Click here to see the whole Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Spending Request Briefing Book.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, which begins on October 1, 2012, the Obama Administration has requested a base budget of $525.4 billion.  This represents a $5.1 billion, or approximately 1 percent, decrease from the FY12 base budget approved by Congress.  

In addition, the Administration has requested $88.5 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), to continue to fight the wars overseas. This is $26.6 billion decrease from the amount enacted last year, $115.1 billion, and brings the FY13 defense budget request to a total of $613.9 billion.

These numbers do not include nuclear weapons related spending in the Department of Energy (DOE) or other defense related funding.  In addition to an initial $613.9 billion for the Pentagon’s base budget and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Administration has requested approximately $17.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities at Department of Energy and $7.2 billion for additional non-Pentagon defense related activities.

This brings total Pentagon defense related spending to approximately $639 billion, a nominal decrease of about $30.7 billion below FY12, largely due to savings from the war in Afghanistan and the end of the war in Iraq.

Though we won’t know for sure until the fiscal year 2013 budget is released on February 13, reports suggest that the Obama administration has decided to delay construction of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s multi-billion dollar facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF). I recently wrote a piece on this topic titled, “The Case Against Increasing Plutonium Pit Production Capacity.”

The key findings are:

1. While the CMRR-NF will be used for a range of activities, it can also be used to support an increase plutonium pit production capacity.

2. The Obama administration Nuclear Posture Review endorsed the Bush administration’s concept of a responsive infrastructure, restating that new nuclear warhead production facilities will serve as a “hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.”

3. By the time of its scheduled completion date of 2024, most nuclear weapons in the arsenal will have already been refurbished or in the middle of a refurbishment.

4. Increased capacity would inhibit opportunities for increasing security by altering perceptions about the U.S. commitment to reductions or disarmament.

5.  Given the potential risks involved, the current budget environment presents an opportunity for Congress to reevaluate whether it is necessary to move ahead with this facility.

You can read the entire piece here.

It has been over 15 years since the Conference on Disarmament has played a significant role in developing multilateral arms control treaties and disarmament agreements. Even the Conference’s most recent success, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, was not adopted before being sent to the United Nations General Assembly. Other efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or a Space Preservation Treaty have stalled in the recent past.

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller has acknowledged that the continuing reliance on consensus at the Conference on Disarmament has proven ineffective – a single party of the 65-member body can prevent the entire Conference from moving forward on issues critical to international peace and security. Nevertheless, she highlighted the United States’ commitment to securing the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as well as the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as essential steps toward global nuclear disarmament.

It is time for alternative venues for negotiation on these issues to be seriously considered. The Australian-Japanese International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has indicated that the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty may be brought before the General Assembly, but this would likely stall under Chinese pressure.

One precedent that could be followed is that of the Ottawa Treaty, which resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Frustrated by the lack of progress in Geneva, the Canadian Foreign Minister invited like-minded nations to sign a treaty banning anti-personnel land mines. This kind of creative approach could be emulated in the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Deciding on a new forum and restarting negotiations could help to build momentum toward creating a viable treaty. Australia, Japan, Canada, and/or others should take the lead and begin to examine how a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty could be negotiated before the end of the decade.

Such an outpouring of international support, as has been enjoyed by the Ottawa Treaty, must convince Congress and the Obama administration of the importance of negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and convincing allies and partners of the merits of international cooperation on the issue. The Conference on Disarmament has been riding on the coat-tails of the previous successes of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Preventing the further production of weapons-usable fissile material should become a top priority of the international community – someone just needs to step up and lead the way.

In his testimony in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing last week entitled “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. updated Congress on the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and its relevance for U.S. national security.

While Clapper’s statement that it is possible that perceived threats from the United States could encourage Iranian terrorists to seek targets on American soil grabbed most of the headlines, his testimony is an important counter to the alarmist reaction about Iran’s capabilities and intentions that has been permeating the country over the last few weeks.

In his prepared statement, Clapper acknowledged that while “Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, […] we do not know […] if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

Clapper did not disguise the fact that Iran appears to be developing the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons. He claims that “Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so.”

This is a critical distinction. Clapper went on to add that an Iranian decision to pursue nuclear weapons is not inevitable.

When asked by Senator Wyden (D-OR) if he agreed with the assessment that Iran would be willing to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability only in the event that said pursuit threatened the regime’s political security within the country, Director Clapper repeated an assessment that also appears in his prepared testimony:

This means that if the international community creates conditions under which a nuclear weapons program would bring greater harm to the Iranian regime than it would security, it is possible that its own cost-benefit analysis will lead Iran to abandon that program. Clapper pointed to the sanctions that have already been implemented, saying he was hopeful that they would reduce Iran’s apparent pursuit of a nuclear capability.

The fundamental goal in solving the Iran dilemma must be to make a compelling case for the Iranian government to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. This is most likely to work through a combination of targeted economic sanctions and aggressive diplomacy. In fact, the military leadership of the United States agrees that a military strike on Iran would be the worst option to pursue, and recommend exhausting all other options before even considering a strike.

Perhaps the most surprising component of Clapper’s assessment was the claim that, “some Iranian officials – probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.” However, while this may seem alarming, it also makes clear that it is up to the United States to assume a firm, but flexible position with Iran. Given that Iran most fears regime change, overt military threats from the United States (and especially Israel) do little to make the regime feel secure enough to engage diplomatically with the U.S.

In the days since the hearing, President Obama has downplayed Clapper’s assessment of Iranian capabilities, saying “We don’t see any evidence that they have those intentions or capabilities right now.”

To see the full hearing, including Clapper’s brief oral remarks and the questions from the Senators for the witnesses, you can follow this link

The concept of delivering a conventional warhead anywhere in the world within an hour has been discussed since the Bush administration. Conventional prompt (formally global) strike may help reduce the role of nuclear weapons, acting as a substitute against some targets where existing conventional forces are incapable of attacking quickly but nuclear weapons are inappropriate. It is intended as a niche capability to be deployed only in extraordinary circumstances.

Congress ended one such proposal, designed to replace the nuclear warheads on Trident D5 missiles with conventional munitions, by cutting all funding for the Conventional Trident Modification program in the Fiscal Year 2007, 2008, and 2009 budgets.  

At a press conference previewing the Fiscal Year 2013 defense budget request, Secretary Panetta announced plans to move forward with a similar plan that would use intermediate-range (1800-3500 miles) ballistic missiles without allaying the concerns which left previous efforts dead in the water. We will not know for certain how much the Department of Defense plans to allocate to this new program until the budget is released in another week.

One of the primary concerns among experts and Members of Congress has been that any weapon carried by a ballistic missile (conventionally armed or not) could be misinterpreted by Russia or China (or India or Pakistan, depending on where they are launched or headed) as a nuclear attack. Then-President Putin said during his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly of Russia that:

“The launch of such a missile [a conventionally armed ballistic missile] could provoke an inappropriate response from one of the nuclear powers, could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey noted at the budget preview that by depressing the trajectory of conventional strike weapons, there would be no issues with discrimination between conventional- and nuclear–armed ballistic missiles. How the Russians will be able to tell a conventional missile with a depressed trajectory from a nuclear missile with a depressed trajectory has not adequately been addressed.

The Pentagon has sought ways to deliver a conventional payload via a means of delivery that doesn’t follow the trajectory of a ballistic missile throughout its entire flight. Research on hypersonic glide vehicles has sought to match the speed of a ballistic missile with the in-flight maneuverability of a cruise missile. These weapons have frequently failed during previous tests, calling into question the efficacy of continuing to fund such programs, especially in the face of other glaring problems.

A significant flaw of prompt conventional strike is that in order to strike a target within one hour’s notice you need precise intelligence. Such intelligence is often extremely difficult to come by. Missile strikes against suspected targets in the past have frequently failed to achieve the expected results. Furthermore, the use of shorter range missiles for the prompt conventional strike mission means that they must already be in position to launch against a target, lest the ability to launch promptly is lost as the weapon is transited in range of the target.  

In the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, conventional prompt strike research and development was estimated to cost over $2 billion through Fiscal Year 2015. Congress appropriated $180 million for prompt global strike development in Fiscal Year 2012, with $10 million of that amount ear-marked for the Navy’s newest intermediate range concept. Though prompt conventional strike may be intended to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, the costs (including the danger of inadvertently starting World War III) hardly seem worth the limited benefits.

For an excellent summary of conventional prompt global strike plans and programs, check out Amy Woolf’s Congressional Research Service report here.