is all fine and good to celebrate the success of GTRI and its predecessor programs in helping secure loose nuclear material, the program’s progress should be measured not by how much material has been secured, but by how much could potentially end up in the hands of terrorists. Funding for nuclear weapons programs at the expense of non-proliferation efforts is counterproductive to U.S. national security.

As Obama mentioned in his 2009 speech, cooperation with Russia is integral to reducing nuclear threats worldwide.  At the CSIS event, Laura Holgate spoke of the need for the non-proliferation advocacy community to be creative in encouraging Congress to engage diplomatically with Russia. It is in the interest of U.S. national security to continue working with Russia on areas of consistent cooperation such as the elimination of chemical weapons from Syria, and as members of the P5+1 and Iran negotiations.

An amicable relationship between Russia and the United States is not only good for national security but for the world.

U.S. will attend Vienna Conference

The U.S. announced this evening that it will attend the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

The Conference, set to take place on December 8-9, 2014 in Vienna, Austria, aims to strengthen the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime, highlight the health and environmental dangers of nuclear weapons use, and underscore the urgency for progress on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) action plan.

Up to this point, the “P5” nuclear weapons countries (Russia, China, U.S., U.K., and France) have boycotted the conferences, fearing that they might be used as a forum to push for the elimination of their stockpiles. North Korea and Israel also skipped the two previous events, while India and Pakistan attended the second.

What the U.K. or the rest of the P5 will choose to do, however, is still an open question.

No other P5 countries have confirmed attendance at the December conference, but they could be influenced by the U.S. move. At an Arms Control Association event in October, Lord Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence under the previous British Labour government, said that, “From the point of view of the United Kingdom, if the U.S. agrees to go, we will go.” He continued on to say that it was “no coincidence that we have not made up our mind for each of the last two conferences until immediately after the United States made its decision.”

For its part, the U.S. has made clear that its participation in no way implies that the country supports the beginning of a diplomatic process that would lead to a ban on nuclear weapons or a convention on their elimination. Rather, U.S. participation in the Vienna Conference will help to reaffirm American commitment to the process laid out in the NPT.

Window of Opportunity to Change U.S. Nuclear Spending Trajectory

You might not have noticed, but the U.S.’ plans to replace our aging nuclear weapons triad have been in the news a lot lately. Folks are understandably confused by the juxtaposition of the exorbitant price tag attached to current plans to upgrade all three legs of the triad at once, and the waning U.S. budget. The issue has prompted a demand for Obama to explain his shift from the inspiring Prague speech in 2009 to a long list of expensive nuclear modernization plans.

And some major voices have gotten into the mix. Defense One published an article from the Council on Foreign Relations recently that offers a summary of the current modernization plans, the debate surrounding them, and the emerging solution suggested by a growing number of nonproliferation advocates.

Some key points:

•    Current plan could cost up to $1 trillion in the next three decades.
•    Deterrence does not require a constantly growing arsenal.
•    Unfortunately all three legs (Air, Land and Sea) are planned for modernization around the same time.
•    The Ohio-Class submarine replacement program is expected to soar to over 50% of the Navy’s total budget in the coming 30 years, edging out other programs.  
•    The Air Force foresaw the probable consequence of replacing the Minuteman III Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and opted to use existing technology to modernize the current fleet instead.
•    There are a growing number of calls from within and outside the government for a re-assessed plan that takes current budget constraints into account.
•    This is a window of opportunity for President Obama to redirect our nuclear spending.

More details

Feeling the pressure, the White House is reviewing the current approach. The plan below claims to reduce spending while maintaining the existing defense structure (previous suggestions included the elimination of one of the three legs).

The chart below summarizes the article’s discussion including the systems slated for modernization, the estimated year of retirement, the current plan, estimated cost, and the proposed solution.

some text

(Based on Defense One/ CFR article)

The above chart doesn’t include many of the other areas “up for modernization” including: nuclear warhead life-extension programs; the production of a warhead that would work for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles; and upgrading Energy and Defense Department systems that all add to growing costs.

While it seems difficult to implement change, the article highlights this information as a pivotal opportunity for the Obama administration. Making a responsible adjustment to current plans would allow the President to maintain the current structure, save money, and leave office with the legacy of moving towards a reduction in our reliance on nuclear weapons.

With important nonproliferation conferences ahead, including the 2015 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty in New York, these decisions hold extra weight; if my NPT simulation course at the Monterey Institute taught me anything, it’s that U.S. nonproliferation actions (positive or negative) will drive the direction of negotiations.

Why Iran Should Have the Political Will to Stay at the Negotiating Table

The most recent news out of Vienna is that the P5+1 and Iran are 95% of the way to an elusive nuclear deal. With less than 40 days to the November 24th deadline, both sides still need to resolve issues around the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, how long the deal will last, how quickly Iran will see sanctions relief, and the possible military dimension to Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear activities. These outstanding points of contention will need to be addressed, and concessions will need to be made, leading some to question Iran’s will to stay at the negotiating table.

The United States, the European Union and the United Nations implemented sanctions in 2010 that by 2012 had hit Iran’s economy incredibly hard.  Inflation rose to 45% in 2012-2013, oil export proceeds dropped, and the rial, Iran’s currency, lost 60% of its value. Nevertheless the Islamic Republic has adjusted to new sanctions and its economy is predicted to grow moderately in 2015. Iran’s GDP is expected to rise 2 percent  in 2014 and 2015, at roughly the same pace as the U.S. economy.

The present not-so-bad economic reality may suggest that Iran can afford to throw in the towel on nuclear negotiations, but it doesn’t take into account the whole picture.

As much as the Iranian regime likes to paint the U.S. as the big bad wolf, Western sanctions are not exclusively responsible for the estimated 31% of Iranians living below the poverty line. The current destitute condition of the everyday Iranian is the result of  widespread corruption and mismanagement from the Ahmadinejad era compounded by an influx of sanctions since 2010. Although sanctions may have played a role in bringing Iran to the table, they wouldn’t have been necessary if hardliner conservatives in Iran and the U.S. hadn’t let relations deteriorate so dramatically post-2003.

Sanctions have worked to destabilize domestic politics and isolate Iran from the global economy, yes, but what about the average Iranian citizen?

SANCTIONS HURT GRANDMA AND NEW BABY, TOO

Although specific sanctions are not placed directly on Iran’s medical industry, backlash from financial isolation has directly affected access to medicine and medical devices.

Sanctions against Iran are supposed to include legal loopholes to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.  Even so, the import of lifesaving medicine from the West is nearly impossible. According to a 2013 study carried out by the Wilson Center, “Iranian patients find it increasingly difficult and expensive, if not impossible, to obtain some of the medicines they need. When they do fill a prescription, they risk amplified side effects and reduced effectiveness because Iran is forced to import more and more medicines, or their chemical building blocks, from India and China, thereby replacing the higher quality products from Western manufacturers.”

I spoke with an Iranian citizen whose grandmother needed back surgery. The doctor was to replace one of her vertebrae with an artificial vertebra. The high quality artificial bone, which before the latest bout of sanctions was easy to obtain in Iran, was impossible to find. Instead the doctor had to use a version made in China. Even the doctor was skeptical of the safety of the device.

In another example, new parents are having trouble obtaining Neocate, a baby formula for infants with milk allergies. Parents in Iran have to wait in long lines and pay exorbitant prices for the only brand of formula their children are safe to consume.

Iran has had to increase imports of lower quality drugs and medical devices from China and India.  Furthermore, U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies often patent their drugs. Meaning the West is the only place certain drugs are manufactured thus Iran can’t look to the East for alternatives.  

In accordance with the Joint Plan of Action, the U.S. and EU have rolled back sanctions on petrochemicals, gold, and precious metal exports. The U.S. has also suspended sanctions on Iran’s automotive industry and associated services and “Establish[ed] a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenue held abroad.” While the recent sanctions rollbacks have helped stimulate the economy, the benefits have not yet reached Iran’s pharmaceutical and medical industry.

The sanctions relief that would result from a nuclear deal this year would allow the average Iranian access to the high quality Western medical goods they need. But ultimately, the only person Rouhani needs to persuade to nail down a deal is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has thus far maintained hardliner resistance to cooperating with the West. That said, the Iranian political apparatus isn’t impervious to influence from below, despite the regime’s undemocratic nature. Pressure from the Iranian people on the regime should not be underestimated as motive for Khamenei to make compromises on a deal. Keep in mind that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was spearheaded by student groups and the urban middle class.

Because of this pressure from below, Iran should have a vested interest in resolving the nuclear issue with diplomacy and with haste. Although the timeline of sanctions relief is still being debated in negotiations, it will be a key feature of any nuclear deal. The sooner the P5+1 and Iran come to an agreement, the faster the average Iranian will see tangible relief from the consequences of sanctions.