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You are here: Home / Archives for Front and Center

February 12, 2010

Ahmadinejad Declares Iran a Nuclear State on Anniversary of Islamic Revolution

Less than a week after declaring to the international community that Iran was increasing its uranium enrichment from 3.5 to 20 percent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that the efforts were successful and that Iran should be considered among the nuclear countries of the world.  

Making his declaration at an event in Azadi Square in Tehran to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad insisted that the uranium enriched to 20% was for peaceful purposes.  “The Iranian nation is brave enough that if one day we wanted to build nuclear bombs, we would announce it publicly without being afraid of you,” he told the crowd assembled for the observation of the anniversary.  

Uranium enriched to 20% U235 is considered highly enriched uranium that could be further enriched with relative ease to make a nuclear weapon.  Iran claims that the enriched uranium will be used in a research reactor to produce medical isotopes.  Tehran backed away from an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium outside the country, raising concerns that Iran’s intentions may not be as benign as it is making them out to be…

There is consensus among nuclear experts that, while Iran does have the capacity to enrich uranium to 20%, the amount that could have been produced by the time of Ahmadinejad’s announcement is negligible.  The International Atomic Energy Commission suggested that Iran’s increased enrichment efforts are only modest to this point, though David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security suggested that at the rate Iran plans to produce 20%-HEU, it may have enough HEU in three years to further enrich enough material for one nuclear weapon.

The announcement of Iran’s intention to increase the level of uranium enrichment, and the later claims of success, was met with an announcement by the United States Treasury Department of further “smart sanctions” against a handful of Iranian construction companies affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard allegedly involved in weapons production and trade.

There is also talk of a fourth round of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.  Russia — which has historically been less enthusiastic about sanctions than the United States, the United Kingdom, and France — has indicated that they might support further sanctions.  The international community seems increasingly dubious of Iran’s denial of intent to develop a nuclear bomb.  However, China remains reluctant to impose new sanctions and may thwart attempts by the UN Security Council to tighten the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.

In light of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s sudden announcement of scaling up mere days before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, one cannot help but wonder if Ahmadinejad’s triumphant proclamation was an attempt to flex muscle to an increasingly vocal and active opposition and an international community sympathetic to the anti-government activists and increasingly distrustful of the aims of Iran’s nuclear program.  

All steps adopted by the United States and the international community should be careful to avoid undermining the pro-democracy opposition movement in Iran. The international community should continue strong and active diplomatic engagement with Iran, and impose sanctions only so long as they are targeted and designed to minimize the burden on the civilian population.  Calls for aggression and military intervention should be turned aside; the consequences of such escalation on both the stability and security of the region and on the civilian population would be catastrophic.

At the same time, the international community must continue to implore Iran to be more transparent with the IAEA about its intentions and grant it greater access to suspected nuclear-related information and facilities.  Iran should know that its plans to increase enrichment will only increase concerns over its nuclear program, especially since it rejected an earlier international offer to further enrich its low-enriched uranium in France and Russia.

Patience, careful monitoring and involvement by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and persistent diplomatic engagement by Western powers will not guarantee success but is the only sensible option to try to block Iran’s nuclear weapons plans.

Posted in: Front and Center, Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 8, 2010

Jon Stewart: "The problem seems to be the weapon."

Long-time readers of NoH know that Jon Stewart has been a big fan of ours for some time.

Last week Stewart once again sported his nuke policy wonk credentials in an interview with Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly. Below is a brief excerpt from the exchange on nukes, which occurred in the context of O’Reilly vetting Stewart for a hypothetical O’Reilly-Stewart ’12 ticket.  A transcript of the full conversation can be read here. Or watch it beginning at the 1:22 mark of the embedded video.

O’REILLY: All right, let’s go to Iran. If you’re my VP, I’m going to have to put you in charge of very delicate negotiations. Now Iran’s building, you know, nuclear weapons over there. And if they get them, they might give them to some guy named Ahmed, who might take then to them Cleveland and blow everything up. So what are we going to do with that?

STEWART: Well, doesn’t Pakistan have a nuclear weapon?

O’REILLY: Yes, they do.

STEWART: Well, couldn’t they give it to somebody?

O’REILLY: I don’t know. I don’t think…

STEWART: Doesn’t Russia have nuclear weapons?

O’REILLY: Russia does.

STEWART: Couldn’t they give it to somebody?

O’REILLY: They could.

STEWART: The problem isn’t the country that gets them. The problem seems to be the weapon.” [emphasis mine.]

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 5, 2010

More juvenile behavior from Pyongyang?

The DPRK on Sunday announced five new ‘no sail zones’ on both its east and west coast, raising concerns in the South that Pyonyang may be gearing up for more short-range ballistic missile tests.  

North Korea’s last round of short-range missile launches in October were passed off by many observers as evidence of Pyonyang’s ‘two-track’ strategy of asserting strength whilst trying to bring the Obama administration back to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue.  So was last week’s artillery barrage near the ROK border.  References to bargaining chips, double standards and even ‘the juvenile behavior of a teenager’ continue to pepper analysis of most North Korean belligerency.   As North-South relations warm with talk of a possible summit between Kim Jong-Il and President Lee Myung-bak, any tests in the next few days will no doubt also be explained in similar terms.  However, should we accept this conventional wisdom…

Whilst North Korea is mainly known for its SCUD-derivative Hwasong, Rodong and Taepodong series of ballistic missiles, its October 2009 tests involved suspected KN-02 missile technology.  Like the rest of the North Korean missile program, the KN-02 is based on old Soviet technology (in this case the reverse engineered 9K79 Tochka provided to North Korea by Syria in 1996).  However, what separates the the KN-02 from the rest of the North’s missile arsenal is that it uses solid-fuel, is more accurate than the notoriously inaccurate SCUD derivatives, and is road mobile.  The KN-02 allegedly also flies a cruise missile profile, making it difficult for PATRIOT missile batteries located in South Korea to intercept.  If fired from close enough to the DMZ, it could target U.S. military installations in the ROK.

Given the success of previous KN-02 tests, it is somewhat notable that all five of last October’s tests were considered failures.  Whilst the North is well known for shortcomings in its long-range missile program, it is regarded as being relatively accomplished in the area of short- and medium-range missile design.  Consequently, could the October tests have been experimental tests of enhanced KN-02 technology?  

Bruce Bennett of RAND suggests that “North Korea may well be testing some different fuel, engine, or other missile variations, perhaps preparing to apply the KN-02 technology to a larger missile.’  Bennett notes that the missiles flew further, or at least in a manner which suggested they had a longer range (130km – 160km), than previously expected.  Interestingly, these tests also came just twenty days after Iran’s very own short range, solid-fuel missile tests.  Was this just coincidence or evidence of another Iran-DPRK missile cooperation project?

If the failed October 2009 tests do represent Pyonyang’s attempt to further enhance its KN-02 technology, then it’s likely that any short-range launches in the next few days will involve the testing of more KN-02 derivatives.  Given the last round of KN-02 tests received a somewhat muted diplomatic reaction, its possible that further tests might also get brushed off merely as attention grabbing behavior.  Consequently Pyonyang could get away with enhancing its firepower without damaging its ever-improving relations with the South.  The finished product may too become a hit on the export market; small enough to hide in a van and seemingly light enough to transport by small aircraft.  

Given current food shortages it would seemingly take a lot more than just juvenile behavior for Pyonyang to ban its own fishing trawlers from so many of its waters.    Further tests should therefore be understood as being motivated by more than just an attempt to gain international attention.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 4, 2010

Belgian Airbase with U.S. Nuclear Weapons Toured by Uninivited Peace Activists

Can Secretary Gates fire Belgian Ministry of Defense officials too?  Via the Federation of American Scientists, it appears that last week some peace activists with a video-camera managed to infiltrate Kleine Brogel Air Base, which happens to house 10-20 U.S. B61 non-strategic gravity bombs.

Watch the incredible video here. Apparently they even managed to stroll by the aircraft shelters beneath which are believed to be the vaults that house our nukes before they were apprehended by base security.

The incident reminded me of something Jeffrey highlighted at the Carnegie Endowment last September:

And if I think there’s – the dominant – the dominant character I would say of the existence of those weapons in Europe is that we don’t talk about them. I think NATO countries have been incredibly reluctant to make the public case about why they need U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. And as a result, because there is no public case, I think you see a corresponding lack of funding for security at the sites at which the European allies provide security, and you see a corresponding lack of investment in dual-capable aircraft. And NATO’s aircraft are getting quite old, and we’re coming up to a series of decision points.

…

[B]ecause there is no support, I worry very much about a singularity, an event. It could be a security event. Our friends from Peace Action, Belgium, could get in the wire with a cell phone and take a picture of a [sic] vault. It could be a very ugly public debate about certifying a particular new aircraft for nuclear weapons. It could be a debate about deploying refurbished B-61s on airbases.

I do worry that something could happen that will deny NATO its preferred option of not talking about this, and then force the participants into a very ugly public debate in which the result would be the rapid, disorganized, uncoordinated withdrawal of the weapons amidst recriminations. And to me that would be much worse than beginning the dialogue about what the optimal posture is and whether that includes weapons.[emphasis mine.]

Well, they didn’t get pictures of the vault per se, but close enough! It will be interesting to see what, if any, impact this incident has on the debate about U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, extended deterrence, and the future of the B61.

UPDATE 2/4: Jeffrey has some more thoughts on the incident here.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

February 4, 2010

Always Look on the Bright Si…ide of Life

In case you haven’t heard, the President’s FY 2011 budget request was released this week.

For a full report, see my budget briefing book online.  

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, which begins on October 1, 2010, the Obama Administration has requested a base budget of $548.9 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). This is approximately $18 billion, or 3.4 percent, above FY 2010 appropriations.

In addition, the administration has requested $159.3 billion to support Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which brings the FY 2011 defense budget request to a total of $708.3 billion.

Including an expected $33 billion in supplemental appropriations, the planned percent increase in total DoD spending for FY 2011 will be 2.1 percent over FY 2010.

Adjusted for inflation this amounts to a $9 billion, or 1.3 percent, increase over FY 2010.

In addition to an initial $708 billion, the administration has requested $18 billion for nuclear weapons activities at DoE and $7 billion for additional non-DoD defense related activities. This brings total non-DoD defense related spending (053/054) to a total of $25 billion, a $2 billion increase over FY 2010.

Though the numbers are large, particularly compared to non-military discretionary spending, let’s look at the bright side of things…

First, the increases requested are significantly lower than during the Bush years, when the DoD’s base budget grew at a steady increase of 4.3 percent (after adjusting for inflation) each year.

Last year, Secretary Gates led a (mostly) successful effort to cut wasteful spending out of the defense budget, eliminating the F-22 Raptor, Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), CSAR-X Helicopter, and Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and reducing the funding for Future Combat Systems (FCS).

This year he’s back for more.

Once again, the DoD has recommended cuts of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Extra Engine and the C-17 Globemaster Strategic Airlift Aircraft, which were blocked from elimination by Congress in FY 2010.  In addition, the DoD will look to cut the CG(X) Cruiser, Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS), and Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC) and delay funding for the LCC-R and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

These cuts could amount to billions of dollars in savings if they are successful.  So look on the bright side, even though the numbers continue to rise, at least the quality of the programs at DoD will (theoretically) rise as well.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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