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A Look at the New House Republican Leadership on National Security and Nuclear Weapons

By Kingston Reif and Jessica Estanislau

The November 2010 elections saw the Republicans take back the House of Representatives.  The change in power means that there are new Sheriffs in town calling the shots on the key House Committees dealing with nuclear weapons.  Below are brief profiles of the new leaders of three key Committees and Subcommittees: Foreign Affairs, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairwoman, Committee on Foreign Affairs

New House International Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen intends to play a very active role on nuclear policy-related issues.  Two areas in particular are likely to come under her close scrutiny.  First, Ros-Lehtinen has long been a skeptic of U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries.  She opposed the U.S.-Russia 123 agreement, which entered into force last December, and has taken a hard line on administration plans to negotiate similar such deals with Jordan, Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia.  Ros-Lehtinen also raised questions about deals negotiated by the George W. Bush administration.  For example, she was one of the few members of Congress to express reservations about the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement.  And although she ultimately supported the U.S.-India Nuclear deal, she co-sponsored a bill to strengthen the agreement which caused unease in India.  Look for her to introduce legislation in the 112th Congress to revamp Congressional procedures for considering civilian nuclear cooperation agreements.  Second, Ros-Lehtinen is an advocate of tougher punitive measures against and Iran and North Korea.  Instead of pursuing a strategy of engagement toward these regimes, she believes that the U.S. must impose tougher sanctions than the Obama administration seems willing to pursue.

Michael Turner (R-OH), Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee

As Ranking Member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee in the 111th Congress, Michael Turner was a thorn in the side of the President’s nuclear risk reduction agenda.  During the House Armed Services Committee’s consideration of the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act last May, Turner offered a sense of congress amendment proclaiming that the Nuclear Posture Review weakens U.S. national security by taking options off the table to respond to a catastrophic nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional attack.  The amendment was included in the House version of the bill but was expunged from the final bill that passed in the lame duck session of the Congress.  Turner is also a strong advocate of U.S. missile defense programs.  He was skeptical of the Obama administration’s September 2009 decision to cancel the Bush-planned system for establishing a third site for National Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.  He also accused the administration of slashing funding for missile defense systems and offered amendments to the Defense Authorization Bill to restore that funding.  In March 2010, Tuner released letters from each of the three directors of the U.S. national nuclear weapons laboratories questioning the conclusion drawn by the JASON defense advisory group that “[l]ifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs [Life Extension Programs] to date.”  Finally, last December Turner organized a letter with Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA) and 14 other House Republicans urging the Senate to delay consideration of the New START treaty until 2011. Expect Turner to continue to cast doubt on the Obama administration’s initiatives on nuclear issues in the 112th Congress.

(Note: for an earlier profile of House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, see here.)

Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), Chairman, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, Appropriations Committee

As the new Chairman of the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep. Freylinghuysen will have an enormous say over funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons activities and defense nuclear nonproliferation accounts.  Freylinghuysen was a strong supporter of the administration’s FY 2011 budget increases for life extension programs and the construction of new nuclear facilities in Tennessee and New Mexico.  However, Freylinghuysen cast doubt on the merits of the administration’s request for an additional $320 million for nuclear security programs, noting in March 2010 that while the President’s goal to secure all vulnerable materials was “laudable”, it is “not well defined and I’m worried about implementation.” Addressing the overall increase in the energy and water appropriations bill, Frelinghuysen said “My constituents are increasingly concerned about the country’s growing budget deficit and are calling for budget cuts, not budget increases,” he said.  Despite these concerns, the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee fully funded the administration’s FY 2011 request for nonproliferation programs, with his support.

European Missile Defenses: Following in the Inept Shoes of National Missile Defense?

The knock on United States National Missile Defense based in Alaska and California is that it never has been proved to work in real-world situations.  Billions of dollars have been spent on that system, now called “ground-based mid-course,” but there is no sure evidence that the defense would work should North Korea launch nuclear-tipped missiles against us.

Because of the powerful political backing for the program, missile defense has avoided the commonsense “Fly Before You Buy” mantra that prevents billions from being wasted on weapons that may eventually prove ineffective.

According to a recent report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the government auditing agency, the Obama Administration is risking repeating history with its proposed  missile defense systems in Europe.

The Bush Administration hid the true costs of National Missile Defense and avoided close scrutiny by using a policy it labeled “spiral development” – which probably should have stood for spiraling costs.

The Obama Administration’s new label is “phased adaptive approach.” According to the GAO, there are more questions than answers about the new plan.

To review the bidding, on September 17, 2009, President Obama announced a new approach for missile defense in Europe while canceling the Bush-planned system for establishing a third site for National Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. The revised system, to be deployed in phases of an increasingly capable system, was called “European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Administration argued that the new system could be deployed sooner against a nearer term threat and more comprehensively than the previous approach.

The first interceptors would be designed to protect U.S. forces deployed in Europe and our European allies against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched by Iran. Eventually, a matured system would help defend against longer-range threats.

The original interceptor deployments would take place on Aegis ships as early as 2011. Phase 2 is scheduled for 2015, including an Aegis defense system on land in Romania. In 2018, there would be more deployment in Poland and then a long-range defense by 2020.

NATO recently endorsed the territorial missile defense system, although it has yet to reach agreement on how to implement the new mission.

However, the missile defense agency is still exempt from rigorous standards.  The GAO notes that: “MDA [Missile Defense Agency] continues to be exempted from DOD’s traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and associated oversight processes.”  

In other words, there is no way to judge success if there are no clear requirements and goals except those defined by the agency with the most stake it defining the system as a success.

The GAO continues: “DOD does not have the information it needs to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential problems,

or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks.”

As with National Missile Defense, the Pentagon may follow the proposed schedule and spend billions with no idea whether the system will really work.  Pentagon does not yet have an overall cost estimate, according to the GAO.  “DOD has not yet developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and has indicated that it is unlikely to do so because EPAA is considered a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a result, DOD does not have a basis from which to assess EPAA’s affordability and cost-effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to monitor implementation progress.”

The GAO adds:  “Without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally sustainable and affordable.”

In other words, the United States may be buying more pigs in pokes with no ability to reply on the new system during a crisis.

By rushing forward with many aspects of the program, the GAO notes, the system will may have challenges in getting all its parts working together: “EPAA’s phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities and so are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost”.

Now none of these criticisms should phase [pun intended] Republicans, who have long embraced missile defense whether or not the system has been proved to work.

These Republicans are modern-day Potemkin-ites.  According to history/myths, Russian minister Grigory Potyomkin had hollow facades of villages constructed along the Dnieper River in order to impress Empress Catherine II during her visit to Crimea in 1787.

The modern-day equivalent is the hollow missile defenses in Alaska and California. The new Obama plan is running the same risk as the West Coast system.

The Administration should slow down, set realistic goals, come up with a definitive cost estimate, and test the hell out of the system.

Are They? Or Are They Not?

The U.S. government should be more cautious in its statements about Iran’s nuclear intentions. If we want the Iranians to sit at the negotiating table, we need to stop faulting them for things we are not sure about. As our executive director John Isaacs said last month, “Negotiations with Iran are more likely to bear fruit if Iranians don’t feel like the United States is officially accusing them of being dead-set on going nuclear.”

The recent testimony by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair is a step in the right direction.  Blair told Congress this month that Iran has not yet made an executive decision to convert its low-enriched uranium stocks into highly-enriched fuel that could be used for nuclear weapons. Neither has Iran decided to develop the technology needed to load an atomic bomb onto a ballistic missile, according to Blair.

Whether or not the Islamic Republic has made up its mind to develop a nuclear weapon makes an enormous difference to U.S. strategy. “If we definitely know what Iran wants to do, that they are planning to build a nuclear weapon, then it is indeed a very dangerous situation,” Isaacs noted on NPR’s Morning Edition in February. “If they’re only moving in that direction and haven’t made a final decision, not only does that take some time urgency off, but it also means there’s an opportunity for the Obama administration to try to launch some negotiations with the Iranian leadership.”

Iran can move toward a nuclear bomb “if it chooses to do so,” said Blair (emphasis mine.)  Added Blair: “Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop one.” This leaves the window open for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.

With his carefully picked words, Blair walked a fine line and aimed to strike a cautionary but not overhyped note about available intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program. Blair set a useful example for officials to follow when discussing delicate questions regarding Iran.

Blair’s statements, however, seem to have created quite a bit of confusion. Blair appeared to contradict earlier statements by CIA director Leon Panetta, who told Congress that, based on the information he’d seen, “there is no question” that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability. Something similar happened earlier this month when Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen told journalists that Iran had enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon on the same day that Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that Iran “was not close to a weapon.”

If administration officials can’t get their message straight, how can we expect the Iranians to know where we stand? The Obama administration should stay away from the microphones when debating what is inside the minds of Iranian leaders. Blair’s nuanced language is welcome and should be the standard throughout the executive branch.

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