The DPRK on Sunday announced five new ‘no sail zones’ on both its east and west coast, raising concerns in the South that Pyonyang may be gearing up for more short-range ballistic missile tests.  

North Korea’s last round of short-range missile launches in October were passed off by many observers as evidence of Pyonyang’s ‘two-track’ strategy of asserting strength whilst trying to bring the Obama administration back to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue.  So was last week’s artillery barrage near the ROK border.  References to bargaining chips, double standards and even ‘the juvenile behavior of a teenager’ continue to pepper analysis of most North Korean belligerency.   As North-South relations warm with talk of a possible summit between Kim Jong-Il and President Lee Myung-bak, any tests in the next few days will no doubt also be explained in similar terms.  However, should we accept this conventional wisdom…

Whilst North Korea is mainly known for its SCUD-derivative Hwasong, Rodong and Taepodong series of ballistic missiles, its October 2009 tests involved suspected KN-02 missile technology.  Like the rest of the North Korean missile program, the KN-02 is based on old Soviet technology (in this case the reverse engineered 9K79 Tochka provided to North Korea by Syria in 1996).  However, what separates the the KN-02 from the rest of the North’s missile arsenal is that it uses solid-fuel, is more accurate than the notoriously inaccurate SCUD derivatives, and is road mobile.  The KN-02 allegedly also flies a cruise missile profile, making it difficult for PATRIOT missile batteries located in South Korea to intercept.  If fired from close enough to the DMZ, it could target U.S. military installations in the ROK.

Given the success of previous KN-02 tests, it is somewhat notable that all five of last October’s tests were considered failures.  Whilst the North is well known for shortcomings in its long-range missile program, it is regarded as being relatively accomplished in the area of short- and medium-range missile design.  Consequently, could the October tests have been experimental tests of enhanced KN-02 technology?  

Bruce Bennett of RAND suggests that “North Korea may well be testing some different fuel, engine, or other missile variations, perhaps preparing to apply the KN-02 technology to a larger missile.’  Bennett notes that the missiles flew further, or at least in a manner which suggested they had a longer range (130km – 160km), than previously expected.  Interestingly, these tests also came just twenty days after Iran’s very own short range, solid-fuel missile tests.  Was this just coincidence or evidence of another Iran-DPRK missile cooperation project?

If the failed October 2009 tests do represent Pyonyang’s attempt to further enhance its KN-02 technology, then it’s likely that any short-range launches in the next few days will involve the testing of more KN-02 derivatives.  Given the last round of KN-02 tests received a somewhat muted diplomatic reaction, its possible that further tests might also get brushed off merely as attention grabbing behavior.  Consequently Pyonyang could get away with enhancing its firepower without damaging its ever-improving relations with the South.  The finished product may too become a hit on the export market; small enough to hide in a van and seemingly light enough to transport by small aircraft.  

Given current food shortages it would seemingly take a lot more than just juvenile behavior for Pyonyang to ban its own fishing trawlers from so many of its waters.    Further tests should therefore be understood as being motivated by more than just an attempt to gain international attention.

Can Secretary Gates fire Belgian Ministry of Defense officials too?  Via the Federation of American Scientists, it appears that last week some peace activists with a video-camera managed to infiltrate Kleine Brogel Air Base, which happens to house 10-20 U.S. B61 non-strategic gravity bombs.

Watch the incredible video here. Apparently they even managed to stroll by the aircraft shelters beneath which are believed to be the vaults that house our nukes before they were apprehended by base security.

The incident reminded me of something Jeffrey highlighted at the Carnegie Endowment last September:

And if I think there’s – the dominant – the dominant character I would say of the existence of those weapons in Europe is that we don’t talk about them. I think NATO countries have been incredibly reluctant to make the public case about why they need U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. And as a result, because there is no public case, I think you see a corresponding lack of funding for security at the sites at which the European allies provide security, and you see a corresponding lack of investment in dual-capable aircraft. And NATO’s aircraft are getting quite old, and we’re coming up to a series of decision points.

…

[B]ecause there is no support, I worry very much about a singularity, an event. It could be a security event. Our friends from Peace Action, Belgium, could get in the wire with a cell phone and take a picture of a [sic] vault. It could be a very ugly public debate about certifying a particular new aircraft for nuclear weapons. It could be a debate about deploying refurbished B-61s on airbases.

I do worry that something could happen that will deny NATO its preferred option of not talking about this, and then force the participants into a very ugly public debate in which the result would be the rapid, disorganized, uncoordinated withdrawal of the weapons amidst recriminations. And to me that would be much worse than beginning the dialogue about what the optimal posture is and whether that includes weapons.[emphasis mine.]

Well, they didn’t get pictures of the vault per se, but close enough! It will be interesting to see what, if any, impact this incident has on the debate about U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, extended deterrence, and the future of the B61.

UPDATE 2/4: Jeffrey has some more thoughts on the incident here.

In case you haven’t heard, the President’s FY 2011 budget request was released this week.

For a full report, see my budget briefing book online.  

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, which begins on October 1, 2010, the Obama Administration has requested a base budget of $548.9 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). This is approximately $18 billion, or 3.4 percent, above FY 2010 appropriations.

In addition, the administration has requested $159.3 billion to support Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which brings the FY 2011 defense budget request to a total of $708.3 billion.

Including an expected $33 billion in supplemental appropriations, the planned percent increase in total DoD spending for FY 2011 will be 2.1 percent over FY 2010.

Adjusted for inflation this amounts to a $9 billion, or 1.3 percent, increase over FY 2010.

In addition to an initial $708 billion, the administration has requested $18 billion for nuclear weapons activities at DoE and $7 billion for additional non-DoD defense related activities. This brings total non-DoD defense related spending (053/054) to a total of $25 billion, a $2 billion increase over FY 2010.

Though the numbers are large, particularly compared to non-military discretionary spending, let’s look at the bright side of things…

First, the increases requested are significantly lower than during the Bush years, when the DoD’s base budget grew at a steady increase of 4.3 percent (after adjusting for inflation) each year.

Last year, Secretary Gates led a (mostly) successful effort to cut wasteful spending out of the defense budget, eliminating the F-22 Raptor, Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), CSAR-X Helicopter, and Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and reducing the funding for Future Combat Systems (FCS).

This year he’s back for more.

Once again, the DoD has recommended cuts of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Extra Engine and the C-17 Globemaster Strategic Airlift Aircraft, which were blocked from elimination by Congress in FY 2010.  In addition, the DoD will look to cut the CG(X) Cruiser, Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS), and Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC) and delay funding for the LCC-R and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

These cuts could amount to billions of dollars in savings if they are successful.  So look on the bright side, even though the numbers continue to rise, at least the quality of the programs at DoD will (theoretically) rise as well.

While the results of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) have yet to be released, we can be sure that at least one decision has already been made: Full steam ahead on a major refurbishment study for the B61 gravity bomb.  

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s FY 2011 budget, released yesterday, includes $251.6 million for the B61 Phase 6.2/6.2A design definition and cost study, an increase of nearly $220 million over what Congress appropriated for FY 2010.  As I had suspected, last year’s request of $60 million and Congressional appropriation of $32.5 million for a non-nuclear refurbishment study turned out to be a mere placeholder that paved the way for a much larger request (and likely appropriation) for a full nuclear and non-nuclear study this year.  NNSA describes the purpose of the study as follows:

A few things stand out here…

This year’s budget request for the B61 is absolutely massive.  I went back and had a look at the requests for the RRW and the largest request was for about $88.7 million in FY 2008.  It kind of makes me wonder if a “study” is all the NNSA is asking for.

A central purpose of the LEP is to consolidate the different mods of the B61 into a single mod (often referred to as the B61-12).  By way of background, the B61 is a family of dual-purpose tactical/strategic weapons, the first of which entered the stockpile in 1968.  There are currently two strategic (the mod 7 and 11) and three non-strategic versions (the mod 3, 4, and 10) of the B61 in the U.S. arsenal.  This would give STRATCOM and the Air Force the flexibility to use the new mod in different capacities, largely wiping out the strategic/non-strategic distinction that currently defines the existing mods.

In explaining the massive increase in requested funding for the B61 LEP, NNSA states that it is necessary to “ensure continued support for our extended nuclear deterrence commitment.”  I take this to mean that NNSA thinks the U.S. will need to keep B61s on European soil for the foreseeable future (Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen estimate that approximately 200 B61-3s and 4s are deployed at six bases in the five European NATO countries).  If this is also the recommendation of the NPR, I hope it at least acknowledges the views of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and our NATO allies on the continued European deployment (though I’m not holding my breath).  It also wouldn’t hurt if the NPR also recommended consolidating our remaining weapons in Europe at a smaller number of (say one or two) U.S. bases.  

As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [i.e. nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.”  Likewise this year NATO is conducting a review of its Strategic Concept.  As part of this review, our NATO partners will surely address this continued European deployment.  The Belgian Senate has unanimously called for the withdrawal of the B61s from Europe, while the German Foreign Minister also recently called for their removal.  And yesterday the foreign minister of Poland co-authored an op-ed in the New York Times proclaiming that “The time has come to cover sub-strategic nuclear weapons with an arms control regime, which would look like the one that was established long ago for strategic arms.”

Will NNSA be able to ensure that tinkering with the nuclear explosive package to enhance surety will not violate the new Stockpile Management Programs’ requirement that any changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile can only be made if they further reduce the need for nuclear weapons testing?  Questions remain as to whether this is possible.  Last year’s Energy and Water Appropriations Bill called for a study (upon completion of the Nuclear Posture Review) “by the JASON Defense Advisory Group examining whether the planned B61-12 can be expected, without nuclear testing, to offer sufficient margin and other advantages as to constitute a long-term 21st Century weapon, or whether it is more likely to be an interim weapon leading to near-term replacement or retirement, and to recommend any additional research that may be needed to make an informed decision on this matter.”

Will Congress be able to roll back funding for the proposed LEP and/or limit funding to a non-nuclear LEP only as it did last year?  Two key factors will make such an effort more difficult this year.  First, the Obama administration is deeply committed to demonstrating its commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.  The B61 LEP is a key part of that effort.  Second, the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, which took the lead in seeking to reduce funding for the B61 LEP last year as well as the RRW in 2007 and 2008, staked its opposition on the fact that the U.S. did not have an overarching nuclear strategy outlining why such programs were necessary.  Once the Nuclear Posture Review is released on March 1, we will have such a strategy.    

Chalk up another Republican endorsement for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Last Friday former Utah Republican Senator Jake Garn called on the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty.  Said Garn:

Today, one of our greatest security interests is to discourage nuclear weapons testing by others. A global verifiable ban on testing would help block the ability of nuclear-armed countries, such as China, to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapon test explosions, could-be nuclear-armed nations — like Iran — would not be able to proof test the smaller, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs that could be used to arm ballistic missiles.

Evidence that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has some pretty sensible views on nuclear weapons continues to pour in.  Last week Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reaffirmed the DPJ’s commitment to Japan’s three nonnuclear principles.  Meanwhile, in an end of the year letter to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada stated that the Japanese diplomats who told the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that the TLAM-N is a key piece of the U.S. extended deterrent to Japan might have gone a little overboard.  According to Okada:

Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, it was never the case that views were expressed as being those of our government concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, in some tentative way such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.

In a speech on European Security at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris Secretary of State Clinton reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.  She also commented on the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.  On the Review Clinton noted: we are conducting a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to chart a new course that strengthens deterrence and reassurance for the United States and our allies while reducing the role and number of the nuclear weapons we have.  How exactly this tightrope will be walked will be revealed (as of now) on March 1.