Such calculations may seem bizarre, but our best protection against a nuclear war is to convince potential aggressors that no matter what they throw at us in a surprise attack, we can respond by causing unacceptable damage in their country. Loren Thomp…
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions
A few big things have come out recently with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. While some were long awaited and highly anticipated, such as the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), none turned out to be particularly earth shattering.
A new NIE on Iran’s nuclear program will remain classified, but reportedly walks back the conclusions of the controversial 2007 NIE, which stated that Iran had ceased its nuclear weapons activities in 2003. Reports indicate that while Iran may not have made the ultimate decision to build a nuclear weapon, due to internal politics and external pressure, it is likely working on the components of such a device.
“We believe Iran is moving to the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability,” Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s senior adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, said at a briefing today. Due to the inefficient nature of Iran’s uranium enrichment technology, though, Einhorn says that “it would make no sense” for Iran to make the decision to build a nuclear weapon at this point.
Likewise, the most recent report (GOV/2011/7) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to express concern over the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, noting that some of these activities may have continued past 2004. According to the IAEA, Iran continues to deny a number of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including implementation of the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment and heavy water related activities; and “clarification of the remaining outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear program.”
Additionally, IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano reported Monday that Iran may have engaged in nuclear weaponization studies more recently than previously thought.
“Unfortunately, I cannot say a lot on this issue. But I can tell you that we have received information…” since the last board meeting in December, Amano said, “we have received some information raising further concerns.”
Tomorrow, Army Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee to deliver his assessment of world threats facing the US. His prepared statement, released today, suggests that any new news from the US is likely to be equally optimistic.
Iran’s Ex-Negotiator Presents Plan to Resolve US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate
Guest post by Alex Bollfrass
Below is a summary of remarks made on 2/24 at Princeton University by Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005.
Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s lead negotiator from 2003 to 2005, presented his vision for a resolution to the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program. In his first public statement since his 2007 arrest, Ambassador Mousavian laid out a plan for political and diplomatic engagement with Iran.
The ex-negotiator described a space for mutual agreement that would respect the US redline of Iranian nuclear weapons and Iran’s non-negotiable right to uranium enrichment.
Without straying far from the official Iranian position, he argued for direct bilateral and comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the United States, while recommending the continued pursuit of P5+1 negotiations. The proper institutional setting, in his view, is the IAEA. The UN Security Council’s involvement and its punitive resolutions should be ended.
Mousavian emphasized that any solution would require the international recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment. Iran would also need the provision of security assurances not only from the United States, but regional countries, as well…
Inside Iranian decision-making
In his rhetorical warm-up, he hypothesized that if the shah had remained in power, Iran would today have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In his view, the West “owes a debt of gratitude to the Islamic Republic” for its restraint on the nuclear front over the past 30 years.
He mourned the lost opportunity for an agreement during President Khatamei’s presidency, which the former negotiator blamed on the Bush administration’s hard line and the West’s misreading of Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment as a sign that it could be pushed to surrender its right to enrichments.
Mousavian identified Ayatollah Khomenei as the ultimate decision-maker on Iranian national security questions, and as having driven the harder line in Iran’s confrontation with the international community upon Ahmedinejad’s election. In a glimpse into the mode of operation in Iran’s government, the ambassador confessed that he had only learned of the Qom uranium enrichment when President Obama revealed it in September 2009 at the G8 meeting in Pittsburgh.
Mousavian’s Plan
In a review of the P5+1’s options, he described the counterproductive effects of military strikes for the entire region. Sanctions have also failed to prevent Iran from developing missile and nuclear technology, while serving the interests of Iranian hardliners. He also argued that the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facility and assassination of nuclear scientists only raised distrust among Iranians and strengthening the arguments for the development of a nuclear deterrent.
Only diplomacy, in his view, holds promise for a resolution. However, so far the Obama and Ahmedinejad administrations diplomatic attempts have yielded no results because neither has proposed a comprehensive solution.
Mousavian argued that the US should engage Iran directly beyond the nuclear issue and build trust through cooperation on Afghanistan. He saw the UN Security Council’s involvement as counterproductive, in particular its use of sanctions, and as an obstacle to resolution. Therefore, the Iranian issue should be taken off the Security Council’s agenda and placed within the IAEA.
The NPT would serve as the basic framework to guarantee Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons should be taken as an assurance. However, he underlined that Iran would accept no inspections or restrictions that went beyond what is required of other NPT signatories.
Under Mousavian’s plan, there would be two steps of the regional component of engagement. The first would be engagement with the Persian Gulf states. This framework would later be expanded to the broader Middle East in an effort to establish an OSCE-type regional organization. In a veiled reference to Israel’s nuclear weapon, Mousavian called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as part of this regional integration.
In response to a question about Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment despite its lack of reactors that could put this fuel to use, Mousavian cited Western and Russian abrogation of past agreements for the provision of nuclear technology and fuel.
Persona non grata in Iran
Following Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Mousavian was removed from his position on Iran’s negotiating team with the P5+1 and the IAEA. Two years later, the Iranian government arrested Mousavian on espionage charges. Despite most charges having been dropped, he received a commuted sentence and barred from serving in the diplomatic corps. Mousavian then left the country for the West.
He has been a fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security for a year and a half. In poor standing with the Iranian regime, he would likely face arrest if he returned.
Alex Bollfrass is the NoH Senior New Jersey correspondent and a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.
House Votes to Cut F-35 Extra Engine
The saga continues in the fight to fund the F-35 extra engine. Today, the House voted 233-198 on an amendment that would cancel the program.
The vote split both Republicans and Democrats, with over 100 Republicans and around 130 Democrats voting yes. Rep. Tom Rooney (R-FL) took the lead on the amendment, crediting House GOP leaders with allowing a vote on the issue despite Speaker John Boehner’s opposition.
Freshman Republicans in the House were initially hesitant to trim military spending, but have since broken ranks with their party’s speaker to include $16 billion in military cuts in the current spending bill. Cutting the F-35 extra engine would save an additional $450 million.
House GOP leaders hope to pass the overall spending bill later this week, which would fund the government through the end of the current fiscal year, but the buck does not stop there. The bill then goes to the Senate. Funding for the extra engine could be among the many changes that are made.
Pakistan rapidly increasing arsenal, still says no to FMCT
Last week the public learned a few new things about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The size of its deployed stockpile is now estimated to be more than 100 weapons. It also is believed to possess the nuclear material for somewhere between 40-100 additional weapons, a capability which could make Pakistan the 4th or 5th largest nuclear weapon state – surpassing both France and the United Kingdom .
As David Sanger and Eric Schmitt pointed out in the New York Times and Karen DeYoung in the above article in the Washington Post—Pakistan’s nuclear-lust is a challenge to the twin goals of prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and reducing nuclear stockpiles globally.
Pakistan is the only country publically opposing the beginning of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the 65-nation UN Conference of Disarmament (CD). Their chief concern is India and the disparity between the two country’s arsenals. Even though, the latest estimates suggest that Pakistan may have more weapons than India. New Delhi does have the capacity to produce more weapons due to a larger fissile material stockpile.
Clearly Pakistan has more than enough weapons and material to deter any potential nuclear threat from India. But, as Daryl Kimball stated in the October 2010 edition of Arms Control Today, “Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT likely will not be alleviated as long as India’s production potential remains greater.” Note production potential. It is negligible that Pakistan has more weapons now. India can, at any time, increase the size of its arsenal and Pakistan sees that potential as a threat–even more so now because of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which could give India even more added potential to produce bombs.
Most observers are in agreement that this will not be an easy task. Still, there is a lot that can be done to lay the groundwork for future negotiations and to put added pressure on Pakistan to change its thinking. Kimball laid out some of the options in the Arms Control piece above. So long as Pakistan and India continue their quest to build more bombs, it is only a matter of time before a FMCT will have to be pursued outside the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.
