An article in the Washington Independent today, in which I’m quoted, points to one – particularly glaring – problem with President Obama’s proposed spending freeze: Why does the proposal exclude defense spending?

From the piece, by Spencer Ackerman:

But while Obama did not rule out future defense cuts in the speech, many of these defense wonks could not understand why an effort at deficit reduction would explicitly exclude defense spending. “Defense spending is over half our discretionary spending,” Olson said. “It would be crazy not to include it. It begs the question whether this is a real effort.” Shortly before the speech, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), the speaker of the House, told reporters that any spending freeze ought to include defense spending.

[snip]

Still, Todd Harrison, an defense-budget analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said he believed the combination of massive defense budgets, massive federal deficits and a weak economy would inevitably compel Congress and the president to cut defense. “It’s likely in the future that everything will come under pressure, defense included,” Harrison said. But he conceded that a variable in that calculation is “political will” for such cuts — which is not in evidence in either the White House or, especially, the Congress, which loves to send defense money back home to individual states and districts.

Also today, Fred Kaplan writes that, “If some Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep in 1982, woken up in 2009, and looked at the U.S. military budget as an indicator of what was going on in the world, he would assume that the Cold War were still raging.”  He notes that, while every aspect of the Pentagon’s budget should not be subject to a spending freeze, there is certainly a large chunk that should.

The second of occasional postings
Guest Post by Afghanistan Ag Man

As it stands today, much of Afghanistan is at risk of experiencing a spring and summer drought on a scale not seen in over a decade. Agriculturally, the full impact of a continued lack of precipitation will not reach its apex until the planting season begins in February and March; however, the security ramifications of a lack of snow for the Integrated Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in the country have already been felt…

Last Monday, Taliban suicide bombers and militants stormed the usually peaceful Pashtunistan Square in downtown Kabul. Even before this attack, those of us on the ground have been discussing the abnormality of intense violence during the winter months. In recent years, one of the few similarities between traditional wars of the past in Afghanistan and the current unconventional conflict had been that a change of climatic seasons was usually accompanied by a change in the pace of the conflict. Unfortunately, this winter has been different.

Violence has increased dramatically during a season that is typically a time for troops and insurgents alike to pause, plan, and wait for the traditional “fighting season” to commence again when the snow melts off in the spring.  New York Times reporter Rod Nordland notes that insurgents have remained in the war theater this winter due to a number of factors, including a stronger Afghanistan-Pakistan border (which prevents insurgents from filtering back into Pakistan) and the growth of American troops levels throughout 2009.  To give a personal example, the troops of my outpost are finding undetonated improvised explosion devices (IEDs) at abnormally high rates, rocket attacks continue to target our convoys and outpost, and missions are usually prefaced by security intelligence reports warning of heavy Taliban activity in the area.

Eastern Provinces are fighting off insurgents at levels usually seen only in the Southern Provinces while violence is prevalent in both the countryside and in Kabul. ISAF casualty rates for the past three months have all increased compared to previous late fall and winter months. And this January, which is not yet over, has surpassed all monthly casualty reports for previous January combat action since 2001.  As the number of troops is set to continue to increase in 2010, so too will the opportunities for insurgents to mount attacks against our forces. NATO predicts increased IED attacks for 2010.

In my view the lack of snowfall has exacerbated the increase in violence. Since my arrival in late November, there has been one night of notable precipitation in my region which added only a few inches to the now-absent snowpack. A deforested, mountainous terrain of at least 8000 feet in elevation that is usually blanketed by an average of three to five feet of snow currently contains little or no snow.

Even though the privates and sergeants in my unit like to rib me when I promote the relationship between snowpack and instability, I do find merit to my argument. Without cold weather and snow to keep insurgents in caves (where they “plot,” instead of “act”), there will be more violence in the streets and fields, even during the winter months.

In addition, while the risks of a water shortage due to the absence of snowpack will not impact the common farmer when his trees are dormant and his fields are fallow, the consequences in the spring growing season and throughout the summer’s crucial pre-harvest period could be devastating for the development efforts we are trying to implement. With unemployment rates at record levels, the only alternatives for an unskilled, illiterate farmer put out of work by poor crop yields will be to join the Taliban in fighting coalition forces and/or  turn to the production of poppy, which requires far less water than, say, wheat. Needless to say, the ramifications of a drought on the outcome and success of the new counterinsurgency strategy that is currently being implemented would be huge.

Do I think this winter violence is a sign of a strengthening insurgency? No. Instead, I see this as a sign of a desperate one. The US and its allies have committed additional troops and have proportionally increased their civilian and financial presence in the country. To give another personal example, development and capacity building projects in the realm of agriculture are underway earlier than expected in the countryside. Examples include vocational trainings on reforestation, orchard management best-practices, and watershed/irrigation rehabilitation, to road construction projects that will facilitate the movement of goods from farm-to-market in the fall.  The Taliban has reason to feel threatened by this progress and it is no wonder that they are mounting a last-ditch effort to thwart the Afghan people’s efforts.

I think we can prevent the insurgents from succeeding.

Last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates hosted a meeting with top defense company executives for the first time since 2008, where he stressed the need for a closer partnership and pledged to work with the White House to “secure steady growth in the Pentagon’s budgets over time.”

Steady growth seems likely, since recent reports indicate that the President’s upcoming defense budget request will increase from $636.3 billion to a record $708 billion in FY 2011. This number does not include an additional $33 billion in supplemental appropriations, set to fund the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  But although Gates has called for ‘steady’ growth, he has also vowed to kill many unneeded and troubled programs.  

Last week, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn reiterated the criteria that senior Pentagon leaders have used to determine which weapon programs will be cut or curtailed in FY 2011: “Our criteria for exercising program discipline are clear: programs that are performing poorly, either over budget or behind schedule or delivering less capability than promised, open themselves up to reconsideration.”

In addition, Reuters reports that, “it looks like mounting public concern about federal spending and the sharply widening budget deficit are likely to curb the ability of lawmakers to pump money back into programs targeted for termination as they have in the past.”

Draft budget documents obtained this week show Gates is seeking to end seven weapons programs in FY 2011, including two that were rescued from the eight-item kill list last year — Boeing Co’s C-17 transport plane and a second engine for Lockheed Martin Corp’s F-35 fighter jet.

Other new terminations are less surprising, including a new Navy cruiser and a program to replace the Navy’s EP-3 surveillance plane, while some programs, such as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, an amphibious vehicle being developed for the Marine Corps by General Dynamics Corp that has experienced problems in the past, have apparently escaped the axe, at least for now.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review and FY 2011 budget request will be released one week from today.  Until then, the speculation continues.

Pavel Podvig flags a quote from a Russian Ministry of Defense source that the RS-24, a multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27, could begin to be deployed in 2011, after one or two more flight tests.  Russia had originally planned to deploy the missile in December 2009 to coincide with the expiration of START.  Are development/testing problems slowing things down?  It wouldn’t be the first time.  Another theory is that the delay might have something to do with the New START negotiations.  In a recent article published on the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ website (and written before the Ministry of Defense source announced the delay),  Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, Director of the Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow opined that:

[W]hen in November 2009 the Ministry of Defense disclosed new deployments of the Topol M, it did not mention the RS-24. Nor did the ministry announce any plans to deploy them in 2010.

The decision could be explained by various reasons, from economic to purely technical. But it might also be possible that the inaction reflects the Kremlin’s desire not to complicate the situation further at a time that the self-imposed deadline for completing the new [START] agreement had already been missed. If this supposition is accurate, it would demonstrate Moscow’s continuing interest in concluding a follow-on treaty.

Continuing on the topic of delays, Global Security Newswire’s Elaine Grossman reports that further refurbishment of the B-61 air-delivered gravity bomb is being delayed by Congress, at least for the time-being.  NoH was all over this back in October when the conference report on the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill was completed.  Recall that NNSA’s initial funding request last February was only enough to study a non-nuclear refurbishment of the B61.  However, if Gen. Chilton’s now (in)famous briefing slides on the B61 are any indication, STRATCOM definitely wants to tinker around with the weapon’s nuclear explosive package, specifically to enhance Surety.  If the Nuclear Posture Review rules in favor of the B61, we can probably expect funding to be requested and approved to look at the explosive package.

Finally, a couple of duck hunters caused quite a stir last Friday as they tried to set up some decoys on a piece of land near the Pantex Plant, which assembles and disassembles our nuclear weapons.  On a sorta related note, Duck Hunt is hands down the greatest Nintendo game of all time.              

In a recent op-ed attacking the New START negotiations, The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen argues, among other things, that the U.S. should not reduce its nuclear arsenal unless Russia agrees to reduce it’s enormous stockpile of nonstrategic (i.e. tactical) nuclear weapons.  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that Russia deploys approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, while another 3,300 are kept in reserve or are awaiting dismantlement. The U.S. deploys approximately 500 tactical nuclear weapons, 200 of which are believed to be deployed in Europe.

The emphasis Cohen puts on tactical weapons is unfounded for several reasons…

1. The Bush administration did not include tactical nuclear weapons in its 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia.

2. The bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States did not make the first round of arms reduction talks with Russia contingent upon reductions in Russia’s substantial arsenal of tactical weapons.  

3. Tactical nukes are an important issue deserving of attention (and concern), as they are particularly vulnerable to attack or theft by terrorists.  However, there is not enough time to address them during this round of arms reduction talks.  Doing so would only complicate the negotiations.  There is no reason to deal with tactical nuclear weapons now, unless, of course, your goal is to significantly delay the completion of the START follow-on agreement.

4. Holding off on dealing with tactical nuclear weapons at this time will not endanger U.S. security. Russian strategic weapons clearly pose the greater danger to the United States.  Moreover, a closer look at the arsenals of tactical weapons possessed by the U.S. and Russia reveals that the huge Russian advantage cited by Cohen may not be that much of an advantage at all.

5. Tactical nukes are certainly a substantial hurdle to achieving Obama’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.  However, the issue should be addressed in the next round of arms reductions talks.  Completion and ratification of the START follow-on agreement in a timely fashion will ensure that the U.S. and Russian can begin negotiations on deeper arms reductions, which should include verifiable reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.  Significant progress on disarmament is difficult to achieve, but approaching the matter in a phased manner can achieve meaningful results.  

For more on Russian tactical nuclear weapons, see here, here, and here.