Lt. General (ret. USA) Robert Gard Jr. PhD, Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, stressed, “Even if the North Koreans engage in provocative behavior that should not dissuade us from engaging them.”
North Korea’s Successful Rocket Launch
By: Duyeon Kim An already intractable problem just became more complicated, although it was much anticipated. On December 12, 2012, at approximately 9:51 a.m. KST, North Korea launched another Unha-3 long-range rocket-satellite with success. An earlier launch of the same rocket failed in April. In a noon broadcast by its state-run TV, Pyongyang announced that […]
North Korea Launches Rocket/Missile
Just moments ago, a beaming North Korean state-run TV announcer proclaimed a successful rocket launch on their noon show (10pm EST). They’re claiming to have successfully launched a satellite into orbit. South Korea’s Defense Ministry confirmed Pyongyang’s first and second stages of its rocket were split successfully. Key capitols are assessing the situation.
We can expect Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington to react sternly although Washington hasn’t released a statement yet. We can also expect the UN Security Council to convene Wednesday at around 11a.m. and discuss passing a resolution (i.e. sanctions) or another president’s statement. After North Korea’s April launch, the UN Security Council President’s statement included a “trigger” clause – this laid the foundation for a swift sanctions resolution for future missile launches and nuclear tests. For more, see my analysis in Arms Control Today after Pyongyang’s April rocket launch.
If this test was successful, it has grave security implications. Pyongyang claims it’s a rocket for peaceful scientific purposes while the world sees it as a veiled attempt to mate a nuclear warhead onto an inter-continental ballistic missile that could hit the U.S. homeland.
The latest launch comes days before the South Korea’s December 19th presidential elections and it’s unclear whether it would affect votes. Until now, both conservative and liberal presidential candidates had expressed willingness to engage Pyongyang. The launch also comes against the backdrop of the North’s “mighty and prosperous nation” year, and just days before the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011.
U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement: “North Korea has once again defied the United Nations, its Six-Party partners, and the world by launching a long-range rocket under the guise of a so-called ‘satellite test.'”
Stay tuned for more.
Rethinking Nuclear South Asia: The Arms Race in India and Pakistan
On Wednesday, November 27, Pakistan test-fired the Ghauri ballistic missile (also known as the Hatf-V), which has a reported range of 810 miles. This isn’t game-changing news in itself, as the Ghauri was first tested back in 1998, and Pakistan has conducted seven other missile tests this year alone. Still, the recent test is a reminder that South Asia increasingly looks to be a more volatile nuclear flashpoint than Iran or North Korea.
Here’s a telling fact: the Ghauri missile that was tested this week is named after Afghan king Shahbuddin Ghauri, who conquered parts of India in the 12th century and established Muslim rule there. If that isn’t enough symbolism for you, consider this: the Ghauriwas specifically developed to counter India’s Prithvi missile – and Prithvi Raj Chauhan was the name of the Hindu ruler that Ghauri conquered.
The symbolic naming of the missiles tells us a lot about the underlying intensity of the India-Pakistan conflict, described just this week by Yale professor Paul Bracken as a “problem from hell.” Discussions about Pakistan among Western experts often revolve around the potential for Pakistani weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists, given the Pakistani government’s instability and its ties to terrorist groups. In 2010, a study by Harvard University’s Belfer Centre highlighted the nuclear terrorism danger, arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal “faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.”
But in focusing on terrorism, are we overlooking the broader problem of the nuclear standoff in South Asia? In September, Tom Hundley argued in Foreign Policy that perhaps we should be more worried about a South Asian nuclear arms race than we are about loose Pakistani nukes. Hundley pointed out that the situation on the subcontinent in some ways poses a greater risk than the US-USSR Cold War standoff – unlike the US and the USSR, India and Pakistan are in close geographic proximity, have already fought a number of wars, and haven’t put in place crisis-management measures like the Moscow-Washington hotline.
Such concerns echo those of Stimson Center co-founder Michael Krepon, a South Asia expert who has been arguing for some time that South Asia is an exceptional case because of the presence of extremist groups, the lack of joint efforts at counter-proliferation (such as arms control treaties), and the added factor of neighboring China, which is a main focus of India’s security concerns.
Indeed, recent shifts in the two states’ military and nuclear doctrines point to the distinctive nature of the South Asian arms race. In the early 2000s, India established its controversial “Cold Start” doctrine, which allowed for retaliation against terrorist attacks through conventional strikes on the India-Pakistan border. Cold Start was developed specifically in response to the Pakistani-backed attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.
In other words, the doctrine is the unique product of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorist activity and the fact that India and Pakistan are neighbors. And although some observers have pointed out that we shouldn’t overstate the importance of Cold Start, the fact is that it played right into what some have called Pakistan’s “paranoid” national security calculus. Cold Start led Pakistan to place a greater strategic emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons.
There’s a lesson here for analysts in addition to “pay closer attention to South Asia.” More broadly, it’s important to keep in mind the limits of conventional frames when it comes to India and Pakistan. Comparisons with the US and the USSR only take us so far, and the common notion of a terrorist-rogue regime nexus isn’t the whole story, either. Yet at the same time, the Cold War should remind us of the dangers of overreliance on nuclear weapons and a mutually escalatory military posture. Moreover, the experience of the US-USSR standoff offers lessons about joint efforts at de-escalation and crisis management, such as arms treaties, the Incident at Sea agreement of 1972, and, of course, the famous hotline. We would all be wise to critically evaluate the narratives that inform our thinking on South Asia – not just every few months when a missile is fired, but in a sustained way that allows us to address this pressing challenge to global security.
Another Secret Pyongyang Trip, Missile Prep & Nuclear Reactor Construction…?
Three bits of news and some quick, initial thoughts:
1. 2nd Secret Trip to Pyongyang…?
The plot thickens. White House officials reportedly made another top secret trip to Pyongyang on August 17th aboard a U.S. military aircraft from Guam, according to Korea’s Donga Ilbo newspaper (Korean language link) citing diplomatic sources. If true, it would be the second such trip this year since the April day-trip that came one week before Pyongyang launched its long-range rocket, but this time for a four-day visit. Donga Ilbo reports the aircraft took the same route as the one in April but this time notified Chinese officials beforehand.
News broke mid-afternoon yesterday (Nov. 28th U.S. time), and so began the Sherlock Holmes investigation. Cryptic diplomatic responses – NCND (neither confirm nor deny) – by senior officials from several capitols both reported and not reported in the news and point to clearer signs that there actually might have been another top secret trip. As Donga Ilbo reported, the August trip (if true) may have been for risk management ahead of the U.S. presidential elections. Perhaps it was follow-up of April’s meeting, and perhaps there was some mentioning of what steps a second Obama administration might be willing to take. At the same time, the trip was an extremely politically risky 007 action taken because it was so close to the elections with no clear indication who would sit in the oval office.
2. North Korean Missile Launch…?
It’s been widely reported that Pyongyang appears to be gearing up for another missile launch with the possible aim of influencing South Korea’s December 19th presidential elections. We just don’t know for sure with North Korea, but there’s another scenario that seems to have been missed in the broader public discourse. The “target” of North Korean missiles is the U.S., not South Korea, so it can be assessed that missile prep and/or launches are a message to the U.S. Assuming the August 17th top secret trip to Pyongyang is true, and assuming some “deal” was struck (however big or small), then the latest missile preparation movements could be a message reminding the Obama administration to keep its word in the next term. While maintaining technical readiness, Pyongyang may not have made a political decision to launch a missile yet – it may wait until the Obama administration completes its transition, watch Washington’s next steps, and then decide to launch if it is unhappy. The current weather may not be attractive for a missile launch, and they usually struggle with the weather even during clearer seasons like the spring and summer. That’s one scenario, but of course, when it comes to North Korea, no one really knows with any certainty — they may very well launch in December. Multiple launches would help help perfect the North’s missile technology, but we should also remember that Pyongyang’s provocations are also contingent upon timing and circumstance whether it’s for domestic or international motivations.
3. Progress at New Nuclear Reactor?
The Chicago Tribune quotes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Yukiya Amano that North Korea “has continued construction of the light water reactor and largely completed work on the exterior of the main buildings” but the IAEA “remains unable to determine the reactor’s design features or the likely date for its commissioning.”
Amano said: “While the agency continues to monitor the reported uranium enrichment facility, using satellite imagery, its configuration and operational status cannot be established.”
Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and IAEA monitors have been denied on-site access.
In a nutshell: More movements resonating from North Korea in the months to come can be expected. It is critical that all members of the Six Party Talks coordinate stances early and are in sync if and when Pyongyang unleashes another provocation amid political transitions in key countries next year.