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Rethinking Nuclear South Asia: The Arms Race in India and Pakistan

On Wednesday, November 27, Pakistan test-fired the Ghauri ballistic missile (also known as the Hatf-V), which has a reported range of 810 miles. This isn’t game-changing news in itself, as the Ghauri was first tested back in 1998, and Pakistan has conducted seven other missile tests this year alone. Still, the recent test is a reminder that South Asia increasingly looks to be a more volatile nuclear flashpoint than Iran or North Korea.

Here’s a telling fact: the Ghauri missile that was tested this week is named after Afghan king Shahbuddin Ghauri, who conquered parts of India in the 12th century and established Muslim rule there. If that isn’t enough symbolism for you, consider this: the Ghauriwas specifically developed to counter India’s Prithvi missile – and Prithvi Raj Chauhan was the name of the Hindu ruler that Ghauri conquered.

The symbolic naming of the missiles tells us a lot about the underlying intensity of the India-Pakistan conflict, described just this week by Yale professor Paul Bracken as a “problem from hell.” Discussions about Pakistan among Western experts often revolve around the potential for Pakistani weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists, given the Pakistani government’s instability and its ties to terrorist groups. In 2010, a study by Harvard University’s Belfer Centre highlighted the nuclear terrorism danger, arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal “faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.”

But in focusing on terrorism, are we overlooking the broader problem of the nuclear standoff in South Asia? In September, Tom Hundley argued in Foreign Policy that perhaps we should be more worried about a South Asian nuclear arms race than we are about loose Pakistani nukes. Hundley pointed out that the situation on the subcontinent in some ways poses a greater risk than the US-USSR Cold War standoff – unlike the US and the USSR, India and Pakistan are in close geographic proximity, have already fought a number of wars, and haven’t put in place crisis-management measures like the Moscow-Washington hotline.  

Such concerns echo those of Stimson Center co-founder Michael Krepon, a South Asia expert who has been arguing for some time that South Asia is an exceptional case because of the presence of extremist groups, the lack of joint efforts at counter-proliferation (such as arms control treaties), and the added factor of neighboring China, which is a main focus of India’s security concerns.

Indeed, recent shifts in the two states’ military and nuclear doctrines point to the distinctive nature of the South Asian arms race. In the early 2000s, India established its controversial “Cold Start” doctrine, which allowed for retaliation against terrorist attacks through conventional strikes on the India-Pakistan border. Cold Start was developed specifically in response to the Pakistani-backed attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.

In other words, the doctrine is the unique product of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorist activity and the fact that India and Pakistan are neighbors. And although some observers have pointed out that we shouldn’t overstate the importance of Cold Start, the fact is that it played right into what some have called Pakistan’s “paranoid” national security calculus. Cold Start led Pakistan to place a greater strategic emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons.

There’s a lesson here for analysts in addition to “pay closer attention to South Asia.” More broadly, it’s important to keep in mind the limits of conventional frames when it comes to India and Pakistan. Comparisons with the US and the USSR only take us so far, and the common notion of a terrorist-rogue regime nexus isn’t the whole story, either. Yet at the same time, the Cold War should remind us of the dangers of overreliance on nuclear weapons and a mutually escalatory military posture. Moreover, the experience of the US-USSR standoff offers lessons about joint efforts at de-escalation and crisis management, such as arms treaties, the Incident at Sea agreement of 1972, and, of course, the famous hotline. We would all be wise to critically evaluate the narratives that inform our thinking on South Asia – not just every few months when a missile is fired, but in a sustained way that allows us to address this pressing challenge to global security.  

Fact Sheet: Fifteen Foreign-Policy Challenges For the Next President

By Usha Sahay, Rachel Murawski, and Eve Hunter The October 22 presidential debate on national security will cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israel and Iran, China, the Middle East, as well as the general issue of “America’s role in the world.” These issues have made headlines in 2012, and been prominent on the campaign trail. But, […]

Pakistan rapidly increasing arsenal, still says no to FMCT

Last week the public learned a few new things about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The size of its deployed stockpile is now estimated to be more than 100 weapons.  It also is believed to possess the nuclear material for somewhere between 40-100 additional weapons, a capability which could make Pakistan the 4th or 5th largest nuclear weapon state – surpassing both France and the United Kingdom .

As David Sanger and Eric Schmitt pointed out in the New York Times and Karen DeYoung in the above article in the Washington Post—Pakistan’s nuclear-lust is a challenge to the twin goals of prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and reducing nuclear stockpiles globally.

Pakistan is the only country publically opposing the beginning of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the 65-nation UN Conference of Disarmament (CD). Their chief concern is India and the disparity between the two country’s arsenals. Even though, the latest estimates suggest that Pakistan may have more weapons than India. New Delhi does have the capacity to produce more weapons due to a larger fissile material stockpile.  

Clearly Pakistan has more than enough weapons and material to deter any potential nuclear threat from India. But, as Daryl Kimball stated in the October 2010 edition of Arms Control Today, “Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT likely will not be alleviated as long as India’s production potential remains greater.” Note production potential. It is negligible that Pakistan has more weapons now. India can, at any time, increase the size of its arsenal and Pakistan sees that potential as a threat–even more so now because of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which could give India even more added potential to produce bombs.

Most observers are in agreement that this will not be an easy task. Still, there is a lot that can be done to lay the groundwork for future negotiations and to put added pressure on Pakistan to change its thinking.  Kimball laid out some of the options in the Arms Control piece above.  So long as Pakistan and India continue their quest to build more bombs, it is only a matter of time before a FMCT will have to be pursued outside the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

U.S.-India Nuclear Ties: More Exceptions & Inconsistencies?

U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to India last week undoubtedly carried a message pointed straight at China. By underlining the importance of and building strategic partnerships with Beijing’s regional rivals, the apparent objective is to bring down China’s role and growing influence amid a bilateral dispute over the yuan’s exchange rate. Where does India fit in? It’s seen as a counterweight to China and the two countries have been long-time competitors. All this, on top of the obvious U.S. objective to deepen relations with the world’s largest democracy, a big security partner on counter-terrorism, and enormous market on which American businesses can thrive. So, it’s apparent that Washington is treating India as a responsible power and ally to American interests after having never been regarded as a possible ally in the second half of the 20th century.  National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon told reporters on Air Force One, “President Obama intends this trip to be — and intends our policy to be — a full embrace of India’s rise.”

Yes, the world and international relationships are constantly evolving, so policies should be crafted (sometimes revised) to fit new realities of the time and the future. However, on the nuclear front, we must remember some facts from history, near and distant, as well as the implications. Click “read more.”

Key facts:
1. Recall that the Bush administration signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India in 2008, which undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since New Delhi is not an NPT-signatory. It also made it harder for the U.S. to be strict with other countries in future civilian nuclear agreements.

2. Recall that the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that same year awarded India with an exemption by lifting an embargo on nuclear trade with New Delhi. This embargo was put in place immediately following India’s nuclear test of 1974, the same year the NSG was formed. The waiver was granted based on India’s promise to abide by strict non-proliferation policy (still without signing the NPT) and in recognition of its energy needs. The waiver allows India to buy uranium for its existing reactors along with technologies to reprocess spent fuel and reduce radioactive waste (a process that also can help build nuclear bombs). However, this also opens the door for India to use the uranium for nuclear devices. It’s important to remember that India is the only non-NPT country to enjoy such a perk. Basically, the waiver recognizes India, which is outside the NPT, as a “nuclear weapons state” – a term and status that is strictly given to NPT members.

President Obama in November 2009 re-affirmed U.S. commitment for “the early and full implementation of our civil nuclear cooperation agreement [with India]… The lifting of U.S. export controls on high technology exports to India will open vast opportunities for giant research and development efforts.  It will enable U.S. industry to benefit from the rapid economic and technological transformation that is now underway in our country.”

His recent trip ignited a wave of news articles from the Indian press about Washington’s plans to support New Delhi’s full membership in the nuclear club and other multilateral export control regimes (NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement). Again, India is relying on the U.S. for successful entry, and reiterated its strong commitment to non-proliferation ahead of Obama’s trip.

Concerns in a nutshell:
1. India is not a signatory of the NPT, which means, it is not held accountable by the international non-proliferation regime.

2. India has signed the Additional Protocol (a good thing) and put its existing and future civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (another good thing), but international inspectors cannot touch New Delhi’s military nuclear facilities. India also retains the right to designate a reactor as “civilian” or “military” (not good things).

3. India has agreed to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and to strengthen the security of its existing nuclear arsenals. However, nothing exists to prevent it from carrying out nuclear weapons tests.  The 2008 NSG decision has made it more difficult to persuade India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stop producing weapons-usable fissile materials.

4. Exceptions and inconsistencies: The plan for India’s entry into the NSG and export control regimes appears to be in phases. Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Froman reportedly said “As the membership criteria of these four regimes evolve, we intend to support India’s full membership in them. And at the same time, India will take steps to fully adopt the regime’s export control requirements to reflect its prospective membership.” NSG membership rules (as well as the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement) are currently linked to the NPT. But the U.S. and India appear to be working towards transcending the existing non-proliferation regime. Froman said the U.S. would “encourage the evolution of a membership criteria of these regimes consistent with maintaining their core principles” while a senior Indian official said, “We are constructing a paradigm beyond the NPT.”

CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 185 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation […]