On January 20, 2011 (22:00 KST, 08:00 EST) South Korea’s global broadcaster Arirang News interviewed Duyeon Kim, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferaiton, about the U.S.-China Summit with regards to the North Korean nuclear issue. Click here for the video.
U.S.-China Summit & North Korea
As expected, the joint statement produced by Presidents Obama and Hu was not ground-breaking on the North Korean issue. It is hard to say that there were any substantially new achievements. However, it was still a positive outcome with some meaningful points because it reflected both sides’ positions on contentious issues (regardless of an agreement), and it generally kept in line with the position of Washington’s allies.
Washington and Beijing agreed on some key points in general and in principle, but many of those key points are reaffirmation of each other’s original positions. The language is also heavily nuanced, which is normal in public diplomatic rhetoric. It appears Beijing has not steered far away from its original stance, and we can still see that Washington and Beijing hold differing views on those same key points.
KEY POINTS
Here’s a run-down of some initial thoughts on points that stand out: (Click “read more”)
(1.) “The United States and China emphasized the importance of an improvement in North-South relations and agreed that sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue is an essential step.”
It’s clear South Korea’s position was reflected in the joint statement because Seoul, Washington and Tokyo are pushing for inter-Korean dialogue to precede the Six Party Talks in the wake of consecutive North Korean attacks.
(2.) “(In this context), the United States and China expressed concern regarding the DPRK’s claimed uranium enrichment program”
This is perhaps the most eye-catching because the joint statement specifically mentions “uranium enrichment program,” which is a term President Hu avoided in the joint press conference. This sentence is significant because it’s clear that Washington’s (and its allies’) position has been reflected in the joint statement, and it’s significant because it the term “uranium enrichment program” is specifically mentioned. It also shows Beijing is concerned about Pyongyang’s nuclear developments.
At the same time, however, the language has been left a bit vague to reflect Beijing’s main position with the phrase “claimed” uranium enrichment program. Just days before the summit, China’s foreign ministry made a public comment that failed to acknowledge the existence of a uranium enrichment facility shown to an American scientist last November. So it’s clear there are fundamental differences here.
Still, “the United States and China reiterated the need for concrete and effective steps to achieve the goal of denuclearization and for full implementation of the other commitments made in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.” Hopefully this will translate into real action to jumpstart dialogue.
(3.) The joint statement did NOT specifically condemn North Korea’s attacks on South Korea: “Both sides expressed concern over heightened tensions on the Peninsula triggered by recent developments.”
However, President Obama said in their joint press conference that the two sides “agreed that North Korea must avoid further provocations.”
ROAD AHEAD
What’s most important is how North Korea will respond, and how Washington and Beijing will follow up on their joint statement.
The joint statement says, “The two sides called for the necessary steps that would allow for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks process to address this and other relevant issues.” However, Washington and Beijing still disagree on the mechanics of moving forward. The U.S., South Korea and Japan want inter-Korean dialogue first, then the Six Party Talks. China, on the other hand, wants the Six Party Talks first and THEN deal with all outstanding issues. The concern surrounding Beijing’s proposal is that Pyongyang’s attacks will remain unresolved and overshadowed by six party nuclear negotiations, which many argue is exactly what North Korea wants.
The allies want the road to dialogue to generally look something like this:
Some gesture of taking responsibility for attacks ==> Inter-Korean dialogue ==> Genuine action reflecting a sincere will to denuclearize ==> U.S.-North Korea dialogue ==> Six Party Talks.
Washington will be debriefing Seoul on the summit by sending a senior official to South Korea. But aside from the summit’s results, we’ll likely see a flurry of diplomacy among the six parties in the weeks and months to come. While it’s always tough to make predictions about diplomacy, we may see some real action as early as February, which is after President Obama’s State of the Union address next week.
Obama & Hu: Hit or Miss
Opinions are split on whether one should hope that Wednesday’s U.S.-China summit will help jumpstart diplomacy on the long dead-locked North Korean issue. Will it be clouded by other pressing issues like the economy? Does the U.S. have leverage? Will China move on North Korea? Will the summit end in symbolic formalities or tangible results?
But the reality is that this is perhaps the Obama administration’s only real chance to make a difference since both countries will soon begin preparations for leadership transitions in 2012. The most effective way to move Beijing is to persuade the Chinese president himself by an American president, head-to-head.
The summit’s joint statement will provide essential clues about the direction of diplomacy on North Korea. But the two leaders are walking into the summit oceans apart on some key points on mechanics. (Click “read more”)
President Hu Jintao has made Beijing’s position clear in his latest joint interview to the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal – he wants to first resume the Six Party Talks and then discuss all matters of concern including Korean tensions. Washington, on the other hand, wants inter-Korean dialogue to precede the Six Party Talks as well as a sincere North Korean gesture to denuclearize prior to negotiations.
Perhaps one of the biggest sticking points is North Korea’s recently unveiled uranium enrichment program. Beijing fails to publicly acknowledge the existence of the facility and has defended Pyongyang’s right to use nuclear energy. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said “We’ve never seen North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility… The situation is unclear right now.”
But Washington wants to work with Beijing to put an end to the North’s uranium enrichment program, which has clearly violated UN Resolutions and Six Party agreements. The two sides could revert to dealing with the uranium enrichment issue at the Six Party Talks, but the question is how to get there?
The fundamental challenge is persuading Beijing to move Pyongyang. China’s top policy priority is its own peaceful development, which it believes will only be achieved if there is regional peace and stability. This is particularly crucial as Hu Jintao hands over the reins to Xi Jinping next year. This means Beijing will be especially reluctant to aggravate Pyongyang as it fears instability in North Korea could cause spillover effects in Chinese territory.
The window of opportunity for Obama and Hu to find a lead and create an environment conducive for progress on North Korea will become increasingly narrow after the summit. President Obama needs to prod Hu to help contain further North Korean provocations and help create an environment for inter-Korean dialogue and eventual six nation dialogue.
This year and the next will be an attractive time for North Korea to engage in more provocations as Washington, Seoul and Beijing become preoccupied with leadership transitions in their respective countries. It will be an appealing time for Pyongyang to shake the U.S.-South Korea alliance as well. It will also be an opportune time for Pyongyang to show its “might and power” as it approaches its own 2012 deadline – perhaps with a bang or a barrage of fireworks, or both.
Until now Washington has maintained a reactive, rather than proactive, approach to the North Korean dilemma. Its will to make progress may have grown after revelations of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program.
Still, Iran overshadows North Korea on the White House policy agenda.
Resolving the North Korea issue is imperative to break the precedent for other rogue actors like Tehran who aspire to follow the Pyongyang model. But how far will the Obama administration go with just two years left in office packed with competing policy priorities?
As for the first step in the future of diplomacy on North Korea, Wednesday will determine whether the summit will be a hit or miss.
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