In the last few years, one of the main topics of speculation regarding a potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program has been Israel’s likely response to an Iranian nuclear bomb.
China’s Nuclear Weapons – Tempering Fears with a Dose of Reality
Several reports about China’s nuclear weapons program have come out in the past few weeks, and they are causing imaginations to run wild and some fears to grow beyond the realm of reality. The fact is that China has indeed been modernizing its arsenal, but it is important to put this modernization in perspective and to not overstate the Chinese nuclear threat.
The primary source of the panic is a map supposedly detailing Chinese nuclear attack plans in the event of conflict that would leave 5 to 12 million Americans dead. This “plan” and the map have made their rounds on many major news sites. Fortunately, a little detective work by the Federation of American Scientist’s Hans Kristensen has revealed that the map wasn’t even produced by the Chinese government. Instead, it seems to have been part of a slideshow posted on a military technology website unaffiliated with the Chinese government.
The map was released around the same time that the Chinese government unveiled details about their development of a small fleet of ballistic missile submarines. These details caused even more dramatic stories about how these submarines could attack U.S. cities with JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missiles. Aside from the fact that no Jin-class submarines have ever sailed on deterrent patrols, there are several major technical problems that prevent this from being reality.
First, according to Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, the current fleet of three Jin-class subs is not currently armed with nuclear weapons because China’s Central Military Commission forbids the mounting of warheads on missiles unless they are about to be used (this doctrine has, so far, extended to submarine launched ballistic missiles as well). This means the submarines leave port with no ability to fulfill their purpose as a deterrent. Second, China’s submarine fleet is incredibly loud and easy to track. The Jin-class is reported to be louder than Soviet submarines that were built 30 years ago. Third, the JL-2 missile only has a range of about 7,200 km. If the missiles were actually armed with warheads; they would be able to threaten U.S. bases in the region but would be unable to reach any major U.S. cities. To even target Washington, D.C., the submarine would have to sail almost to Hawaii without detection. Navy Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, has summed up these shortcomings quite effectively: “For a submarine-launched ballistic missile to be effective it has to be accurate, and you have to be stealthy and survivable and I’ll leave it at that.”
China is also expanding its arsenal of land based ballistic missiles; however, some of this expansion is temporary as certain systems are being developed to replace older missiles like the DF-3A and DF-4 which were deployed in the 1970s and 80s, respectively. Even with the 2007 unveiling of the DF-31A, which has a range of 11,000 km and the under-development DF-41, which has a range of 13,000 km, China will only have around 50 (out of about 240-300 total) land based missiles capable of reaching the continental United States. The usefulness of these missiles, however, is limited because firing them at the U.S. would mean firing the missile over Russian territory, which could provoke a nuclear response from Russia.
The modernization of nuclear weapons by a foreign power is rightfully bound to cause some concern; however, much of the media reporting has painted the picture of a possible doomsday scenario that could happen today or tomorrow, and this is simply not the case. As Gregory Kulacki has noted, “under the counting rules of the New Start agreement between the United States and Russia, the size of China’s nuclear arsenal would officially be counted as zero. This is because the several hundred warheads China is believed to possess are not mated to the missiles that can deliver them, but are kept in storage, like the several thousand warheads the United States and Russia each hold in reserve in addition to the 1,550 each of the two nuclear superpowers are allowed to deploy under the treaty.”
It is also important to remember that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is more than enough to deter any actual attacks from China against the U.S. homeland, forward deployed U.S. troops, and U.S. allies. The United States has almost 2,000 warheads mounted on missiles that can reach China compared to the 45-50 warheads that can reach the United States, and this fact is well known by the Chinese government.
In other words, it is by no means time to bring back the nuclear attack drills taught in American schools during the Cold War, nor is it necessary to consider expanding our own nuclear program because of China.
Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Worry About a Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear Transfer
In recent years, a number of analysts and former government officials have argued that Saudi Arabia would feel pressured into pursuing its own nuclear deterrent should Iran, a country that the Saudis view with contempt and fear, develop its own nuclear arsenal. In light of the Kingdom’s inability to domestically develop such a capability in a short amount of time, the concern was that Saudi Arabia would purchase a nuclear weapon from its long-time ally Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons program was partly financed by the Gulf kingdom.
Claiming this “conventional wisdom” was “wrong”, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argued in its February 2013 report “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds a Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” that a nuclear weapon transfer from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely should Iran ever attain a nuclear weapon. Aside from the lack of hard evidence of any assurance from Pakistan that it would sell its weapons to Saudi Arabia, both countries would face significant disincentives to ever follow through with such a transaction.
On the Saudi side, it would face a harsh backlash from the international community. Saudi Arabia is a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory and its contravention of this treaty and the norm it encapsulates would likely cause many countries to issue far-reaching and damaging economic sanctions against the Gulf kingdom. The US-Saudi security relationship, upon which the country is so dependent for its military security, would also be nullified, and Israel might consider a reactionary strike against Saudi Arabia, similar to those against Iraq in 1981.
Pakistan would face a similar international backlash. Although it is not an NPT signatory, its actions as a nuclear weapons proliferator would also contravene accepted international proliferation norms and likely result in far-reaching economic sanctions. In light of Pakistan’s weak economy and political institutions, it would suffer considerably if such sanctions were issued.
Taken together, the CNAS report concludes that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have no incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons transaction in the event of Iranian weaponization.
Nine months later, doubts have been raised on this assessment following the publication of a BBC investigative report claiming that unnamed NATO sources confirm the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear agreement. In the report’s own words, Pakistani nuclear weapons “are now sitting ready for delivery” to the Gulf Kingdom.
Along with the “recent ‘rift’ between the US and Saudi Arabia and ambiguous statements from Saudi officials regarding the existence of this nuclear arrangement, the report has helped resurrect fears about the prospect of a Riyadh ready to go nuclear. Just yesterday, Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal wrote with full confidence that, should Iran go nuclear (which he believes they will), “Saudi Arabia will move swiftly to acquire a nuclear deterrent from its clients in Islamabad.”
So, should we doubt the CNAS assessment of the situation? Will Saudi Arabia attain a nuclear weapon from Pakistan?
The answer to both questions is no. Even if the arrangement does exist, which the CNAS report originally doubted, the prospect of Pakistan transferring a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia any time soon is as slim as it was before.
Why? Because the array of disincentives facing both countries that the CNAS report identified in February still remain nine months later. If Riyadh purchased a weapon from Islamabad, both countries would still suffer from the damaging effects of the international backlash that would result. The costs continue to vastly outweigh the benefits.
Even if Iran attains a nuclear weapon and begins to act aggressively towards Saudi Arabia, it is not clear that a nuclear transfer would likely follow. While the Kingdom may seriously consider the acquisition of a nuclear weapon to defend itself in such a scenario, Pakistani incentives are unlikely to change. In comparison to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is not threatened by Iran or its ambitions in the wider Middle East. The benefits of selling a nuclear weapon would remain low in the face of high costs and so while Saudi Arabia may come to favor a transfer, Pakistan would likely refuse it.
Thus, the CNAS report’s overall assessment remains valid in light of these new findings. Regardless of whether a nuclear arrangement exists between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the likelihood of a nuclear transfer remains low for the foreseeable future. There are many justified fears concerning the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This just isn’t one of them.
The Brian Lehrer Show Discusses Historic WMD “Red Lines” with John Isaacs
“Obviously, nuclear weapons are the worst of the worst,” said John Isaacs.
The UK’s Trident Program: Sink or Swim?
Well, it looks like the US isn’t the only country grappling with the issue of nuclear modernization. Across the Atlantic, the British government is in the midst of such a debate. The latest shoe to drop was the release on July 16 of a much-anticipated government-commissioned report titled the “Trident Alternatives Review.” The report put forth a range of possible alternatives to the country’s current nuclear deterrent.
