In the end, there is no magic wand that will bring us biosecurity. Every reasonable, cost-effective approach must be employed, from biodefense to international transparency to ethical education of scientists and involvement of the public.
Biological Threats: A Matter of Balance
In the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Center’s Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons Control argues that the Graham-Talent WMD Commission exaggerates the bioterrorist threat and proposes solutions that won’t produce the comprehensive approach needed to strengthen public health security.
Biohazard: Why U.S. Bioterror Research Is More Dangerous Than Bioterrorism
In their new article on ForeignPolicy.com, Lynn Klotz and Edward Sylvester argue that the race to develop countermeasures to biological weapons might have actually increased the probability of a bioterrorist attack and made it more difficult to achieve the kind of international cooperation that can truly reduce this threat.
Reducing Biological Risks to Security: International Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration
In recent years, the U.S. government has strengthened its national preparedness and response capabilities for catastrophic disease events, including bioterrorism. But it has paid inadequate attention to prevention and response measures internationally. The Obama Administration can change course, correct this deficit, and take strong action to reduce biological risks to security.
Weaknesses in Primary Health Care Threaten Public Health Security and Stability
In the last two decades there has been a notable shift toward short-term curative and emergency medical care. As Alan Pearson and Jason Haile explain in this new policy brief, however, this increasing focus on treating specific diseases too often further diverts funding and resources away from the development of robust health care systems – systems that must be in place to effectively respond to a public health crisis like a biological weapons attack.
