In this analysis, Alan Pearson participates in a roundtable discussion, hosted by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, about the impact of scientific advances at the intersection of chemistry and biology and ways to discourage their application for the development of new substances designed to incapacitate or kill.
‘Appalling Gap’ in Homeland Security Raises Concerns
A recent report issued by the congressionally-mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves concluded that there is an “appalling gap” in our readiness to defend ourselves against a catastrophic event within our borders.
Background on Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
Historically, bioterrorism threat and risk assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities, consequences, and technology-centric approaches which focus on low-probability high-consequence worst-case scenarios.
Casting a Wider Net for Countermeasure R&D Funding Decisions
Senior Science Fellow Lynn Klotz calls for public debate of policy determinations that he says privilege funding and resources for biodefense over that for naturally occurring infectious diseases and a potential influenza pandemic.
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril?
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons provides a comprehensive survey of the scientific, military, humanitarian, legal and political issues associated with the development and use of incapacitating biochemical weapons.
