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Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 – to be attended by all Middle Eastern states – which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”

Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty “ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”

Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.

Reports that Israeli submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles will deploy off the Iranian coast affirm the eminence of the threat posed by a nuclear Middle East, and the urgent need to make progress on the MENWFZ. Should Iran succeed in obtaining the capability to develop a nuclear weapon—which it seems bent on doing—the resulting change in power dynamics could be so extreme that Israel might feel obligated to act. Indeed Tel Aviv hasn’t shied away from threatening military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, underscoring its belief that the loss of its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region in the absence of a peace accord may not be something it is willing to countenance. Israel’s anger over the language in the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon only reaffirms this point.

What’s more, yesterday’s attack on the aid convoy bound for Gaza has contributed to further political tension in the region and condemnation of Israel by its neighbors and the international community. This incident also underscores how engaging Israel diplomatically in an effort to disarm its nuclear arsenal will prove increasingly difficult, as well as how the regional political volatility increases the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the region.

While the goal of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as reaffirmed in the NPT RevCon final document is laudable, it is clear that Israel is not yet a willing partner in this effort.  The past few days have witnessed Israel deploy submarines armed with nuclear weapons off the coast of Iran and violate international law by attacking a humanitarian aid convoy in international waters. The time is right for the international community to be firm with Israel and demand cooperation in bringing stability to the region. Let’s cross our fingers for Israel’s participation in, and the success of, the 2012 MENWFZ conference.

The NPT Review Conference’s Focus on a Nuclear Free Middle East

As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) comes to a close in New York, the call for a ban on nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East has come back into the fore as a top issue. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), which exist in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, are zones in which countries commit themselves to not acquire, manufacture, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Article VII of the NPT affirms the rights of countries to establish such zones.  A NWFZ in the Middle East has been on the NPT agenda since the treaty’s entry into force in 1970. Since the 1995 NPT RevCon, the goal has been more adamantly pursued by Egypt, but still to no visible avail.

Nevertheless, the start of this year’s NPT RevCon saw the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China all voice unequivocal support for the initiative— with ample support from states in the region too.  The Arab Group has stated that failing to achieve it would be a failure of the NPT as a whole.  While some view a NWFZ in the Middle East as a lofty, far-off, or even impossible goal, there is no denying the worth it would have.

The implications of the initiative are clear. Israel, not just Iran, would have to foreswear nuclear weapons.

Israel’s program is controversial for numerous reasons.  First, Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapons capability, officially maintaining that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region.  Second, as one of the only countries in the world to have ever carried out preemptive attacks on nascent nuclear programs (for example in Iraq and Syria), Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is often viewed as particularly hypocritical. Finally, in defiance of numerous requests and resolutions issued by the General Assembly of the UN which call on Israel to join the NPT, Israel nevertheless continues to refuse. This places it in the not so select company of Pakistan, North Korea, and India.

The situation is further complicated by instability in the region and the ongoing peace process- the progress of which will be consequential in determining the success of disarmament efforts (a belief supported by the current U.S. administration). Many Arab states and Iran view Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to their security and the stability of the region. Moreover, they view the removal of Israel’s arsenal as a precondition to lasting peace in the region. Israel, however, tends to view peace as a precondition to any disarmament or reduction in force levels, claiming it needs a strong defense to defend against “hostile” neighbors. Iran’s nascent nuclear program, coupled with Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric, lend credence to Israel’s argument.

This deadlock implies neither the situation for disarmament nor the situation for peace exists; and yet, it is evident that the current situation is not sustainable.

It is thus encouraging that on the eve of the close of the NPT RevCon, leaders are hustling to reach a compromise on how to establish the NWFZ. Egypt has submitted working papers that outline tangible steps towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and is leading a movement—now seconded by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon- to create a conference to specifically address the establishment of a Mideast NWFZ. Meanwhile, U.S. and Egyptian senior officials are attempting to secure Israel’s attendance at this conference. Tomorrow evening will reveal if they succeed.

If a final document is agreed to, it will likely call for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Important as these steps are, there are other challenging steps that must be taken if these goals are to be achieved.  

For example, Israel will have to make dialogue and diplomacy a more important part of their foreign policy, as opposed to military threats, and will have to withdraw from the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the Arab states and Iran must acknowledge Israel’s existence as a state, and respect its sovereignty accordingly. This involves, for example, the cessation of rockets fired from Southern Lebanon by Iranian sponsored Shi’a Hezbollah militants.

Achieving the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East will be taxing and perplexing at each level of the process – but it will be well worth the effort.  It is encouraging to hear that representatives at the NPT RevCon appear up for the task. We can only hope they will begin to make progress.

Israel and the Nuclear Security Summit

Last week Israel’s Prime Minister announced his decision to cancel abruptly his appearance at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.  Israeli officials suggested that Netanyahu scuttled the trip due to fears that a group of Arab states might have used the conference to demand Israel sign up to the Non Proliferation Treaty.  At a time when Israel continues to lobby allies to punish Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program, such focus on its own program would have made it a target for criticism.  And in the context of nuclear terrorism, this criticism seems increasingly valid.  

Netanyahu’s attendance at the summit would have been unprecedented.  He would have been the first Israeli premier ever to participate in discussions on nuclear issues.  It’s also a subject he is knowledgeable about, having written specifically about it in his book, ‘Fighting Terrorism’.  And it’s a subject that is particularly relevant for Israel, since historically it has been a frequent victim of terrorist attacks.

That Israeli adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and possibly Syria have all at one stage or another pursued nuclear weapons illustrates two things.  First, it suggests that the deterrence Israel supposedly gains from its opaque nuclear posture has done little to stop its adversaries from pursuing nuclear weapons.  Secondly, it’s possible that Israel’s nuclear program may have actually motivated some of these programs, or at least served as a convenient excuse for programs which may have gone ahead regardless of Israel’s nuclear status.  The more nuclear programs there are in the region, particularly if they are pursued clandestinely, the greater the risk that materials could be diverted – with or without permission – to radical groups..  

Egypt’s 1990 call for a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction ought now to be reviewed again.  The proposals would prohibit the 22 nations that make up the Arab League plus Israel and Iran from possessing all forms of WMD – whether nuclear, biological or chemical.  They would also oblige intrusive procedures to guarantee full compliance, allowing for no exception to the agreement.  

This idea was endorsed in the Resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as a way of getting Middle Eastern states to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty at a time when they were becoming increasingly frustrated by Israel’s nuclear posture.  If established, not only would it reduce the potential for catastrophic war in the region, but the proposal would also have the added benefit of minimizing the risk that terrorists might one day acquire fissile materials that could be used in an attack.

As Zeev Maoz suggested in his 2003 study questioning the security value of Israel’s nuclear program, ‘in return for greater regional security, Israel must give up its nuclear weapons’.  Indeed, if it’s serious about reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, the pursuit of a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction should become a priority goal for Israel.  In light of its vast conventional superiority and strong ties with the U.S, Israel is in a position to denuclearize as part of this policy, so long as every other state in the region is not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.  

In contrast, attempting to escape criticism wherever possible, while reprimanding others for IAEA non-compliance, seems an unlikely way to reduce the potential for nuclear proliferation in the region – and thus the threat of nuclear terrorism.

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