In their new article on ForeignPolicy.com, Lynn Klotz and Edward Sylvester argue that the race to develop countermeasures to biological weapons might have actually increased the probability of a bioterrorist attack and made it more difficult to achieve the kind of international cooperation that can truly reduce this threat.
Reducing Biological Risks to Security: International Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration
In recent years, the U.S. government has strengthened its national preparedness and response capabilities for catastrophic disease events, including bioterrorism. But it has paid inadequate attention to prevention and response measures internationally. The Obama Administration can change course, correct this deficit, and take strong action to reduce biological risks to security.
Weaknesses in Primary Health Care Threaten Public Health Security and Stability
In the last two decades there has been a notable shift toward short-term curative and emergency medical care. As Alan Pearson and Jason Haile explain in this new policy brief, however, this increasing focus on treating specific diseases too often further diverts funding and resources away from the development of robust health care systems – systems that must be in place to effectively respond to a public health crisis like a biological weapons attack.
Statement at the 2008 Meeting of Experts on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and its Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons delivered this statement at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on August 19, 2008.
Alan Pearson Blogs Live from the 2008 Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts
Despite the death of Bruce Ivins, the man the FBI claims is solely responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, questions about the largest biological attack carried out on U.S. soil still remain. What are the big picture implications for our nation’s security from biological attacks? What can be done to strengthen the oversight of national biodefense programs and dual-use research in the life sciences? Starting Monday, August 18, Alan Pearson, the Center’s Director of Biological and Chemical Weapons Prevention, will blog from a major international UN conference addressing some of these very issues.